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THE FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE:
A TALE OF TWO CONCEPTS
David H. Taylor *
INTRODUCTION
The forum selection clause, a contractual designation as to where any litiga-
tion that may occur in regard to the contract should take place,I appears to be a
rather simple concept. Though simple, the forum selection clause presents an
opportunity to serve both private and judicial interests of economy and ef-
ficency. 2 In the face of expansive notions of personal jurisdiction and venue, the
clause can serve private commercial interests by allowing a party to limit its
expenses of defending a lawsuit in a distant forum. By determining in advance
where litigation should take place, parties can anticipate the costs of litigation in
a contractually designated forum and consider those costs in determining their
substantive rights and obligations under a contract. Additionally, the forum se-
lection clause would seem to reduce litigation expenses and conserve judicial
resources by obviating the need for pre-trial motions relative to the propriety of
the action proceeding in the forum of filing.3
The attainment of these worthy goals by such a simple device prompted the
Supreme Court in 1972 to reverse a longstanding American judicial antipathy4
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sity; J.D., 1980, Washington University (St. Louis). This article was written with support from a
summer research grant provided by the Northern Illinois University College of Law. The author
wishes to acknowledge the helpful efforts of research assistants Deborah Menas and Timothy
Rigsbee.
I. This definition of the forum selection clause is generalized. As will be discussed, the forum
selection clause has been considered at various times to include notions of venue, subject matter
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and choice of law concerns in determining where and how litiga-
tion relative to a contract will take place. A precise definition of the concept is the subject of this
article.
2. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure,
25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 51, 51-52 (1992) (forum selection clauses "have many virtues" among them
"orderliness and predictability in contractual relationships," and "obviating a potentially costly
struggle" over jurisdiction and venue at the outset of litigation).
3. The goals of reducing litigation costs and conserving judicial resources have been largely
illusory, as enforcement of the forum selection clause has become the object of much litigation.
Therefore, that which was intended to reduce litigation costs has actually served to contribute to
them.
4. Historically, state and federal courts shared the view that the forum selection clause violated
public policy in that enforcement would allow parties to "oust" a court of its jurisdiction. See Insur-
ance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874), containing the famous quotation:
Every citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and to invoke the protec-
tion which all the laws of all those courts may afford him. A man may not barter away...
his freedom, or his substantial rights .... [Aigreements in advance to oust the courts of the
jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.
785
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toward enforcement of the forum selection clause. 5 Since 1972, forum selection
clauses have enjoyed widespread acceptance in federal courts. Unfortunately,
the apparent simplicity of the forum selection clause has proven seductive. In
the rush to embrace it as a tool of commercial and judicial expediency, courts
and commentators have concentrated on the development and application of a
standard for enforcement without first defining exactly what the concept is to
which the standard applies.6 They have merged the concepts of jurisdiction, 7
Id at 451.
This argument against enforcement of forum selection clauses came to be known as the "ouster
doctrine." It applied to situations where a party filed an action in a forum other than that specified
in a forum selection clause, and the defendant sought enforcement of the clause, thereby ousting the
filing forum's jurisdiction. It is in this context that forum selections clauses were first considered for
enforcement. See infra notes 42-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ouster doctrine.
At present, forum selection clauses have been recognized as valid in all but a few states, as well
as in the federal court system. See infra note 316. The scope of this article is limited to a discussion
of forum selection clauses in federal courts.
5. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (forum selection clauses
prima facie valid and enforceable if "reasonable").
6. The struggle with the development of a standard for enforcement for the forum selection
clause has received much attention by commentators. See generally, eg., Patrick J. Borchers, Forum
Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Re-
form, 67 WASH. L. REv. 55, 93 (1992) (Congressional action needed to enforce standards); James T.
Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts, 65 Ky. L.J. 1, 45 (1976)
(courts should consider policy when evaluating forum selection clauses); Michael Gruson, Forum-
Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133,
154 (1982) (forum selection clauses involve state law enforceability issues as well as federal common
law procedural issues); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise
Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 27 Tax. INT'L L.J. 323, 370 (1992) (courts should
consider adhesiveness and unconscionability of contract before enforcing forum selection clauses);
Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Proce-
dure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 291, 372 (1988) (courts must clarify doctrine);
Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 2, at 52-53 (contract principles offer best paradigm
for analyzing forum selection clauses).
7. Forum selection clause controversies are generally raised in a defensive posture. In this
context, an action has been filed in a forum other than that specified by the clause. The defendant
then seeks enforcement of the clause so as to dismiss the action or transfer the action to the contrac-
tual forum. As such, the discussion centers upon whether a court properly having jurisdiction over
the parties should decline to exercise that jurisdiction because of the contractual provision. Forum
selection clauses in this context have been referred to as derogation clauses. See infra notes 32-34
and accompanying text for a discussion of the two different types of forum selection clauses. Most
often, defendants prefer a contractual forum with which they have a close connection or, obviously,
one in which the defendants would not raise an objection to jurisdiction.
To the contrary, forum selection clauses have been referred to as prorogation clauses when they
are raised by a plaintiff in an offensive posture. The question whether forum selection clauses may
confer personal jurisdiction and venue on an otherwise improper forum has seldom been discussed.
See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text noting Court's failure to address this issue. Neverthe-
less, forum selection clauses have been assumed to confer personal jurisdiction and have been relied
upon to do so. See infra note 170. This article posits that the lack of discussion is a principal reason
why the paramenters of the forum selection clause remain ill-defined.
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venue,8 and choice of law9 into the forum selection clause.' 0 Additionally, the
concepts of the forum selection clause and the arbitration clause have been
equated by courts and commentators further adding to the conceptual
confusion. I I
The result of this lack of attention to a conceptual definition of the forum
selection clause is apparent in three Supreme Court opinions that were decided
within a period of twenty years, The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 12 Stewart
v. Ricoh Corp. ,13 and Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, t4 that take two very differ-
ent approaches to enforcement. The first approach, as articulated in The
Bremen and refined in Shute, views the question of enforcement primarily as a
question of contract formation. In The Bremen, a forum selection clause was
held to be prima facie valid and enforceable unless the opposing party could
establish that the clause was "unreasonable."' 5 The second, very different ap-
8. As with personal jurisdiction, when the forum selection clause is considered a matter of
venue, it is most often the focus of litigation in a defensive posture where the defendant seeks to have
the action dismissed or transferred from a forum other than that specified in the contract to the
contractual forum. The reverse situation, or offensive posture, using the clause to confer venue
where it would otherwise not be proper, has not received much discussion. The cases that have
relied upon a clause to confer personal jurisdiction have also considered venue to have been con-
ferred by the clause. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
9. The forum selection clause reorders choice of law issues where an action is filed in other than
the contractual forum. Two situations can occur. First, the court in which the action is filed must
determine whether to apply the law of the forum of filing or the law of the contractual forum.
Second, if the action is transferred to the contractual forum, the transferee court must then deter-
mine whether to apply the law of the contractual forum, or that of the transferor forum as would be
the case in the absence of the forum selection clause. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 4.5, at 215-16 (when defendant moves for transfer transferee court must apply law
that would have been applied by transferor court).
10. See, e.g., Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 2, at 51 ("[florum selection clauses
are also referred to as choice-of-forum clauses, forum clauses, jurisdiction agreements, etc." and for
purposes of article, terms could be used "interchangeably"); id. at 64-69 (preferable to view forum
selection clause as device that confers personal jurisdiction upon designated forum); Alexander
Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters L.P. & Apco, Inc. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 918 (11th Cir. 1989)
(referring to forum selection clauses as "conferral of personal jurisdiction clauses").
11. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) (referring to an arbitration
clause as a "specialized kind of forum selection clause"); Borchers, supra note 6, at 61, 67 (forum
selection clauses and arbitration clauses function similarly); Mullenix, Consensual Adjudicatory Pro-
cedure, supra note 6, at 315 -19 (trilogy of Supreme Court cases affirm notion that arbitration clauses
may dictate forum for dispute).
The concepts are similar in that by an arbitration clause, parties agree to submit to arbitration,
usually in a specified forum. See, eg., Gilmer v. Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1652 (1991)
(arbitration clause binds parties to resolve their disputes in arbitral forum rather than judicial fo-
rum); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229-30 (1987) (same); Mitsub-
ishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (same). There is also
an important difference. An arbitration agreement removes an action from the judicial system and
does not attempt to reorder principles of procedure. See infra note 389 and accompanying text for
further discussion of arbitration agreements.
12. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
13. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
14. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
15. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10. The essence of the "reasonableness standard" was that a
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proach, adopted in Stewart, views enforcement not as a question of contract
formation, but instead as a question of whether the action should be transferred
from a noncontractual forum to the contractual forum depending upon the fac-
tors outlined in the transfer of venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a): convenience
of parties and witnesses and "the interest of justice." 16
That the struggle to construct a standard for enforcement has proven
extremely difficult is best reflected by the fact that the decisions in Stewart,
adopting the "venue/fairness" approach, and Shute, refining The Bremen's "for-
mation/reasonableness" approach, were issued within a three-year period. 17 In
Shute, as in The Bremen, the forum selection clause was enforced under the
contract formation/reasonableness standard if there were no defect in forma-
tion.' 8 On the other hand, the Stewart approach permitted an exercise of judi-
cial discretion based upon factors of fairness that could lead to a refusal of
enforcement in a situation where the forum selection clause would be enforced
under the formation/reasonableness standard. 19
The two approaches to enforcement of forum selection clauses exist because
clause would be enforced unless the clause was unreasonable or unjust, or the product of fraud or
overreaching. Id. at 15. The main justification for enforcement was an attempt to facilitate com-
merce. Id. at 9, 13-15. The reasonableness standard also involved an inquiry as to whether the
forum designated by the contract was so inconvenient as to prevent a party from pursuing its action.
Id. at 18. Nevertheless, the reasonableness standard placed a "heavy burden" upon the party seek-
ing to avoid enforcement of the clause, and the level of inconvenience required to prevent enforce-
ment was rarely achieved in later cases. See, e.g., id. at 1, 15-19. The result was that clauses were
almost never denied enforcement when challenged. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
The Court "refined" the reasonableness standard in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S.
Ct. 1522 (1991). A forum selection clause contained on the back of a passenger cruise ship ticket was
held to be enforceable in a situation that would have seemed to have been excluded from enforce-
ment under the "reasonableness" standard of The Bremen due to the adhesive nature of the contract.
Commentators have decried the Shute decision as opening the door for the routine inclusion of
forum selection clauses in consumer contracts. Mullenix, Carnival Cruise Lines, supra note 6, at
359-60. Additionally, as courts had almost never relied upon the serious inconvenience arm of the
reasonableness test, the "refinement" of Shute may serve to render ineffectual any challenge to en-
forcement based upon formation. See Mullenix, Carnival Cruise Lines, supra note 6, at 359-60.
16. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30. Additionally, the Stewart court apparently shifted the burden from
the party seeking to avoid enforcement, as in The Bremen and Shute, to the party seeking to enforce
the forum selection clause through a transfer motion. See supra notes 247-49, 295 -96 and accompa-
nying text.
17. Though the approaches directly conflict with each other, the Court attempted unsuccess-
fully to distinguish the decisions on the ground that Stewart was a diversity action, while The
Bremen and Shute were actions in admiralty. See supra notes 260-63, 355-57 and accompanying
text.
18. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 29.
19. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30-31. The Stewart Court stated:
Section 1404(a) directs a district court to take account of factors other than those that bear
solely on the parties' private ordering of their affairs. The district court must also weigh in
the balance the convenience of the witnesses and those public-interest factors of systemic
integrity and fairness that, in addition to private concerns, come under the heading of "the
interest of justice." It is conceivable in a particular case for example, that because of these
factors a district court acting under § 1404(a) would refuse to transfer a case not with-
standing the counterweight of a forum selection clause ....
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each addresses a very different underlying conceptual view of the clause. 20
What the Court has not recognized or discussed is that these two very different
approaches toward enforcement have existed since the beginning of the shift
away from judicial repudiation of the clause. 21 In accepting the forum selection
clause as being prima facie valid, The Bremen Court neglected to define which of
the two conceptual views it was adopting.2 2 As a result, the Court has formu-
lated contrasting standards of enforcement, each of which is based upon a differ-
ent underlying conceptual view of the forum selection clause.
The essential difference between these two conceptual views is the extent to
which parties may contractually reorder procedural principles. In Stewart, the
Court's conceptual view was very narrow.23 The Stewart approach involves a
contractual expression of a preference for where venue should lie from among
the possibilities for venue as designated by statute. Enforcement is not routine
but is subject to an exercise of judicial discretion based on principles rooted in
the "interest of justice."' 24 In this view, procedural principles are not privately
reordered. By contrast, the other view, reflected in The Bremen and Shute, is
expansive.25 Parties may confer venue and personal jurisdiction where they see
fit. Enforcement does not depend on the interests of justice, but merely concerns
questions of contract formation. If the contract evidences no defect in forma-
tion, the forum selection clause is enforced. 2 6
Privatization of procedure usually involves removing a controversy from
the system of dispute resolution through litigation in favor of resolution by
means such as arbitration. Nevertheless, the forum selection clause involves a
very different kind of privatization. Instead of removing a case from the litiga-
tion system, it seeks to reorder certain aspects within that system. Depending
on how the forum selection clause is conceptualized, such reordering could im-
20. The approach of The Bremen and Shute contemplates a contractual device by which parties
may confer personal jurisdiction and venue on a court where neither would otherwise be proper. In
short, it allows for parties to privately reorder the procedural framework, and that reordering is free
from judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness. Under the Stewart approach, parties may not re-
order procedural principles but may only seek to select a venue choice from within the existing
procedural framework. That choice is subject to judicial scrutiny for fairness in the consideration of
enforcement.
21. As will be discussed herein, see infra notes 38-41, 81-101 and accompanying text, prior to
The Bremen the minority view that forum selection clauses were not void as contrary to public
policy actually encompassed two distinct approaches as to when a forum selection clause should be
enforced. One view was essentially the prima facie validity approach articulated in The Bremen. The
other approach was to enforce a forum selection clause in situations where deferring to the contrac-
tual forum would be in accordance with the principles of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
That is, considerations of party and forum convenience overrode the plaintiff's choice of forum in
favor of the contractual forum designated by the forum selection clause.
22. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972). See infra notes 178-79 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the failure of the Court to address these different conceptual
views.
23. See supra note 16 and accompanying text for a discussion of Stewart.
24. Stewart v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29-31 (1988). See infra notes 265 -67 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of these interests.
25. See supra note 15 and accompanying text for a discussion of The Bremen and Shute.
26. See infra notes 177-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of this view.
19931
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plicate one or more of several procedural issues: selecting venue, 27 determining
where personal jurisdiction would lie,28 or selecting the applicable law for the
litigation.29 The scope of the conceptualization is critical because procedural
principles do not exist in isolation of each other but instead are interrelated.
When parties are allowed to reorder certain aspects within the procedural frame-
work, the application of related principles may become problematic.
Commentators who have analyzed the opinions and surveyed the judicial
enforcement of the forum selection clause have noted such problems and have
developed categories of issues that are considered unresolved, or perhaps un-
resolvable. 30 Most recently, proposals for legislative action have been made to
resolve those questions.31 Therefore, it is useful to revisit the conceptual history
of the forum selection clause. This reveals a tale of two coexisting, conflicting
conceptual views. The Court has yet to appreciate that the fundamental differ-
ence between these views lies in the extent to which procedural principles may
be privately reordered under each. Although the Court at times has contem-
plated each view in its formulation of a standard of enforcement, neither the
Court nor commentators has analyzed the two conceptual views for the purpose
of determining which reflects the appropriate scope of the forum selection
clause. This article offers that analysis and demonstrates that by defining the
forum selection clause's appropriate scope many of the issues presented by the
Court's considerations of the clause are resolved.
After a brief explanation in Part I of the two contexts in which a forum
selection clause can arise, this article, in Parts II - VI, examines in successive
order the Court's consideration of a standard for enforcement, from the shift
from repudiation to acceptance in the lower courts prior to The Bremen, to the
27. See supra note 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of venue.
28. See supra note 7 and accompanying text for a discussion of personal jurisdiction.
29. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for a discussion of choice of law.
30. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 6, at 78-93 (discussing five categories of "conundrums"
concerning forum selection clauses: "Choice of Law;" "Interpretive Issues;" "Transfer Issues;"
"Subject Matter Jurisdiction Issues;" and "The Reasonableness Test"); Gruson, supra note 6, at 137-
38 (discussing forum selection clause issues in international and interstate contracts); Mullenix, Con-
sensual Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at 296-302 (containing comprehensive examination of
perplexing issues attending forum selection clauses after decisions in The Bremen and Stewart).
31. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 6, at 93-111 (proposing comprehensive federal statute that
would limit enforcement of forum selection clauses to contracts having value of $50,000 or more and
proposing standards for enforcement similar to that of The Bremen); Phoebe Korfeld, The Enforce-
ability of Forum-Selection Clauses After Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corporation, 6 ALASKA
L. REv. 175, 175-76 (1989) (calling for legislation to provide certainty and predictability to enforce-
ment of forum selection clauses in order to promote trade); Leandra Lederman, Note, Viva Zapatal:
Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 422, 432-37 (1991) (arguing that Congress should codify standards for enforcement of The
Bremen and insert into Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), a "Zapata motion" by which party
would seek enforcement of forum selection clause); see also Mullenix, Consensual Adjudicatory Pro-
cedure, supra note 6, at 369-72 (though not calling for legislative action, urging courts to adopt
stricter approach to waiver of civil litigation rights that encompasses due process considerations); cf.
Mullenix, Carnival Cruise Lines, supra note 6, at 359-60 (apparently inspired by decision in Shute,
titled section in her article discussing the case, "Why Forum-Selection Clauses Are a Bad Idea,"
though not addressing need for legislative reform).
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Supreme Court's three pronouncements on the topic in The Bremen, Stewart,
and Shute. It discusses the division reflected in these three opinions between the
two very different views as to what the forum selection clause is, and how and
when it should be enforced. The analysis reveals that, although the view of the
forum selection clause adopted by the Supreme Court in The Bremen and Shute
provides an opportunity for expansive private reordering of existing rules, stat-
utes, and principles of procedure, the Court did not appreciate or analyze the
full extent to which procedural principles would be reordered by the conceptual
view of the forum selection clause that it adopted.
In Part VII, this article discusses that the most sound and preferred concep-
tual view and standard for enforcement of the forum selection clause is the nar-
row conceptual view reflected in the approach of Stewart. The Stewart view, in
short, is that the forum selection clause should be treated as just one factor in
determining where venue should lie. As will be discussed, this is the conceptual
view of the minority circuits that first enforced forum selection clauses prior to
The Bremen. Though a narrow view, it is consistent with the conceptual view of
other consensual procedural mechanisms in that it does not allow for parties
privately to reorder the procedural framework. Additionally, it ensures that the
question of procedural fairness is included in the enforcement analysis.
Part VII also briefly discusses the calls for legislative reform. It argues that
the preferred mechanism for reform is to recognize the standard for enforcement
of Stewart and its underlying conceptualization of the forum selection clause as a
matter of venue considered within the existing procedural framework. If legisla-
tive reform is necessary, adhering to the principle that less is more, this article
proposes legislative reform in terms of a minor revision to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the
federal venue statute and to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the transfer of venue statute.
I. Two CONTEXTS: AN OFFENSIVE AND A DEFENSIVE POSTURE
Forum selection clauses have been described as being either derogation or
prorogation clauses. 32 The derogation clause arises in a defensive posture. It
occurs when a plaintiff files an action in a forum other than that designated by
the forum selection clause. The defendant seeks to have the action either dis-
missed in the forum of filing or transferred to the contractual forum. 33 In this
context, the clause is not relied on to confer personal jurisdiction or venue on the
contractual forum. Instead, it is relied on to deny plaintiff the ability to main-
32. Gilbert, supra note 6, at 5; Mullenix, Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at
329; Solimine, supra note 2, at 53-55.
A clause can be both a derogation and a prorogation clause depending upon the context and the
party utilizing the clause. For example, if a plaintiff files suit in the contractual forum and seeks to
use the clause as a basis for venue and personal jurisdiction over the defendant, it is a prorogation
clause. If plaintiff files suit in a noncontractual forum and defendant seeks to utilize the clause to
have the suit maintained in the contractual forum instead of the forum in which the plaintiff has
commenced the litigation, the same clause is a derogation clause.
33. As will be discussed herein, see infra notes 317-20, the choice of procedural mechanism
employed by a defendant seeking to enforce a forum selection clause when an action is filed in a non-
contractual forum also has served to add to the confusion as to the proper standard for enforcement.
1993]
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tain the action in the noncontractual forum. This is the only context in which
the Supreme Court and the vast majority of lower courts have considered the
forum selection clause. 34 A prorogation clause arises in an offensive posture
when a plaintiff files an action in a forum contractually designated by a forum
selection clause. In this context, the plaintiff may seek to rely on the clause to
determine venue and to confer personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 3 5
Because the Court has not considered the prorogation, or offensive con-
text,36 it has developed a standard for enforcement that only contemplates
whether a clause should be enforced for the purpose of having the case heard
elsewhere. American tradition has not distinguished the prorogation and dero-
gation clauses for purposes of developing a standard of enforcement. 37 Yet, it is
in the prorogation context that the forum selection clause most obviously could
reorder procedural principles by conferring personal jurisdiction and venue on a
court when there is no basis for personal jurisdiction or venue other than the
contractual agreement. Having not had the opportunity to consider the enforce-
ment of a prorogation clause, the Court has not fully or properly defined the
concept for which it has developed a standard for enforcement. In a derogation
context, the rather hands-off approach of the "reasonableness" standard from
The Bremen and Shute may seem the appropriate approach. A court only has to
consider whether it should not hear the case. In the prorogation context, where
a court may have to decide whether to hear a case that has no independent basis
for jurisdiction or venue other than the contractual agreement, the more intru-
sive inquiry of the Stewart approach that contemplates factors of fairness and
convenience seems more appropriate. Until the forum selection clause is prop-
erly conceptualized, a standard for enforcement that is free of the troublesome
34. See Gruson, supra note 6, at 136-37 (litigation usually involves the defendant seeking to
have the proceeding brought in the contractual forum). It was the defendants in The Bremen, Stew-
art, and Shute, who argued for the enforcement of a forum selection clause for the purpose of having
the case not heard in the forum in which the cases were filed. In each, the defendant sought to have
the case heard in the forum designated in a forum selection clause.
National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) is often cited, however, as
being a case that considered a forum selection clause in a prorogation context. See, eg., Borchers,
supra note 6, at 62 (discussing Szukhent as "non-exclusive forum selection agreement"); Solimine,
supra note 2, at 55 (describing Szukhent as "first case" in which Supreme Court "bestowed approval
upon forum-selection clauses"). As discussed herein at infra notes 150-61 and accompanying text,
however, Szukhunt merely involved the validity of an appointment of an agent for service of process
within the context of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3) and should be distinguished from the forum selection
clause cases.
35. See Gruson, supra note 6, at 136 (discussing that "court will look at the forum-selection
clause as a submission to its jurisdiction (by the defendant]").
36. See Solimine, supra note 2, at 65 (acknowledging that "the clauses in The Bremen, Stewart
and Shute did not explicitly waive the minimum contacts barrier [thereby conferring personal juris-
diction]," but arguing that forum selection clause "would not be effective" unless that was in fact
considered to have been done).
37. See Mullenix, Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at 329-32 (civil law sys-
tems recognize difference between prorogative and derogative clauses, but American courts have
not). As discussed herein, American courts might have benefitted if they had at least considered the
prorogation aspects of forum selection clauses when determining a standard of enforcement in the
derogation context.
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issues that have attended the Court's three attempts in The Bremen, Stewart,
and Shute, will remain elusive.
II. BEFORE THE BREMEN: BACK TO THE BEGINNING(S)
Many commentators have discussed the shift in judicial regard toward en-
forcement of forum selection clauses that occurred prior to the decision in The
Bremen. 38 The discussion has centered on how the original antipathy toward
forum selection clauses as an impermissible "ouster" of the jurisdiction of a
court by private parties gradually lessened in some circuits in favor of a standard
of enforcement that inquired as to whether the clause was "reasonable" and
would thus be enforced. Nevertheless, these commentators have failed to recog-
nize that two competing formulations of "reasonableness" developed, based on
differing views of the ability of contracting parties privately to reorder the prin-
ciples of procedure to be applied in any litigation relative to their contract.
Those two formulations of "reasonableness," discussed herein as the "serious
impairment formulation" 39 and the "forum non conveniens formulation," 4° re-
surfaced in and are at the heart of the difference between the contract formation
approach of The Bremen and Shute, and the fairness approach of Stewart.
4 1
By failing to recognize that two conceptual views existed, the Court has not
weighed the relative merits of each in its struggle to determine a standard for
enforcement of the forum selection clause. Not only has the Court not analyzed
the two contrasting formulations, the Court has wavered between the two in its
approach to enforcement in The Bremen and Shute versus that of Stewart.
Therefore, an examination of the two views is useful in sorting out the differ-
ences between the conceptual views embodied in the Supreme Court's considera-
tions of the forum selection clause.
38. See generally G. Merle Bergman, Contractual Restrictions on the Forum, 48 CAL. L. REV.
438, 440-47 (1960); Borchers, supra note 6, at 60-65; Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity
of Contractual Provision Limiting Place or Court in Which Action May be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4th
404, 408-44 (1984); Ingrid M. Farquharson, Choice of Forum Clauses - A Brief Survey of Anglo-
American Law, 8 INT'L LAW. 83, 87-98 (1974); Gilbert, supra note 6, at 11-19; Gruson, supra note
6, at 138-47; Friedrich K. Juenger, Supreme Court Validation of Forum Selection Clauses, 19
WAYNE L. REV. 49, 51-56 (1972); Willis L. M. Reese, The Contractual Forum: Situation in the
United States, 13 AM. J. COMp. L. 187, 187-92 (1964); Nicolas Fernandez, Note, Enforcement of
Forum Selection Clauses in Transnational Contracts - Is Agreement Possible Between the United
States and the European Economic Community?, 3 FLORIDA INT'L L. J. 265, 266-70 (1988); Richard
A. Ganter, Note, Absent Bad Faith, Fraud, or Overreaching, A Reasonable Forum Selection Clause in
a Commercial Cruise Contract is Enforceable, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 505, 511-15 (1992); Leder-
man, supra note 31, at 427-29 (1991); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Comment, Choice-of-Court Clauses in
the United States: The Road to Zapata, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 124, 130-34 (1973); see also Unterweser
Reederei, GMBH Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. Bremen, 428 F.2d. 888, 896-07 (1970) (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting).
39. See infra notes 81-85, 96-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "serious impair-
ment formulation."
40. See infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "forum non convenien
formulation."
41. See infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text for a further discussion.
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A. The Ousting of the Ouster Doctrine
Writing for the majority in The Bremen in 1972, Chief Justice Burger effec-
tively summarized the American view42 toward forum selection clauses of the
previous 100 years: "[florum-selection clauses have historically not been favored
by American courts.' 43 Courts and commentators most often expressed that
disfavor by reciting a passage from the 1875 opinion in Insurance Co. v. Morse:"
Every citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and
to invoke the protection which all the laws or all those courts may
afford him. A man may not barter away his... freedom, or his sub-
stantial rights .... [A]greements in advance to oust the courts of the
jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void. 45
The "ouster doctrine" 46 thus was born and thereafter was relied upon to deny
effect to forum selection clauses as contrary to public policy. 47
Movement away from the ouster doctrine is often said to have been fore-
shadowed twenty-three years prior to the decision in The Bremen in the dicta of
a concurring opinion by Learned Hand in Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co. :48
In truth, I do not believe that today at least, there is an absolute taboo
against such contracts at all; in the words of the Restatement [of Con-
tracts, § 558 (1932)], they are invalid only when unreasonable; and
Mittenthal v. Mascagni is a notable instance in which a contract in
futuro was held "reasonable." What remains of the doctrine is appar-
ently no more than a general hostility, which can be overcome, but
which nevertheless persists.49
In 1960, G. Merle Bergman prophetically warned that this statement could
be interpreted to mean much more than was actually intended by Judge Hand.50
Hand's intention is drawn into question by his language in an opinion nineteen
years prior to Krenger where he stated that it is "well settled" that a clause in a
bill of lading "intended to confine any litigation over the contracts to a French
42. English courts apparently had retracted their antipathy to forum selection clauses nearly
one hundred years earlier and have enforced them thereafter. Zapata Off-Shore, 428 F.2d at 900
n. II (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
43. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
44. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874).
45. Id. at 451.
46. The term "ouster doctrine," or a derivation thereof, has been used almost universally by
commentators. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 6, at 60 (referring to "the ouster doctrine"); Gilbert,
supra note 6, at 8-9 (discussing "ouster"); Fernandez, supra note 38, at 276 (referring to the "com-
mon law ouster rationale"); Solimine, supra note 2, at 54 (referring to "[t]he 'ouster' concept").
47. For a list of cases refusing to enforce forum selection clauses based upon the "ouster doc-
trine," see Dougherty, supra note 38, at 409-11; Gruson, supra note 6, at 138-39 n.14-17.
48. 174 F.2d 556, 560 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J., concurring), cert denied, 338 U.S. 866 (1949).
49. Id. at 561. In Mittenthal v. Mascagni, 66 N.E. 425 (Mass. 1903), a forum selection clause
specifying the courts of Florence, Italy, was held to be enforceable as reasonable under the circum-
stances. It was not until nearly 50 years later that enforcement began to be seen in more than an
isolated incident.
50. Bergman, supra note 38, at 440.
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court" would not be valid. 51 Though one commentator has stated that the ap-
parent about-face by Learned Hand indicates the rapid change in the judicial
view of forum selection clauses, 52 Bergman's observations that the statement by
Hand could be taken to mean much more than he actually intended are
persuasive.5 3
It is Bergman's thesis that Judge Hand was not advocating the wholesale
enforcement of forum selection clauses, but instead that he meant only to ac-
knowledge their validity in a limited context-where their enforcement was con-
sistent with the factors considered under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens3 4 Judge Hand's citation to Mittenthal v. Mascagni bolsters Berg-
man's thesis. In Mittenthal,55 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts upheld the
trial court's exercise of discretion to decline jurisdiction in favor of an Italian
court, as provided in an employment contract. The Mittenthal court's denial of
jurisdiction was based upon consideration of the forum non conveniens factors
of party residence and domicile, place of partial performance of the contract,
and upon the fact that the language of the contract in dispute and law to be
applied were Italian. 56
While some courts clung to the notion that contractual forum selections
were void as contrary to public policy, 57 the "general hostility" toward forum
selection clauses began to erode as courts relied on Judge Hand's soon-to-be-
famous statement from Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co.58 Courts upheld the en-
forcement of forum selection clauses, most notably in the Second59 and Third
51. Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d. 941, 942 (2d Cir.
1930).
52. Note, Enforcement and Effect of the Jurisdiction Clause in Admiralty, 34 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 72, 73 (1959) (trend is to look more favorably upon forum selection clauses). But see
Nadelmann, supra note 38, at 127 ("The more favorable climate for forum selection clauses did not
develop overnight.").
53. See Mullenix, Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at 308, n. 55 ("Bergman
persuasively argues that Judge Learned Hand's statement in his Krenger concurrence was based
upon a misapprehension of the Restatement of Contracts § 555 (1932).").
54. See Bergman, supra note 38, at 441. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), the
Supreme Court held that federal courts may exercise discretion to decline to entertain a case brought
before a court with proper jurisdiction and venue on the grounds of forum non conveniens. The
discretion is properly exercised when an adequate alternate forum is available, and considerations of
party, evidentiary, and court convenience override the traditional considerations of plaintiff auton-
omy in the selection of forum. See id at 506-08.
55. 66 N.E. 425 (1903).
56. Id. at 426-27.
57. See, e.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d. 297, 300-01 (5th Cir.
1958) (agreements made to oust jurisdiction before any controversey arose are unenforceable as
against public policy), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
58. 174 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1949). See supra note 49 and accompanying text for Judge Hand's
statement in Krenger.
59. See, e.g., Cerro De Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, O.A.S., 187 F.2d 990, 990-91 (2d
Cir. 1951) (forum selection clause valid under laws of Peru and Norway where agreement was made
and properly enforced under circumstances); Win. A. Mueller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line, Ltd., 224
F.2d 806, 808 (2d. Cir.) (enforcement of forum selection clause providing for exclusive jurisdiction in
Swedish courts proper when agreement freely made and not unreasonable), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
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Circuits, 6° where the courts found it not to be "unreasonable" to do so based on
the circumstances of a particular case:
[W]e accept the conclusion of Judge L. Hand stated in his concurring
opinion in the Krenger case .... From this it follows that in each case
the enforceability of such an agreement depends upon its reasonable-
ness. We agree with the appellant to this extent: the parties by agree-
ment cannot oust a court of jurisdiction otherwise obtaining;
notwithstanding the agreement, the court has jurisdiction. But if in
the proper exercise of its jurisdiction, by a preliminary ruling the court
finds that the agreement is not unreasonable in the setting of the partic-
ular case, it may properly decline jurisdiction and relegate a litigant to
the forum to which he assented .... 61
Two important but separate concepts were developed by these courts when
considering the enforcement of a forum selection clause. First, such a clause
does not "oust" a court of its jurisdiction-that is, the jurisdiction of the court is
not altered by the existence of a forum selection clause. Second, a clause will be
enforced when "reasonable," notwithstanding the continuing jurisdiction of the
court.
In enforcing forum selection clauses, courts brushed aside the "ouster" doc-
trine, the source of judicial repudiation of forum selection clauses since 1874,62
as being inapposite. Courts recognized that the enforcement of a forum selec-
tion clause did not effect an "ouster" of jurisdiction; rather, a court's jurisdiction
still exists, even though the court gives effect to an agreement of the parties. In
such a case, the court merely declines to exercise its constitutional and statutory
jurisdiction.6 3
It may seem odd that a doctrine that was adhered to for so long could so
easily be brushed aside, but the Court had already cleared the intellectual path
for doing so by acknowledging in several other contexts that jurisdiction was not
903 (1955). In Mueller, an action in admiralty, the Second Circuit held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding it not unreasonable to give effect to a clause in a bill of lading providing
for exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of Sweden.
60. See, e.g., Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 344-45 (3d Cir.
1966). In a diversity action brought by a sub-contractor against a general contractor, the Third
Circuit found it reasonable for the Pennsylvania district court to enforce a forum selection clause
specifying New York as the location of any action brought in relation to the contract in question.
Id. at 345. The court considered reasonableness to be defined by whether enforcement of the clause
would seriously impair the plaintiff's ability to pursue its cause of action. Id.
61. Mueller, 224 F.2d. at 808.
62. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text for a list of citations referring to the "ouster"
doctrine.
63. See Gilbert, supra note 6, at 5 n. 16, 9-10 (parties' agreement cannot deprive court of compe-
tent jurisdiction; courts may withhold jurisdiction to enforce parties' agreement); Gruson, supra note
6, at 140 (parties' contractual agreement cannot abrogate court's jurisdiction which is based on
statute; jurisdiction withheld merely by law giving effect to contractual agreement).
But see Borchers, supra note 6, at 61 ("like forum selection agreements, arbitration agreements
oust the jurisdiction of the regular tribunals," apparently arguing that forum selection clause is
"ouster" of jurisdiction); Mullenix, Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at 331 (refer-
ring to reasoning employed by courts to overcome "ouster doctrine" as "some fancy, linguistic
mumbo-jumbo that does violence to a common understanding of the English language").
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actually being ousted when a court declined to exercise jurisdiction. In 1821,
Justice Marshall announced the view that it would be "treason" for the Court to
decline to exercise jurisdiction." Thereafter, but prior to the rejection of the
ouster doctrine, courts concluded that a declination of jurisdiction was not an
ouster of jurisdiction in the areas of abstention doctrines,65 suits between per-
sons of foreign citizenship, 66 and forum non conveniens, 67 thereby renouncing
Justice Marshall's earlier view. 68
The early courts enforcing forum selection clauses made it clear by the pro-
cedural mechanisms they used that their jurisdiction had not been "ousted," but,
instead, that the courts were merely declining to exercise the jurisdiction that
the court possessed irrespective of any agreement of private parties. In the ma-
jority of cases, enforcement was effectuated by way of a party's "motion to de-
cline jurisdiction."'69 Though in a few cases other procedural mechanisms were
64. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) ("We have no more right to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or
the other would be treason to the constitution.").
65. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1959) (federal
judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction when unfamiliar with controlling law is derived from policy
of federalism); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332-33 (1943) (abstention doctrine is applicable
to federal courts in furtherance of state and federal harmony without need for congressional restric-
tion of judicial powers) (citing Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941)).
66. See Canada Malting Co. v. Patterson S.S. Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 422-23 (1932) (jurisdiction
properly declined where all parties were Canadian citizens and litigation would be more appropri-
ately conducted in foreign court); The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 364-65 (1885) (courts to use discre-
tion in accepting jurisdiction over controversies when all parties are foreigners).
67. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1947) (under doctrine of forum non
conveniens, court may decline statutorily conferred jurisdiction, but doctrine should be applied only
in rare cases).
68. See supra note 64 and accompanying text for Justice Marshall's earlier view. Though arbi-
tration agreements also operate to cause a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction, they are not
included in the foregoing list because of a critical distinction. Judicial declination of jurisdiction in
light of an arbitration agreement is a result of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1988).
Because Congress has the authority under Article III of the United States Constitution to determine
the extent of the federal courts' jurisdiction, Congress may also determine when the federal courts
should decline to exercise that jurisdiction. Such situations must be distinguished from situations in
which the courts themselves decline jurisdiction, particularly when they do so to enforce an agree-
ment of private individuals.
69. See generally Wm. A. Mueller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 806, 807 (2d
Cir.) (appellees' motion to decline jurisdiction granted by district court and affirmed by court of
appeals), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955), overruled on other grounds by Indussa Corp. v. S.S.
Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967); Cerro De Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, O.A.S., 187
F.2d 990, 990-91 (2d Cir. 1951) (not specifically stating nature of motion brought by defendant to
enforce forum selection clause in question but referring to district court exercising discretion to
determine that forum was not appropriate one to hear case); Amicale Indus., Inc. v. S.S. Rantum,
259 F. Supp. 534, 535 (D.S.C. 1966) (motion to decline jurisdiction granted); Hernandez v. Konin-
klijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maatschappij N.V., 252 F. Supp. 652, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (same);
Pakhuismeesteren v. The S/S Goettingen, 225 F. Supp. 888, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (same); Takemura
& Co. v. The S.S. Tsuneshima Maru, 197 F. Supp. 909, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (not specifically stating
nature of motion brought, court held forum selection clause limiting litigation to courts of Japan was
not unreasonable); Aetna Ins. Co. v. The Satrustegui, 171 F. Supp 33, 34 (D.P.R. 1959) (same);
Transcontinental Commodities, Inc. v. Italnavi Societa Di Navigazione Per Azioni-Genova, 175 F.
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employed to effectuate enforcement, the court's analysis in each case indicates
that the issue always under consideration was whether to decline to exercise
jurisdiction, and that the court did not consider that an ouster of its jurisdiction
could occur by operation of a contractual provision. 70
The fact that the enforcement of a forum selection clause does not alter,
change, or eliminate the power of a court as conferred by statute or constitution
may seem to be a simple point. Nevertheless, the failure of courts and litigants
to recognize this fact when they consider the appropriate procedural mechanism
to use to enforce a forum selection clause has been a major contributor to the
conceptual enigma that the clause has become. An unresolved issue often noted
by commentators concerns the ramifications of the choice of procedural mecha-
nism to obtain enforcement of a forum selection clause.71 Once it is recognized
that the existence of the clause does not alter or diminish a court's jurisdiction,
the appropriate mechanisms for enforcement are narrowed. Motions to dismiss
challenging lack of jurisdiction, subject matter 72 or personal,73 improper
venue,74 or failure to state a claim 75 are inappropriate. The existence of a forum
selection clause by itself does not alter the power of the court in any of these
areas.
76
While the ouster doctrine was the major hurdle to be overcome in the shift
toward judicial acceptance of contractual forum selection, the doctrine was only
applicable to forum selection clauses in the derogation context-where the con-
tractual forum is other than that in which the action has been filed, and the
Supp 406, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (motion to decline jurisdiction declined where issue of assent to
agreement of forum clause remains unresolved); Nieto v. The S.S. Tinnum, 170 F. Supp. 295, 296
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (motion to decline jurisdiction granted); Murilio Ltda. v. The Bio Bio, 127 F. Supp.
13, 15 (S.D.N.Y.) (same), aff'd, 227 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1955); Export Ins. Co. v. Skinner, 115 F.
Supp. 154, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (motion to decline jurisdiction on grounds of forum non conveniens
denied); Cerro De Pasco Copper Corp. v. The Alabama, 109 F. Supp. 856, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
(motion to decline jurisdiction granted).
70. See, e.g., Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d. 341, 343, 346 (3d
Cir. 1966) (proper for district court to decline jurisdiction and to grant defendant's motion for en-
forcement of forum selection clause by means of Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state claim);
Hawaii Credit Card Corp. v. Continental Credit Card Corp., 290 F. Supp. 848, 849, 851-52 (D.
Haw. 1968) (seeking enforcement of forum selection clause by means of motion to dismiss for im-
proper venue under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3)); Geiger v. Keilani, 270 F. Supp. 761,
762-64 (E.D. Mich. 1967) (discussing nature of motion brought by defendant seeking enforcement of
forum selection clause for purpose of determining whether defendant is barred by consolidation
principles of Rule 12(g) from bringing motion because of previous Rule 12 motion and concluding
there is no bar because motion most closely analogous to motion for transfer of venue pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
71. See infra notes 317-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of commentators' criticism
of this unresolved issue.
72. FED. R. Civ. PRO. 12(b)(l).
73. FED. R. Civ. PRO. 12(b)(2).
74. FED. R. Civ. PRO. 12(b)(3).
75. FED. R. Civ. PRO. 12(b)(6).
76. See infra notes 113-75, 257-59, 271-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of parties'
ability to reorder principles of procedure under forum selection clauses.
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forum of filing must decide whether to decline to proceed with the action.77
None of the cases presented the question of enforcement of a forum selection
clause in the prorogation context 78 and, therefore, the implications of reordering
longstanding principles of personal jurisdiction that would result from a proro-
gation clause were not considered. 79
While it is important that the historical anomaly of the ouster doctrine be
discarded in the derogation context, enforcement in the prorogation context in-
volves questions beyond that of the ouster doctrine. Enforcement in the former
simply means that judicial acceptance of a contractual forum selection clause
does not alter the jurisdictional reach of a court. Enforcement in the latter,
though not implicating the discarded fiction of ouster, addresses a very different
concept-to what degree may parties confer jurisdiction where it would not
otherwise be present? The prorogation context involves a private reordering of
procedural principles that was abhorred in the premise of the ouster doctrine.80
Although the ouster doctrine itself has been rejected, the doctrine's premise,
abhorrence of litigants' ability privately to reorder procedural principles, has not
been rejected.
B. Two Views of Procedure-Two Views of Reasonableness
Having first determined that enforcement of a forum selection clause in a
derogation context leaves their underlying jurisdiction intact, courts then devel-
oped a second concept in their shift toward enforcement of forum selection
clauses-that a clause would be enforced if "reasonable."81 Two views of what
constituted reasonableness developed. The apparent majority view, largely de-
veloped in cases from the Second Circuit, held that a determination of reasona-
bleness involved the same considerations as did a motion to dismiss on the basis
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.82 The second view, largely developed
77. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of forum selection clauses in
the derogation context.
78. The early cases discussing enforcement of a forum selection clause, see supra note 34, ap-
parently all arose in the derogation context.
79. See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's failure to note
that a contract does not create a court's jurisdiction.
80. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the premise that the
ouster doctrine was born to deny effect to forum selection clauses as contrary to public policy.
81. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts' enforcement of
forum selection clauses when reasonable.
82. See Gruson, supra note 6, at 142-45 ("The factors applied by the courts to determine the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of a forum-selection clause are similar to or identical with the
factors used by courts in deciding the issue offorum non conveniens.").
Cf. Gilbert, supra note 6, at 11 ("[D]ifferent factors will be significant in the courts decision in
choice of forum cases as opposed to the straight forum non conveniens situation.").
For cases expressly indicating that the test for reasonableness was equivalent to the factors of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see, e.g., Hernandez v. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot
Maatschappij N.V., 252 F. Supp. 652, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("The relevant factors as to this issue are
similar to those involved in deciding a question of forum non conveniens.") (citations omitted);
Takemura & Co. v. The S.S. Tsuneshima Maru, 197 F. Supp. 909, 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ("Factors
determinative of unreasonableness are similar to those involved in deciding an issue of forum non
1993]
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in the Third Circuit, considered reasonableness to exist unless a party demon-
strated that enforcement of the clause would seriously impair or practically pre-
vent the party from pursuing her cause of action.83 These two formulations of
reasonableness, the "forum non conveniens formulation" and the "serious im-
pairment formulation" reflected very different views of the relationship between
conveniens...."); Nieto v. The S.S. Tinnum, 170 F. Supp. 295, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ("A considera-
tion of the reasonableness of such a provision, is so closely related to the issue of forum non con-
veniens that they may well be considered together.") (citations omitted); Sociedade Brasileira De
Intercambio Comercial E Industrial, Ltda. v. S.S. Punta Del Este, 135 F. Supp. 394, 396 (D.N.J.
1955) ("What are to be applied in this case are the criteria included in the doctrine of forum non
conveniens .... "); Murillo Ltda. v. The Bio Bio, 127 F. Supp. 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y.) ("[Tihe factors
determinative of an inconvenient forum largely turn upon identical ones involved in the unreasona-
bleness of a stipulation limiting the tribunal to which resort may be had, and accordingly both the
ground of the unreasonable stipulation and that of the inconvenient forum should be appraised to-
gether."), aff'd, 227 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1955); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. The Republica de
Venezuela, 105 F. Supp. 272, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ("The Court is requested to decline jurisdiction in
this admiralty suit on the ground of forum non conveniens.").
For cases applying factors of the doctrine of forum non conveniens to determine reasonableness
but not expressly stating that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is equivalent to the question of
reasonableness in forum selection clause enforcement, see, e.g., Win. H. Mueller & Co. v. Swedish
Am. Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 806, 807-08 (2d. Cir.) (factors considered by court include expense of
appellant to litigate in Sweden, reasonableness of agreement, and whether agreement was freely
made), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955); Cerro De Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, O.A.S.,
187 F.2d 990, 991 (2d Cir. 1951) (factors considered by district court were whether it was proper
forum based on fact that parties had no real ties to United States and whether agreement was such
that no court had jurisdiction); Hawaii Credit Card Corp. v. Continental Credit Card Corp., 290 F.
Supp. 848, 851-52 (D. Haw. 1968) (factors included location of witnesses and evidence); Geiger v.
Keilani, 270 F. Supp. 761, 766 (E.D. Mich. 1967) (factors included location of witnesses and which
law governed agreement); Amicale Indus., Inc. v. S.S. Rantum, 259 F. Supp. 534, 537-38 (D.S.C.
1966) (factors included foreign ownership of vessel, location of witnesses, location of vessels when
loaded, and appellant's knowledge of provisions under which cargo was shipped); Pakhuismeestern,
S.A. v. The S/S Goettingen, 225 F. Supp. 888, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (factors included governing law
and libellant's ability to bring action in foreign forum notwithstanding statute of limitations); Skins
Trading Corp. v. The S/S Punta Del Este, 180 F. Supp. 609, 609-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (factors in-
cluded convenience of witnesses, accessibility of proof, contacts with forum, and alleged fraudulent
conduct of party seeking enforcement of forum selection clause); Aetna Ins. Co. v. The Satrustegui,
171 F. Supp. 33, 34-35 (D.P.R. 1959) (factors included validity of agreement and location of evi-
dence); Chemical Carriers, Inc. v. L. Smit & Co.'s Internationale Sleepdienst, 154 F. Supp. 886, 888-
89 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (factors included whether under foreign jurisdiction's law libelant would be
deprived of remedy, whether parties have similar actions pending in local court, and convenience of
witnesses and litigants).
83. Because the phrase "serious impairment" often arises in discussions of forum non con-
veniens issues, it is of concern that the reader may construe this formulation to be the same as, or a
component of the forum non conveniens formulation. In fact, the formulations are quite dissimilar.
Perhaps a more appropriate name in the forum selection clause context would be "total impair-
ment," because "total impairment" more accurately describes the strictness of the standard. As
described by an early advocate of the "serious impairment" formulation of reasonableness, a forum
selection clause would be reasonable unless "the selected state would be an inappropriate, or mani-
festly inconvenient, place for the suit." Reese, supra note 38, at 189.
See Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 344 (3d Cir. 1966)
(" 'Such an agreement is unreasonable only where its enforcement would, under all circumstances
existing at the time of litigation, seriously impair plaintiff's ability to pursue his cause of action.'"
(quoting Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d. 810, 816 (Pa. 1965)).
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principles of procedure and agreements of private parties. s 4 Most importantly,
the two formulations reflect the same division in approach that exists between
the venue/fairness approach of Stewart and the contract formation/reasonable-
ness approach of The Bremen and Shute.8 5
Under the forum non conveniens formulation,8 6 for purposes of enforce-
ment, the agreement of the parties is subjected to judicial scrutiny, considering
factors such as the relationship of the contractual forum to the subject matter of
the dispute, the residence of the parties, the availability of evidence and wit-
nesses, and the proposed forum's interest in the litigation, etc.8 7 This scrutiny
should ensure that the enforcement of a forum selection clause does not subvert
the parties' expectations of fundamental fairness in the procedural system.8 8 As
84. The fact that the two formulations differed as to what constituted reasonableness is perhaps
best illustrated by the Second Circuit's opinion in Cerro De Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen,
O.A.S., 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951), the precursor to Mueller. The DePasco court gave effect to a
forum selection clause and upheld the trial court's exercise of discretion in declining jurisdiction
after analyzing traditional factors of forum non conveniens, such as the availability of witnesses and
the relation of the facts giving rise to the claim to the contractual forum. Id. at 991. Judge Clark
concurred with the opinion but argued for a less strict standard for enforcement, one akin to the
serious impairment standard in that it did not provide for trial judge discretion as to the appropriate-
ness of the contractual forum based upon the forum non conveniens factors of fairness. Id. (Clark,
J., concurring).
I prefer to place my concurrence upon the validity, under the circumstances here disclosed,
of the contract requiring all claims to be settled in Norway. The apparently wider discre-
tion granted in the opinion to the district judge to pass upon the appropriateness of the
forum may, perhaps, raise more extensive questions which we need not now face.
Id. (Clark, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
See also Bergman, supra note 38, at 445 -46 (discussing meaning of holding in Mueller and
questioning whether court had adopted forum non conveniens formulation or more strict "serious
impairment" formulation); Reese, supra note 38, at 191 (contrasting two approaches to enforcement
as being "prima facie" enforcement versus "more convenient forum"). But see RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 cmt. a (discussing view of reasonableness standard that merges
together serious impairment ("a provision, however, will be disregarded if ... the forum chosen...
would be seriously inconvenient...") and forum non conveniens formulations ("the provision will
be given effect... if to do so would be fair and reasonable")).
85. See infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difference between the
Stewart approach and The Bremen/Shute approach.
86. For a discussion of the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens to the enforce-
ment of forum selection clauses, see, e.g., Reese, supra note 38, at 190-92 (uncertain how heavily
courts rely upon forum non conveniens when considering forum selection clauses); Note, Enforce-
ment and Effect of the Jurisdiction Clause in Admiralty, supra note 52, at 74-76 (lesser burden for
enforcing forum selection clauses than for applying the forum non conveniens doctrine); Comment,
Stipulations Ousting Admiralty Courts of Jurisdiction, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 506, 506-10 (1959-
1960) (courts disagree on their requirements for dismissal based on forum selection clauses as op-
posed to forum non conveniens motions).
87. For a thorough discussion of the application of forum non conveniens factors to determine
the reasonableness of a forum selection clause, the setting out of various forum non conveniens
factors, and the listing of each forum selection clause case that considered a specific factor, see
Gruson, supra note 6, at 142-44.
88. For cases recognizing that forum selection clauses are not void but declining to enforce a
clause after application of the reasonableness factors considered under the doctrine forum non con-
veniens, see, e.g., Hawaii Credit Card Corp. v. Continental Credit Card Corp., 290 F. Supp. 848,
851-52 (D. Haw. 1968) (declining to enforce clause specifying California as forum for litigation
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66
such, the parties' agreement should only be enforced if it is consistent with such
expectations as determined by looking at the factors familiar from the doctrine
of forum non conveniens.8 9
There was, however, some disagreement as to the proper application of the
because "many" of witnesses and "most" of evidence located in Hawaii and because Hawaii was
target of activities of defendant that gave rise to litigation); Skins Trading Corp. v. The S/S Punta
Del Este, 180 F. Supp. 609, 610-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (declining to enforce clause designating courts
of Montveideo, Uruguay, as location for disputes arising under contract due to lack of any connec-
tion between events giving rise to litigation and Uruguay and to availability in New York of wit-
nesses for both parties); Chemical Carriers, Inc. v. L. Smit & Co.'s Internationale Sleepdienst, 154 F.
Supp. 886, 888-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (declining to enforce clause designating courts of Rotterdam,
Netherlands, as location for hearing disputes due to pendency in non-contractual forum of related
action with which action in question might be consolidated, availability of witnesses in non-contrac-
tual forum and "hardship" to plaintiff of having to litigate action in Netherlands); Sociedade
Brasileira De Intercambio Comercial E Industrial, Ltda. v. S.S. Punta Del Este, 135 F. Supp. 394,
395 -96 (D.N.J. 1955) (declining to enforce clause specifying courts of Uruguay as location for hear-
ing disputes because plaintiff's choice of forum should not be disturbed unless there is a "balance
strongly in favor of the defendant" that would require transfer of action to contractual forum); St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. The Republica de Venezuela, 105 F. Supp. 272, 273-74 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) (declining to enforce clause specifying courts of Amsterdam, Netherlands as location of suits
due to uncertainty as to whether jurisdiction over defendant could be obtained in contractual forum,
and due to availability of witnesses in New York, and connections between defendant and New
York).
89. See, e.g., Win. H. Mueller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 806, 808 (2d. Cir.)
(agreements enforced only if reasonable; parties cannot oust court's jurisdiction; reasonableness
based on facts of case such as residency of parties and witnesses, availability of evidence and restric-
tiveness of alternate jurisdiction on libellant's recovery), cert denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955); Cerro De
Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, O.A.S., 187 F.2d 990, 991 (2d Cir. 1951) (enforcement of
clause based on facts of case such as minimum contact with United States, destination of cargo was
European ports, ship's crew was neither in nor planned to visit United States, and libellant's ability
to receive effective remedy in alternate forum); Geiger v. Keilani, 270 F. Supp. 761, 766 (E.D. Mich.
1967) (enforcement of clause based on facts of case such as location of all witnesses in foreign juris-
diction, foreign law governs contractual rights, and interpretation of agreement dependent upon
foreign customs); Amicale Indus., Inc. v. S.S. Rantum, 259 F. Supp. 534, 537-38 (D.S.C. 1966)
(enforcement of clause based on facts that vessel was foreign owned, location of witnesses, and libel-
lant's knowledge of provisions under which cargo was shipped); Hernandez v. Koninklijke Neder-
landsche Stoomboot Maatschappij N.V., 252 F. Supp. 652, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (enforcement of
clause based on witness availability and foreign court's ability fairly to adjudicate issue in question);
Pakhuismeesteren, S.A. v. The S/S Goettingen, 225 F. Supp. 888, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (enforcement
of clause based on connection of case with United States, ship's home port, location of witnesses,
governing law, and foreign court's experience with controversy); Takemura & Co. v. The S.S.
Tsuneshima Maru, 197 F. Supp. 909, 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (enforcement of clause based on libel-
lant's failure to show enforcement to be unreasonable when foreign jurisdiction is domicile of all
parties and respondent agreed to waive foreign statute of limitations); Aetna Ins. Co. v. The Satrus-
tegui, 171 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D.P.R. 1959) (enforcement of clause based on facts that evidence only
available in foreign jurisdiction, enforcement not against public policy, vessel owned by foreign juris-
diction and it was loaded by foreign citizens in foreign jurisdiction); Nieto v. The S.S. Tinnum, 170
F. Supp 295, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (enforcement of clause based on facts that foreign jurisdiction in
best position to interpret controlling law, foreign court open to libellant, and foreign court able to
adjudicate matter fairly); Murillo Ltda. v. The Bio Bio, 127 F. Supp. 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y.) (enforcement
of clause based on port where shipment originated, jurisdiction where bill of lading executed, validity
of forum selection clause under law of tribunal provided for, statute of limitations, and domicile of
parties), aff'd, 227 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1955); Export Ins. Co. v. Skinner, 115 F. Supp. 154, 155
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forum non conveniens formulation of reasonableness. Under a motion to dis-
miss for forum non conveniens, the burden is on the defendant to show that the
plaintiff's choice of forum should be disturbed.90 The existence of a forum se-
lection clause has been considered to shift the burden in the forum non con-
veniens analysis to the plaintiff who filed suit in the noncontractual forum.91
Other courts kept the burden on the defendant. 92 Still others held that the exist-
ence of the forum selection clause reduced the defendant's burden.93 Finally,
some courts concluded that the clause operated to remove the burden from
either party and instead required the court to conduct an evenly balanced analy-
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) (motion to decline jurisdiction denied due to reference in bill of lading to United
States and several points of contact between transaction and United States).
90. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
91. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 6, at 10-11 (presumption against dismissal in plaintiff's favor
on grounds of forum non conveniens); Comment, Stipulations Ousting Admiralty Courts of Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 86, at 508 (when stipulation to litigate in foreign forum, libellant has burden to
prove stipulation unreasonable); Unterweser Reederei, GMBH Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. Bremen, 428
F.2d 888, 906 (5th Cir. 1970) (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (objecting to majority's opinion that declined
to enforce forum selection clause but had argued in dicta that under forum non conveniens analysis,
burden would remain with plaintiff, and arguing that "[tihe burden should rest upon the party ob-
jecting to that forum [the contractual forum] to show a significant balance of greater inconvenience
in litigating in the designated forum"); Hernandez v. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maat-
schappij N.V., 252 F. Supp 652, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("The libelant in the case at bar, who chal-
lenges the provision to which he previously assented, has the burden of proving its
unreasonableness."); Takemura & Co. v. The S.S. Tsuneshima Maru, 197 F. Supp. 909, 912
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) ("It is incumbent upon the libellant, once the existence of such an agreement is
shown, to prove that it is unreasonable and hence unenforceable.").
92. See, e.g., Carbon Black Export v. The SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 301 (5th Cir. 1958)
(though declining to enforce forum selection clause, court discussed application of forum non con-
veniens factors with burden on defendant to determine reasonableness); Chemical Carriers, Inc. v. L.
Smit & Co.'s Internationale Sleepdienst, 154 F. Supp. 886, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (motion to decline
jurisdiction denied when balance strongly favoring defendant was not present) (citation omitted);
Sociedade Brasileira de Intercambio Comercial E Industrial, Ltda. v. S.S. Punta Del Este, 135 F.
Supp. 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (same); Murillo Ltda. v. The Bio Bio, 127 F. Supp. 13, 16 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) ("Weighing thus this stipulation in the balance of conveniens, respondents [defendants] have
sustained the burden of making out the inconvenience of this forum.").
Presumably, if a court discussed that an analysis of reasonableness of a forum selection clause
was equivalent to an analysis under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, but did not discuss which
party bore the burden, the burden remained with the defendant as under a traditional forum non
conveniens analysis. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of validity of
forum clauses when enforcement is in accord with factors considered under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.
93. See Note, Enforcement and Effect of the Jurisdiction Clause in Admiralty, supra note 52, at
75-76 (plaintiff's advantage in "clause cases" is minor factor when defendant need show only rea-
sonableness or clause based on substantial relationship between case's subject matter and named
jurisdiction). In support of its argument, the note compared Aetna Ins. Co. v. The Satrustegui, 171
F. Supp. 33 (D.P.R. 1959) (jurisdictional agreements enforced when not unreasonable or against
public policy) with Koster v. (Am) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947) (af-
firmed district court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction when defendant showed harrassment and plain-
tiff failed to show benefit in his choice of forum). Note, Enforcement and Effect of the Jurisdiction
Clause in Admiralty, supra note 52, at 76 n.27. The author believes it is arguable whether the
authority cited in the Note for this contention is actually supportive thereof.
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sis as to the proper forum for the suit.9 4 This confusion as to how the forum non
conveniens factors should be balanced and how the burden of persuasion should
be allocated was most likely the root of Judge Clark's concern in his concurrence
in Cerro De Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen.9 5 There, Judge Clark argued
for the "serious impairment" formulation of reasonableness because of the po-
tential questions that would be raised by the majority's adoption of the forum
non conveniens formulation.96
Under the "serious impairment" formulation of reasonableness, the forum
selection clause is afforded prima facie validity without scrutiny of any of the
forum non conveniens factors. The parties are allowed to reorder contractually
the principles of venue, personal jurisdiction, and choice of law as they see fit as
long as one party is not completely prevented from pursuing her claim. 97 The
parties' agreement is not subject to a determination of whether fundamental fair-
ness exists in regard to the forum designated by contract. The agreement is
merely examined to determine whether its enforcement would result in gross
injustice. A lawsuit can be relegated to a forum that has little, if any, connection
with the lawsuit as long as either party is not totally prevented from bringing her
claim as a result of the tenuous connection, or lack of connection, between the
claim and the contractual forum.
Though the two formulations represent very different approaches to reason-
ableness and very different views as to the power of parties to alter principles of
procedure by contract, the distinction has been rarely discussed. 98 Because the
94. While it is not entirely clear as to where the following courts placed the burden, several
courts appear to have conducted an even balancing as to which was the most convenient forum, the
contractual forum or the forum in which plaintiff filed suit. See, e.g., Pakhuismeesteren, S.A. v. The
S/S Goettingen, 225 F. Supp. 888, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (motion to decline jurisdiction granted on
conditions allowing libellant to maintain action in foreign tribunal); Skins Trading Corp. v. The S/S
Punta Del Este, 180 F. Supp. 609, 610-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (forum selection clause unenforceable
due to unreasonableness to give clause effect when one cause of action is fraudulent issue of bill of
lading); Nieto v. The S.S. Tinnum, 170 F. Supp. 295, 296-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (motion to decline
jurisdiction granted when foreign court open to libellant and when it is in best position to interpret
controlling law).
95. 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951).
96. Id at 991 (Clark, J., concurring) (without using term "serious impairment," concurrence
expressed concern for majority's decision to confer "wider discretion" on district judges).
A similar concern later would be echoed by courts and commentators in the application of the
Stewart standard of enforcement pursuant to § 1404(a). See infra notes 267-70, 321-22 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of criticism of Stewart's insertion of the exercise of judicial discretion in
enforcement of forum selection clauses.
97. See Mullenix, Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at 302-03 ("The Bremen
and its progeny (the successors to the serious impairment formulation], effectively supersede conven-
tional standards for jurisdiction, venue, transfer and forum non conveniens, imposing variegated
standards for forum selection not contemplated by those rules or doctrines;" and "[T]he imposition
of contract principles on forum selection rules has, in many instances, stood jurisdictional principles
on their head .... ").
98. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 6, at 61 (discussing that early cases that enforced forum
selection clauses did so if agreement were "reasonable," but not discussing different formulations of
reasonableness); Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of
Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 700, 702 (1992) (Mueller and its
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two views reflect the conceptual division that presently exists in the Supreme
Court's pronouncements on forum selection clauses, the distinction between the
two views of reasonableness is important. In an often cited quotation, Judge
Frank of the Second Circuit ridiculed the ouster doctrine, the rejection of which
prompted judicial acceptance of the forum selection clause: "Perhaps the true
explanation [for decisions relying upon the ouster doctrine to refuse to enforce
forum selection clauses] is the hypnotic power of the phrase 'oust the jurisdic-
tion.' Give a bad dogma a good name and its bite may become as bad as its
bark." 99
In putting the "bad dogma" to sleep, perhaps the courts were a bit hasty.
For although it seems rudimentary that an agreement between parties does not
operate to "oust" a court's jurisdiction, that does not necessarily justify the re-
pudiation of the underlying principle of the ouster doctrine. The principle that
underlies the ouster doctrine is that parties, by agreement, can neither affect the
basic power of the court nor reorder the fundamental principles of procedure.
Yet, in the prorogation context, a forum selection clause may operate to do just
that if it designates that an action take place in a forum where venue or personal
jurisdiction are otherwise improper.
The scope of repudiation of the ouster doctrine was limited to a rejection of
the notion that forum selection clauses effectuate an ouster of a court's jurisdic-
tion. Nevertheless, the underlying principle of the doctrine still has viability in
determining whether reasonableness should be determined by the forum non
conveniens formulation or by the serious impairment formulation. Accepting
that the principles of procedure are an interactive mechanism for adjudication,
once parties are allowed to contract to alter one aspect of the framework of the
mechanism in regard to resolution of their dispute, as is the case with the serious
impairment formulation but not the forum non conveniens formulation, it can
only follow that other principles with which their agreement must interact might
no longer function as intended100 For example, a clause might designate as
venue for an action a court that lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant or
progeny upheld forum selection clauses that were not "unreasonable," but did not discuss different
formulations of reasonableness); Gruson, supra note 6, at 142 (concluding that pre-Bremen factors
for enforcement of forum selection clauses were "similar to or identical with the factors used by the
courts in deciding the issue of 'forum non-conveniens,' " but failing to recognize very different ap-
proach to reasonableness reflected in serious impairment formulation); Fernandez, supra note 38, at
268 -70 (discussing single standard of reasonableness outlined by Supreme Court in The Bremen).
99. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir. 1942) (foot-
note omitted).
100. One commentator twice has described this basis for questioning the enforcement of forum
selection clauses as one of three "unconvincing" reasons for denying effect to forum selection
clauses. See Willis L. M. Reese, A Proposed Uniform Choice of Forum Act, 5 COLUM. J. TRANS. L.
193, 196 (1966) ("The reasons stated by the courts for denying effect to choice of forum clauses are
unconvincing. By and large, the courts have contented themselves with saying either (i) that the
parties cannot by their agreement oust a court of jurisdiction, or (2) that to allow parties to change
the rules relating to the place where suit may be brought would 'disturb the symmetry of the law'
and lead to inconvenenience, or (3) simply that choice of forum provisions are against public pol-
icy") (citations omitted); Reese, The Contractual Forum, supra note 38, at 188 (same). For criticism
of Professor Reese's thesis, see Mullenix, Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at 310-
1993]
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perhaps is so located that potential witnesses would be beyond the subpoena
power of the court. Such unresolved issues have been the subject of much dis-
cussion by commentators and call for corrective legislative action.101
III. THE BREMEN: A CONCEPTUAL CHOICE BY DEFAULT
The Supreme Court accepted certiorari in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co. 102 to resolve a division in the circuits as to whether forum selection clauses
should be enforced.10 3 The Court, however, defined the circuit court division as
being merely one of enforcement versus non-enforcement, without distinguish-
ing the forum non conveniens 1° 4 and serious impairment standards of enforce-
ment. 105 The Eleventh Circuit's opinion below had set out these two differing
standards of enforcement; the majority followed the forum non conveniens for-
mulation, while Judge Wisdom in dissent advocated for the serious impairment
formulation. 106 Yet, the Supreme Court failed to appreciate that the two formu-
lations were separate and distinct and that the ability of parties privately to re-
12 (Professor Reese failed to give credit to contrary authority and failed to address valid concerns
regarding consensual agreements).
Professor Reese rejected the second reason as being without merit, stating that "there are no
rules, other than those concerned with jurisdiction, which determine whether suit should be brought
in one state rather than in another." Reese, Choice of Forum, supra this note, at 196-97; Reese, The
Contractual Forum, supra note 38, at 188. His argument is in error. First, there are in fact other
rules that determine where a suit should be brought. The venue statute of The Federal Judiciary Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1391, is most certainly a policy statement of Congress that lawsuits should be allocated
to certain forums. Second, he overlooks the importance of the interactive nature of principles of
procedure. Though choice of law issues do not determine where suit should be filed, where a suit is
filed has significant implications on the choice of law question. Disturbing the choice of forum does
in fact "disturb the symmetry of the law." Third, Professor Reese's argument neglects that there is a
middle ground, and that the issue need not be one of all-or-nothing enforcement or non-enforcement.
With the forum non conveniens formulation, enforcement can be effectuated within the symmetry of
the law.
101. See infra notes 395 -96 and accompanying text for a discussion of commentators' proposals
for legislative action.
102. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id. at 7-8. As discussed supra at note 82, this approach was primarily used in the Second
Circuit.
105. Id. at 10-11. As discussed supra at note 83, this approach was primarily taken in the
Third Circuit.
106. The Eleventh Circuit majority interpreted Carbon Black Export v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254
F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), as holding that forum selection clauses were unenforceable as contrary to
public policy. Unterweser Reederei, GMBH Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. The Bremen, 428 F.2d 888,
893 (1 1th Cir. 1970), vacated, 407 U.S. 1 (1972). Nevertheless, the majority acknowledged that
" 'At the very least.. . [Carbon Black] stands for the proposition that a choice of forum clause will
not be enforced unless the selected state would provide a more convenient forum ... '" (citing Reese,
The Contractual Forum, supra note 38, at 191-92). Id. at 894. The majority then applied a forum
non conveniens formulation analysis to the question of enforcement of the forum selection clause,
with the burden on the defendant, and concluded that the plaintiff's choice of forum should not be
disturbed. Id. at 894-95. The dissent argued that the more strict serious impairment formulation
should be applied, and that the burden should lie with the plaintiff seeking to file suit in a noncon-
tractual forum. Id. at 896, 901-02, 906 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
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order principles of procedure would be dramatically affected by the choice of
formulation for determining "reasonableness." 10 7 The Court then issued a deci-
sion that appears to allow parties in a wholesale fashion to reorder concepts of
procedure and the fundamental jurisdictional power of the courts,108 and it did
so with little discussion while relying on inapplicable precedent.1 9
The Court's conceptual misappreciation was perhaps a result of the factual
context in which the question of enforcement of forum selection clauses was
presented to the Court-whether a plaintiff may bring suit in a forum other than
that to which the parties had previously contracted to confine any litigation.
When the forum selection clause issue arises in this context, that of a derogation
clause, the question of enforcement raises the specter of the ouster doctrine." 0
Though commentators have disagreed,' it is the reverse situation of proroga-
tion, in which a party seeks to file suit in a contractual forum that has no con-
nection to the litigation or the parties, that brings to the forefront the more
problematic question of to what degree parties should be able to reorder princi-
ples of procedure contractually. In the prorogation context, a court is con-
fronted with the question of whether it should entertain a suit merely on the
basis of a contractual arrangement and in contravention of established jurisdic-
tional principles. In other words, may parties construct private principles of
procedure and then have them enforced by the courts? The decision in The
Bremen has been interpreted to mean that parties may do so in wholesale fash-
ion. '1 2 Yet, the issue was not presented to the Court, and such a holding was
not contemplated.
107. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2 n. 1 (1972) (drawing analogy between
approaches to enforcement of Second and Third Circuits as contrasted with Fifth Circuit view of
unenforceability as being contrary to public policy).
108. See infra notes 144-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of parties' ability to reorder
concepts of procedure and the fundamental jurisdictional power of the courts.
109. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of The Bremen Court's use
of precedent.
110. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ouster doctrine and
its limited applicability.
111. See Mullenix, Carnival Cruise Lines, supra note 6, at 330-31 ("A much more serious
problem [than that presented by the prorogation nature of forum selection clauses without sufficient
regard to the due process concerns implicated in person and jurisdiction] is presented by the negative
or derogation effect of forum provisions."); Mullenix, Consenual Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note
6, at 358-68 (court's new pro-defendant bias enables potential defendants to dictate in which forum
plaintiff may bring action, without concern for plaintiff's due process rights).
112. See, e.g., FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 9, § 3.5, at 104 (parties can contract as to where
adjudication will take place); Gilbert, supra note 6,' at 6 (though not specifically referring to The
Bremen as precedent, stated that "consent... may effectively enable a court properly to exercise in
personam jurisdiction"); Gruson, supra note 6, at 192-93 (parties may contractually submit to be
sued in jurisdiction that otherwise would not have had in personam jurisdiction); Mullenix, Consen-
sual Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at 330 (stating that prorogative clauses are universally
approved without sufficient regard to due process concerns or public policy determinations).
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A. From "Ouster" to "Conferral" of Jurisdiction
In The Bremen,t113 the Court considered the question of whether to discard
the traditional American view disfavoring forum selection clauses' 1 4 in the con-
text of an "international towage contract"' 1 5 between Zapata, a Delaware cor-
poration located in Houston, Texas, and Unterweser, a German corporation. 16
Pursuant to the contract, Unterweser was to tow Zapata's off-shore oil drilling
rig, The Chapparal, from Louisiana to the Adriatic Sea off of Ravenna, Italy.'" 7
The contract specified that any dispute under the contract "must be treated
before the London Court of Justice."' 18
The Chapparal was damaged in a storm while in international waters in the
Gulf of Mexico and, at the instructions of Zapata, was towed to Tampa, Florida,
the nearest port of refuge." 19 Zapata then commenced a suit in admiralty in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida for negligence
and breach of contract. 120 Unterweser responded by filing a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, on the basis of forum non con-
veniens, and by filing a motion to stay prosecution of the action. 12 1 Subse-
quently, Unterweser commenced an action against Zapata in the contractual
forum in the High Court of Justice in London. 122 Zapata unsuccessfully sought
dismissal of that action, arguing that the English court did not have jurisdiction
over it.123 Both the lower English court and the English Court of Appeal held
that the forum selection clause conferred jurisdiction upon the English court and
that the clause should be enforced. 124
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, relying
on Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The Monrosa,125 followed the traditional Amer-
113. The decision in The Bremen has been analyzed by many commentators. This article seeks
not to repeat that which has previously been written, but will confine its analysis of the decision to
the misconceptualization by the Court of the nature and effect of the forum selection clause. For
discussions of The Bremen, see generally Borchers, supra note 6, at 60-65; Anne K. Covey &
Michael S. Morris, The Enforceability of Agreements Providing for Forum and Choice of Law Selec-
tion, 61 DENV. L.J. 837, 837-50, 837 n.1 (1984) (citing articles that have analyzed decision in The
Bremen); Gilbert, supra note 6, at 24-28; Gruson, supra note 6, at 147-49; Mullenix, Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at 306-15; Nadelman, supra note 38, at 124-27 & 133-35.
114. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.






121. Id. at 4; Unterweser Reederei, GMBH Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. The Bremen, 428 F.2d
888, 889 (5th Cir. 1970), vacated, 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
122. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 4; Zapata Off-Shore, 428 F.2d at 890.
123. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 4 n.4 ("Zapata appeared specially and moved to set aside
service of process outside the country.").
124. Id. at 4.
125. 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958) (as cited by The Bremen Court, 407 U.S. at 6, Fifth Circuit
held that "agreements in advance of controversy whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts
are contrary to public policy and will not be enforced").
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ican view that forum selection clauses are unenforceable.1 2 6 The district court
then considered the motion to dismiss under the standards of forum non con-
veniens, 127 without regard to the forum selection clause, and denied Un-
terweser's motion.1 28 The district court had previously denied the motion to
stay. 12
9
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted
that Unterweser, at the trial level, had declined to pursue its motion to dismiss
for either lack of jurisdiction or on the basis of forum non conveniens, 130 and
that Unterwesser did not contend that the forum selection clause, if enforceable,
operated as an ouster of the jurisdiction of the court.1 31 In considering the dis-
trict court's denial of the motion to stay, the Fifth Circuit relied on its previous
decision in Carbon Black and held that "the forum-selection clause, in and of
itself, did not compel the district court to stay proceedings so that the parties
might litigate in England pursuant to its provisions."1 32 Curiously, the Fifth
Circuit hedged its bet and stated that the decision in Carbon Black had been
analyzed by a commentator to mean that a forum selection clause would only be
enforced if the contractual forum were "more convenient" than that in which
the suit was brought.1 3 3 Though Unterweser had declined to pursue its motion
to dismiss for forum non conveniens,1 34 the Fifth Circuit considered whether to
enforce the forum selection clause under the forum non conveniens formulation
of reasonableness with the burden on the defendant and held that "apart from
the forum selection clause itself the circumstances [the forum non conveniens
considerations of availability of witnesses, proximity of the event giving rise to
the dispute to the forum, etc.] supported a retention and determination by the
district court."1 35
126. In re Unterwesser Reederei, GMBH, 296 F. Supp. 733, 736 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
127. The doctrine of forum non conveniens places a heavy burden on the party seeking dismis-
sal of the action because "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
128. In re Unterwesser, 296 F. Supp. at 735 ("The balance of convenience is strongly in favor of
litigation in this forum initially and to allow the same action to be prosecuted simultaneously else-
where would cause extreme hardship.").
129. Id.
130. Unterwesser Reederei, GMBH Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. M/S Bremen, 428 F.2d 888, 894
n.35 (citation omitted).
131. Id. at 893.
132. Id. at 894.
133. Id. at 894, 894 n.33. The Court cited Reese, The Contractual Forum, supra note 38, at
191-92, which argued that the Fifth Circuit precedent from Carbon Black stood for the proposition
that "[a]t the very least ... a choice of forum clause will not be enforced unless the selected state
would provide a more convenient forum than the state in which the suit is brought." But the Court
did not indicate whether that argument is correct. In the preceding paragraph, the Court cited
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. N.V. Stoomvart, 201 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. La. 1961), for the proposition
that, "the Fifth Circuit's holding in Carbon Black is applicable and such an attempt to oust the
Court of its jurisdiction in advance will be stricken herewith as contrary to public policy and unen-
forceable." Id. at 894.
134. See supra note 130.




It would have been impossible for the Fifth Circuit to reach any other deci-
sion on the basis of a forum non conveniens analysis because the contractual
forum was the High Court of Justice in London. Though the Supreme Court in
its subsequent consideration of the case seemed enamored with the fact that this
was "a neutral forum," 136 neutrality also meant that the London forum had no
connection with the lawsuit. Neither of the parties, nor the facts giving rise to
the cause of action, nor relevant witnesses or evidence had any connection what-
soever with England.1 37 Nevertheless, a neutral forum that is equally conve-
nient, or equally inconvenient, does not necessarily warrant a disruption of the
plaintiff's choice of forum.138
In dissent, Judge Wisdom argued that the traditional view of non-enforce-
ment of forum selection clauses should be rejected. 139 Judge Wisdom disagreed
with the majority's hedge toward the forum non conveniens formulation for en-
forcement and advocated for the much more strict "serious impairment" stan-
dard for enforcement which would place the burden upon the party seeking to
avoid the contractual forum, here the defendant.1 40 Taken together, the Fifth
Circuit's majority and dissenting opinions set out both sides of the question of
whether to provide for enforcement of forum selection clauses and the differing
formulations of the courts that had done so.
In deciding The Bremen, the Supreme Court first had to address the
"ouster doctrine," as had the lower courts that had previously rejected the long-
standing view of unenforceability of forum selection clauses.141 The Court did
so by referring to the doctrine as "hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction." 142
The Court then clarified that the fiction was not that parties could in fact "oust"
a court of its jurisdiction, thereby allowing parties by private agreement to alter
the fundamental power of courts, but that the enforcement of a forum selection
clause effected an "ouster" at all. 14 3
The Court appeared to agree with the lower courts that had adopted the
declination of jurisdiction approach to the ouster argument,144 reasoning that an
agreement between parties, specifically a derogation clause, does not alter the
jurisdiction of a court. Nevertheless, the enforcement of a forum selection
clause in a prorogation context might in fact alter the jurisdictional reach of a
court by allowing contracting parties to reorder basic procedural principles.
136. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
137. See supra notes 113-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of The Bremen.
138. See supra notes 86-88 for a discussion of factors to be weighed in a forum non conveniens
analysis.
139. Unterwesser Reederei, GMBH Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. The Bremen, 428 F.2d 888, 897-98
(5th Cir. 1970) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
140. Id at 906 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
141. See supra notes 42-80 for a discussion of the lower courts' application of the "ouster
doctrine."
142. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
143. Id. at 12 ("No one seriously contends in this case that the forum-selection clause 'ousted'
the District Court of jurisdiction over Zapata's action.").
144. See supra notes 69-70 for a discussion of the cases where courts used a declination of
jurisdiction approach to the ouster doctrine.
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Such reordering by private agreement would contravene long-established princi-
ples of personal jurisdiction based on both a defendant's contacts with the forum
and the notion of fundamental fairness. 145
Though application of the forum selection clause in the prorogation context
would alter existing jurisdictional principles, the Court did not limit its holding
to derogation clauses. In fact, the Court's discussion of National Equipment
Rental v. Szukhent 46 seemed to indicate that the Court intended to extend its
holding to prorogation clauses. 147 Its reliance upon Szukhent for that extension,
however, is not warranted.
In Szukhent, the Court held that a party to a contract may designate an
agent for service of process within the territorial boundaries of a state and
thereby subject itself to personal jurisdiction. 148 Though Szukhent is often cited
for the proposition that a party may contractually consent to personal jurisdic-
tion in a given forum even though jurisdiction would otherwise not be pres-
ent,' 49 that view of Szukhent is more expansive than the case's actual holding.
Szukhent held that a party may contract to "submit to the jurisdiction of a given
court."' 5 0 It is the act of submitting that provides the basis for personal juris-
145. The modem formulation of personal jurisdiction looks to the defendant's connection to
the forum to determine whether jurisdiction may be asserted over the defendant. See, e.g., Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("[Due process requires only that in order
to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."); see also Burger King v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) ("The constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purpose-
fully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum state."); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212
(1977) ("[AII assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set
forth in International Shoe and its progeny.").
Personal jurisdiction based upon implied consent was also based upon a two-fold connection,
between the defendant and the forum. The activities of the defendant within the forum were held to
constitute consent to submit to the jurisdiction of the forum by means of service of process upon a
statutorily designated agent within the forum. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927);
FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 9, § 3.5 at 105-09 (development of implied consent doctrine discussed).
146. 375 U.S. 311 (1964). For criticism of The Bremen Court's reliance upon Szukhent, see
Mullenix, Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at 307-09 (Szukhent's authority
stemmed from international waiver situations, and court's statement concerning consensual jurisdic-
tion was dictum). See also Unterwesser Reederei, GMBH Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. The Bremen, 428
F.2d 888, 912 n.17 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) ("Szukhent is not significant authority ... .
147. See infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
148. Szukhent, 375 U.S. at 315-16.
149. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 6, at 6 ("It has been the generally accepted rule for some time
that a court which is otherwise competent [referring to subject matter jurisdiction] may exercise
personal jurisdiction bestowed upon it by the parties' consent... [t]hat is, consent, even prior to the
existence of the dispute or cause of action may effectively enable a court properly to exercise in
personam jurisdiction.") (citing inter alia National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311
(1964)); Reese, Choice of Forum Act, supra note 100, at 194 ("It is perfectly clear that consent is an
effective basis of jurisdiction in the United States, and that an agreement that suit on a particular
controversy should be brought in the courts of a chosen state amounts to a consent by the parties
which subjects them to the jurisdiction of the chosen state with respect to that controversy.") (citing
Szukhent).
150. Szukhent, 375 U.S. at 315-16.
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diction. 15 1 In Szhukhent, submission occurred because process was served upon
an agent of the defendant who was within the forum's jurisdictional reach. 152
Service of process on a defendant agent does not extend or alter the existing
jurisdictional power of the court. 153 Instead, the presence of the defendant's
agent is considered to be a submission by the defendant to the court's jurisdic-
tional reach. To view Szhukhent as holding that parties may contractually cre-
ate personal jurisdiction without the defendant's submission contravenes the
principles of International Shoe and its progeny that base findings of personal
jurisdiction on the existence of actual, albeit minimum contacts. 154 Accord-
151. Submission is the key to providing a court with personal jurisdiction over a defendant
when the limitations on the court's power to exercise such jurisdiction are rooted in both liberty
interests of the Due Process Clause and concepts of state sovereignty. See World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1980) (discussing that interests of federalism serve to limit
extent of assertion of personal jurisdiction by forum). But see Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compa-
gnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1981) ("The personal jurisdiction requirement...
represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual
liberty.").
In a concurring opinion in Compagnie des Bauxites, Justice Powell criticized the view that
jurisdictional limitations were based only in the liberty interest of due process and did not also
involve concerns of state sovereignty as a "theory [that] could require a sweeping but largely unex-
plicated revision of jurisdictional doctrine." Id. at 719 (Powell, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on personal jurisdiction seems to reaffirm the
assertion of jurisdiction based upon an exercise of power rooted in sovereignty. Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
152. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(dXl) ("Service shall be made as follows: (1) Upon an individual.., by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by
law to receive service of process."). See Annotation, Agreements to Submit to Process of Foreign
Courts, 73 A.L.R. 1453, 1454 (1931) (consent to service of process on agent is valid means of estab-
lishing personal jurisdiction).
153. See Compaignie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 702 (although disagreeing that federalism oper-
ates to restrict jurisdictional power of forum, acknowledging that if such were case, that jurisdic-
tional reach of court could not be altered by private agreement, but individual could submit to
jurisdiction of forum, and stating "[i]ndividual actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty,
although the individual can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise be protected").
154. See supra note 145 for a discussion of International Shoe and its progeny.
In Szukhent, the Court took great pains to define narrowly the issue in terms of whether the
agency in question was within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. The Court stated:
The only question now before us is whether the person upon whom the summons and
complaint were served was "an agent authorized by appointment" to receive the same, so
as to subject the respondents to the jurisdiction of the federal court in New York.
Szukhent, 375 U.S. at 313.
Nowhere in the opinion does the Court attempt to fit its holding within the International Shoe
framework of jurisdiction based upon minimum contacts. International Shoe exempted from its
minimum contacts analysis the situation where the defendant "be not present within the territory of
the forum." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Apparently the Szuk-
hent Court considered presence to have been established by means of the agency.
Of course, the Court has upheld jurisdiction based upon consent. See, e.g., Henry L. Doherty &
Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 627-28 (1935) (non-resident business owner impliedly consents to
suit in jurisdiction of business); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (non-resident involved in
automobile accident impliedly consents to be sued in jurisdiction of accident). Traditionally, a de-
fendant consents to jurisdiction by virtue of her involvement in activities within the state, and the
court exercises its power to regulate activities within its territory. Neither is present in a private
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ingly, such a view would allow parties to create jurisdiction in a court with
which the parties had no contact besides their mention of the forum in a
contract. 155
In The Bremen, the Court interpreted the Szukhent holding too broadly,
stating: "a party may validly consent to be sued in a jurisdiction where he can-
not be found for service of process through contractual designation of an 'agent'
for receipt of process in that jurisdiction."' t56 The Court missed the point of
Szukhent that a party is "found" within the jurisdiction when its agent is physi-
cally present there; it is the act of being present within the jurisdiction that
creates the court's jurisdiction, not the contract. 157 Consent to personal juris-
contractual consent. Therefore, The Bremen Court's reliance on Szukhent was misplaced because
Szukhent's holding restricted the scope of personal jurisdiction to physical presence.
Moreover, even when the Court has indicated that jurisdictional limitations are not based on
concerns of state sovereignty but are merely liberty interests, the Court still has required contacts
between the defendant and the forum seeking to assert jurisdiction. See Compagnie de Bauxite, 456
U.S. at 701-02.(defendant's sanction for failure to comply with discovery requests may include find-
ing of personal jurisdiction, apparently consent through bad acts). The Court stated:
[o]ur holding today does not alter the requirement that there be "minimum contacts" be-
tween the nonresident defendant and the forum State. Rather, our holding deals with how
the facts needed to show those "minimum contacts" can be established when the defendant
fails to comply with court-ordered discovery.
Id. at 702 n.10.
155. In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985), the Supreme Court rejected
the notion that a single contract between a nonresident of the forum defendant and a resident was
sufficient, in and of itself, to subject the nonresident to personal jurisdiction within the forum. See
id. at 478 ("If the question is whether an individual's contract with an out-of-state party alone can
automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party's home forum, we believe the
answer clearly is that it cannot."). For discussion of whether personal jurisdiction may be main-
tained on the basis of a single contract, see generally Pamela J. Stephens, The Single Contract as
Minimum Contacts: Justice Brennan "Has it His Way," 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 89 (1986);
Duncan E. Barber, Note, Minimum Contacts in Single Contracts Cases: Burger King Has Its Way,
1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 505 (1986); Paul Eric Clay, Note, Quest for a Bright Line Personal Jurisdiction
Rule in Contract Disputes, 61 WASH. L. REV. 703 (1986); Leslie L. Davenport, Note, Personal Juris-
diction in a Commercial Context: The Effect of Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 19 CONN. L. REV.
641 (1987); Valerie Ann Hall, Note, Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz" The Minimum Con-
tacts Test Meets the Modern-Day Franchise Agreement, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 169 (1986); Chris-
tie A. Linskens, Note, Jurisdiction in Single Contract Cases: Burger King Sets the Standard, 69
MARQ. L. REV. 645 (1986).
The use of a forum selection clause as a basis for personal jurisdiction can involve an even more
tenuous connection to the forum than the use rejected as insufficient in Burger King. In The
Bremen, the Court spoke of the desirability of parties contracting for a "neutral forum" in which to
resolve any dispute that may arise. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
Presumably, "neutral forum" means that neither of the parties is a resident of the forum. In con-
trast, Burger King rejected jurisdiction based upon a single contract even though one of the parties
was a resident. The residency of one party to the contract at least gives the forum some connection
to the dispute.
But see Heller Financial, Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1292 n.4 (7th Cir.
1989) (citing Burger King for support, court stated that "[o]bviously, a valid forum-selection clause,
even standing alone, can confer personal jurisdiction").
156. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
157. In the context of venue, the Court has recognized the distinction between the creation of
an agency that causes venue to exist in a forum where the agent is located and the attempt to directly
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diction is confined to consent to a lawsuit arising from an act within the forum
or contact with the forum.15 8 As a forum selection clause does not oust a court
of jurisdiction,15 9 it also should not be considered to confer jurisdiction in a
forum where it does not otherwise exist. 160
Because the issue of forum selection enforcement was presented to The
Bremen Court only in the derogation context, 16 1 the Court perhaps did not rec-
ognize that its holding could be interpreted as allowing parties to affect basic
principles of procedure and thereby create jurisdiction. It would have been very
interesting indeed if the Court had been confronted with a forum selection
clause in the prorogation context. For example, if the clause had designated the
courts of Nebraska as the forum for any litigation arising under the contract,
would the Court have enforced the clause, which would have entailed holding
that the contract formed the basis for creating personal jurisdiction in Nebraska?
As the Court has never held that a single contract standing alone forms the basis
for establishing personal jurisdiction, the answer most likely would be no. Nev-
ertheless, not only does the reasoning in The Bremen indicate the Court would
have ruled to the contrary, but the Court also embraced the concept of allowing
parties to reorder the power of a court when it stated that courts should enforce
parties' choice to have disputes resolved in a "neutral forum.' 1 62 The Court's
notion of neutral forum implies a forum that does not have any contacts with
either party, let alone minimum contacts, as are required in a personal jurisdic-
tion analysis, and it implies a forum that does not necessarily comply with statu-
tory venue requirements. 63
Concerns of whether a contractual conferral of jurisdiction would negate
confer venue by consent. In Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 175 (1939), the Court
held that the designation of an agent for service of process within a state provides for both personal
jurisdiction and venue over the defendant corporation in the state where process may be had upon
the agent. The existence of the agency caused the corporation to be considered a "resident" of the
forum state and venue to be proper with the then-existing venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 112, that fixed
venue by residence. Id. at 167, 171. Neirbo was distinguished in Oldering v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co.,
Inc., 346 U.S. 338 (1953), where the Court held that a non-resident motorist statute authorizing
service of process upon the Secretary of State of the state in which a party was operating a motor
vehicle did not provide for venue in that state.
158. See supra notes 145, 153-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the minimum con-
tacts analysis of personal jurisdiction.
159. See supra notes 48-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial rejection of the
ouster doctrine.
160. But see Gruson, supra note 6, at 136 (arguing that exclusive forum selection clause oper-
ates as submission to jurisdiction of contractual forum). Mr. Gruson's argument misses the point.
Without the necessary "minimum contacts" or service of process within the forum, perhaps by
means of agency, the court does not have jurisdiction to which the defendant may submit. Mr.
Gruson's argument would have the clause operate as both the contact that creates the jurisdiction
and the submission to jurisdiction.
161. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of forum selection clauses in
the derogation context.
162. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
163. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (choice of venue based on several concepts, all of which are based
upon connection between forum and parties and/or claim presented, such as defendant residence,
locale of events giving rise to claim, location where defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction).
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minimum contacts requirements were not a problem, of course, for the High
Court of Justice in London. The court rejected Zapata's objection to the exer-
cise of jurisdiction over it and held that the contract conferred personal jurisdic-
tion on the court."64 The English view as to the extent to which parties may
confer personal jurisdiction upon a court is broader than the American view.1 6 5
This being so, the English court's willingness to find personal jurisdiction solely
by virtue of a contractual provision did not justify the United States Supreme
Court's adoption of a view of forum selection clauses that stands principles of
American civil procedure on its head. Yet the Court apparently did just that by
reasoning that giving prima facie effect to forum selection clauses was essential
in light of changing commercial markets to encourage and foster the participa-
tion of American business and industry in "expanding international trade."' 66
Unfortunately, the Court did not mention that a potential effect of its holding is
that parties will be able to confer jurisdiction on a court, even if neither party
has any contacts with the forum in which the court is located.1 67
164. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 4.
165. Civil law jurisdictions also are more favorably disposed to the enforcement of forum selec-
tion clauses. See Borchers, supra note 6, at 56 n.2 (citing authorities discussing that civil law tradi-
tions of party autonomy were much more favorable for enforcement of prorogation forum selection
clause).
166. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.
The Court also stated:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged, if notwith-
standing solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be re-
solved under our laws and in our courts.
Id. at 9.
... [I]n an era of expanding world trade and commerce, the absolute aspects of the doc-
trine of the Carbon Black case have little place and would be a heavy hand indeed on the
future development of international commercial dealings by Americans. We cannot have
trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms,
governed by our laws, and resolved by our laws.
Id.
... [A]greeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element
in international trade, commerce, and contracting.
Id. at 14.
... [I]n light of present-day commercial realities and expanding international trade we
conclude that the forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set
aside.
Id. at 15.
See also J.D. Becker, The Chaparral/Bremen Litigation: Two Commentaries" Forum Selection
Clauses and Anglo-American Unity, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 329, 329 (1973) (The Bremen is remark-
ably internationalist); Borchers, supra note 6, at 63 (The Bremen was "notable not only for its result,
but also for its refreshingly cosmopolitan tone"); Gilbert, supra note 6, at 3 (forum selection clauses
desirable to parties in international transactions).
167. There is no discussion in the Court's opinion of a forum selection clause contained in a
purely domestic contract specifying a domestic forum. As mentioned, perhaps the Court was only
concerned with forum selection clauses in the derogation context. Nevertheless, the holding of The
Bremen has not been limited to such a context. See Gruson, supra note 6, at 149 ("Federal Courts
have universally agreed that the teaching of The Bremen is not limited to admiralty cases nor to
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The skeptical reader may be thinking that if a party may confer jurisdiction
upon a court with which the party lacks minimum contacts merely by appearing
before the court and failing to raise a jurisdictional objection, 168 or, if a party
can confer venue upon a court that does not properly have statutory venue over
the action by failing to raise a venue objection,1 69 why not allow a party to
confer jurisdiction upon the court contractually.1 70 The situations are simply
not analogous.
Where a party waives its objection to a court's lack of personal jurisdiction
or lack of venue by appearing before the Court, the party is not seeking to alter
the extent of the court's power to hear a case. The party is, in fact, submitting to
the existing jurisdictional reach of the court by appearing where an action has
been filed and choosing to waive any jurisdictional or venue objections that the
party may have. For purposes of conceptual clarity, that situation should be
referred to as "procedural waiver." It is that act of submitting through appear-
ance within the forum to the court's jurisdiction that distinguishes procedural
cases involving the selection of a foreign forum but applies to all forum selection clauses even if they
select a domestic forum and even if they arise in a suit between parties of different states."). See also
infra notes 260-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether the holding of The Bremen
can properly be limited to admiralty. The Bremen has additionally been applied in state courts. See,
e.g., Gruson, supra note 6, at 149-50 (number of states have followed The Bremen); Solimine, supra
note 2, at 56 (although The Bremen limited to admiralty cases with international overtones, has had
precedential effect in state courts).
The Bremen Court specifically distinguished the contractual provision before it from a provision
in a contract between domestic corporations specifying a foreign forum, and suggested that in the
latter situation, a forum selection clause would not be enforced. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17
("We are not here dealing with an agreement between two Americans to resolve their essentially
local disputes in a remote alien forum.") However, The Bremen's holding has not been so limited.
See, e.g., Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Mgt. Co., 926 F.2d 865, 869 (9th Cir. 1991) (forum selection clause
contained in employment contract enforced between American corporation and American employee
designating Saudi Arabia as exclusive forum for disputes).
168. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 9, § 3.26 at 182-85 (party who enters general appearance in
action without raising objection to improper venue will be deemed to have waived all jurisdictional
objections). Objections to lack of personal jurisdiction can also be deemed waived by other conduct
before the forum court, such as failing to comply with discovery requests. See also Insurance Corp.
of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 704-05 (1982).
169. Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1), an objection to improper venue is deemed waived
unless the defenses are raised in defendant's answer or motion filed prior to defendant's answer. See
also FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 9, § 2.15 at 84-85 (discussing that "objections to venue of a particu-
lar court's venue are waived if not properly asserted").
170. Courts have in fact held that personal jurisdiction may be so contractually conferred. See,
e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 1990) (forum selection
clause that designated venue to be in specified county acted so as to confer personal jurisdiction in
that court though defendant lacked any contacts with that forum, relying on argument "since a
defendant is deemed to waive.., objections to personal jurisdiction or venue simply by not making
them in a timely fashion, a potential defendant can waive such objections in advance of suit by
signing a forum selection clause"); Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Hqtrs. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912,
921 (11 th Cir. 1989) (upholding exercise of personal jurisdiction on basis of forum selection clause
and stating "[b]ecause the nonresident defendant in the present case contractually agreed to personal
jurisdiction in Florida, the usual due process analysis need not be done"); Heller Fin., Inc. v.
Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1292 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Obviously, a valid forum-
selection clause, even standing alone, can confer personal jurisdiction.").
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waiver from the situation where a party, in advance of litigation, seeks to confer
jurisdiction contractually on a court that might otherwise not have jurisdiction.
That situation should be referred to as "procedural consent."
Procedural waiver and procedural consent are not analogous. 17 1 With pro-
cedural waiver, the parties do not affect the court's existing jurisdictional power,
but instead, they merely submit themselves to this power. 172 This submission
reflects considerations of minimum contacts and fairness. In contrast, with pro-
cedural consent, the parties seek to expand the court's jurisdictional reach.1 73
In this situation, minimum contacts do not necessarily exist. 174 Indeed, absent a
voluntary submission, there has been no contact. Moreover, as the suit has not
yet been filed, fairness cannot be assessed. Thus, these two concepts reflect very
different views of the ability of parties to alter principles of procedure contractu-
ally. That the former is unquestionably permissible, is not authority for the
existence of the latter. Similarly, the fact that parties are allowed to contract to
submit to the existing jurisdictional reach of a court, as in Szukhent, is not justi-
fication for holding that parties may contractually expand the jurisdictional
reach of a court. Nevertheless, that expansion is exactly what the Court did in
171. Though the terms consent and waiver are often used interchangeably, in common usage
the terms have separate and distinct meanings that are consistent with those suggested herein.
Waiver is a unilateral act from which results a legal consequence. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1580
(6th ed. 1990). As contemplated herein, that act is submitting to the jurisdictional reach of a court.
See id. (defining waiver, in part, as "essentially unilateral, resulting as legal consequence from some
act or conduct of party against whom it operates"). Consent is mutual agreement between two
parties. Id. at 305. There is no act other than the agreement, and therefore, no actual submission to
the power of a court as is present in a waiver. Cf. id. (defining waiver, in part, as "[a]greement;
approval; permission; the act or result of coming into harmony and accord").
See also General Contracting & Trading Co., LLC, v. Interpole, Inc., 940 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir.
1991) ("In terms of submission to a court's jurisdiction, it is possible to attempt fine distinctions
between 'waiver' and 'consent.' It can be argued, for example, that the distinction turns on whether
the manifesting conduct took place within, or outside of, the confines of the suit in question.").
172. As discussed supra, at note 151, personal jurisdiction limitations are based on concepts of
both due process liberty interests and notions of state sovereignty.
173. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie de Bauxite de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702 n. 10 (1982) (Court argued that "if the federalism concept operated as an independent restriction
on the sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction
requirement. Individual actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual
can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise be protected."). The Court asserted that
"no action by parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court." Id. at 702. The
Court confused the concepts of waiver and consent, underscoring the necessity for the distinction.
Limiting personal jurisdiction by concerns of federalism does not prevent a waiver to jurisdiction,
but it does prevent a consent. As the Court indicated, a party may "subject" itself to the powers of
the court. Id. The act of "subjecting" oneself to the court's powers is a waiver. Id. It is consent
when prior to litigation parties seek to confer jurisdiction contractually upon a forum that is uncon-
nected to the litigation, that violates a view of personal jurisdiction that includes concepts of state
sovereignty.
174. See, e.g. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 1990) (per-
sonal jurisdiction present over defendant who had no contacts with forum other than forum selection
clause that stated that venue should lie in specified county within forum, and basing personal juris-
diction solely on existence of forum selection clause); Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883
F.2d 1286, 1290 (7th Cir. 1989) (same).
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The Bremen when it invited parties to seek "neutral forums" having no connec-
tion to the litigation for resolution of potential disputes. Moreover, the Court
engaged in far too little, if any, consideration or discussion of the new power it
was bestowing upon parties. Unfortunately, the Court has thereafter relied upon
The Bremen for the proposition that prorogation clauses do not offend due pro-
cess.175 As such, jurisdictional principles were disregarded without discussion
or consideration.
B. A Very Broad View of What Is Reasonable
After the Court disposed of the ouster doctrine, and in so doing, created a
doctrine of contractual jurisdiction, the Court then had to determine the proper
standard for enforcement of forum selection clauses, that is, what should consti-
tute "reasonableness." The Court adopted the broadest formulation of reasona-
bleness, holding that "forum-selection clauses are prima facie valid and should
be enforced unless it can be shown by the resisting party that enforcement would
be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances." 1 76 To establish unreasonableness,
the resisting party must show that "trial in the contractual forum will be so
gravely difficult and inconvenient that he [the party seeking to avoid the forum-
selection clause] will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in
court." 177
In The Bremen, the Court did not discuss that two different standards of
reasonableness had developed in the lower courts. 178 Although the decision be-
low set out the contrast between the forum non conveniens formulation, sup-
ported by the majority, and the serious impairment formulation, supported by
the dissent, the Court apparently did not appreciate the differences between
them. Without acknowledging the differences in these conceptual views of en-
forcement of the forum selection clause, the Court cited cases espousing each of
the two formulations of reasonableness as precedent for the concept of enforce-
ment of reasonable clauses.' 7 9 The Court also failed to appreciate that different
views existed as to which party bore the burden in establishing reasonableness,
175. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n. 14, (1985) (Court mistakenly
stated that The Bremen Court had determined that "freely negotiated" forum selection clauses that
are not "unreasonable and unjust" do not offend due process) (citing The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 5 1972)). The Bremen opinion contains no such analysis. See The Bremen,
407 U.S. at 15 (due process does not appear anywhere on page 15). Though one cannot disagree that
the implication of The Bremen is that parties may lodge personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a
court that would not otherwise have jurisdiction, it cannot be said that the Court engaged in any due
process analysis.
176. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
177. Id. at 18.
178. See supra notes 81-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two standards of
reasonableness.
179. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10, n. 11 (citing Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casu-
alty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 345 (3d Cir. 1966) (reasonableness presumed absent proof enforcement of
forum selection clause will "subvert the interests of justice") and Cerro DePasco Copper Corp. v.
Knut Knutsen, O.A.S. 187 F.2d 990, 991 (2d Cir. 1951) (reasonableness of forum selection clause
determined through assessment of particular facts involved)).
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citing the above authority for the principle that the party "resisting" the clause
bore the burden when in fact the cited authority did not uniformly allocate the
burden to the resisting party.180
The adoption of the serious impairment formulation of reasonableness re-
moved from consideration those factors that sought to ensure some degree of
fairness to the litigants, including a weighing of the factors of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens that would require a relationship between the contractual
forum and the controversy sought to be litigated before it. Nevertheless, the
Court sought to place some limitations upon enforcement. These limitations
address contract formation issues,181 however, and not procedural fairness.1 8 2
The limitations would deem a forum selection clause unenforceable if the clause
"was invalid for fraud or overreaching."18 3 The agreement must be between
"experienced and sophisticated" business persons,184 and must have been
"freely negotiated"' 8 5 at "arm's-length."' 8 6 Additionally, the Court appeared
to limit its holding to cases in admiralty18 7 arising in the limited factual context
180. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10 (citing Central Contracting, 367 F.2d at 345 and S S.
Littlejohn, 346 F.2d at 287).
181. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9 (principles of.doctrine of forum non conveniens inconsis-
tent with modern international commercial dealings and contracts). Two main factors may have
contributed to the Court's emphasis on contract formation issues. First, for Judge Hand, the trend
toward judicial acceptance of forum selection clauses indicated that forum selection clauses should
only be enforced when each party is "fully advised" of the effect of the claim. Krenger v. Penn-
sylvania R.R. Co., 174 F.2d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 1949). Judge Hand noted that whether a person
voluntarily agreed to a forum selection clause would be decided using principles of contract forma-
tion. Id. Second, in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964), the Court
addressed the question of whether a submission to jurisdiction was a constitutional waiver subject to
the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent standard analysis, or was a contract question to be governed
by "mere contract law," deciding that the question was jurisdictional in nature. The Court's atten-
tion to these contract formation factors may have been its attempt to address the question of the
standard for civil waiver.
182. But see The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15-16 (discussing that forum selection clause would be
found invalid if "enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is
brought"). Unfortunately, confusion as to the meaning of this factor minimizes its application in a
calculus of enforcement considerations.
Commentators differ on whether public policy is a separate factor to be considered, or is part of
the "unreasonable" prong. See, e.g., Covey & Morris, supra note 113, at 839 (public policy factor is
separate consideration and part of "four-prong test"); Gruson, supra note 6, at 149 (The Bremen
standard involves two factors, unreasonableness and contractual defenses of fraud and
overreaching).
183. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.
184. Id. at 12.
185. Id. To determine whether the clause had been freely negotiated and not the result of
undue influence or overwhelming bargaining power, the Court considered whether: (1) the clause
was part of a pre-printed form contract; (2) several companies had bid for the contract; and (3) the
parties had in fact engaged in negotiations that resulted in "numerous changes in the contract." Id.
at 12 n.14, 13 n.15.
186. Id. at 12.
187. See id. at 10 (this is correct doctrine to be followed by federal district courts sitting in
admiralty).
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of international agreements.188
The enforcement of a forum selection clause freely agreed to and negotiated
by experienced and sophisticated international corporations cannot be said to be
unfair or unjust. The difficulty created by adopting the serious impairment for-
mulation of reasonableness is that the Court removed much of the trial judge's
discretion to make determinations of when enforcement is reasonable. 189 Conse-
quently, the phrase "prima facie valid" was routinely invoked to enforce forum
selection clauses almost automatically,1 90 even in contexts where enforcement
may not have been fair or just. 191
188. See id. at 12-17.
The Court repeatedly emphasized that it was considering enforcement of the forum selection
clause in the context of an international agreement:
There are compelling reasons why a freely negotiated private international agreement...
such as that involved here, should be given full effect.
Id. at 12-13.
In this case, for example, we are concerned with a far from routine transaction between
companies of two different nations.
Id. at 13.
Thus, in light of present-day commercial realities and expanding international trade we
conclude that the forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set
aside.
Id. at 15.
Those considerations [the towage business in American waters] are not controlling in an
international commercial agreement.
Id. at 17.
We are not dealing here with an agreement between two Americans to resolve their essen-
tially local disputes in a remote alien forum.
Id. at 17.
This case, however, involves a freely negotiated international commercial transaction.
Id. at 17.
[S]election of a London forum was clearly a reasonable effort to bring vital certainty to this
international transaction.
Id. at 12-17.
189. See id. at 20 (White, J., concurring) (district court best equipped to adjudge matters of
forum selection clause enforceability).
190. See, e.g., Solimine, supra note 2, at 52 (recent judicial trend is almost invariable enforce-
ment of forum selection clauses); Lederman, supra note 31, at 432 (Bremen test almost always re-
sults in enforcement of forum selection clause).
191. The enforcement of forum selection clauses contained in employment contracts presents
one of the greatest opportunities for unfairness because of the inequality of bargaining power be-
tween employer and employee. See Spradlin v. Lear Siegler, 926 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1990) (enforcing
forum selection clause designating Saudi Arabia as exclusive forum for disputes arising from employ-
ment contract between American citizen and Delaware corporation in suit by employee who had
been terminated from employment in Saudi Arabia and ordered to leave country).
The enforcement of forum selection clauses in passenger tickets also presents an opportunity for
an unfair result from enforcement due to the disparity in bargaining power. See infra notes 323-85
and accompanying text for discussion of Shute, an example of an unfair result.
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C. Circling Back to an Altered Starting Point
It is an interesting circle in which the Court reasoned in bringing the forum
selection clause from repudiation to prima facie validity. It began with a rejec-
tion of the "ouster doctrine" in order to find forum selection clauses enforceable
as a declination of jurisdiction by the courts, rather than an "ouster" of jurisdic-
tion by the parties. Thereafter, the circuitous path enabled parties to confer
jurisdiction where it would otherwise not exist. Relying on precedent errone-
ously interpreted to mean that parties may confer jurisdiction on a forum led the
Court to adopt a standard of reasonableness-the serious impairment formula-
tion-which placed a heavy burden on a resisting party. This formulation al-
lowed for little, if any, trial court discretion. Conversely the concept of
declining jurisdiction implies that the declination is not pro forma but discre-
tionary. Nevertheless, when there is limited opportunity for the exercise of dis-
cretion because the enforcement standard gives effect to forum selection clauses
in almost all situations, the result certainly resembles an ouster of the court's
power by an agreement of the parties. Yet, the Court thought there to be no
question that a forum selection clause did not effectuate an ouster.1 92 Thus,
although a forum selection clause technically does not oust jurisdiction, practi-
cally speaking, the Court's analysis permits the clause to alter a court's jurisdic-
tional power. The Court had circled back to its starting point, but the concept
that parties cannot contractually alter a court's jurisdictional power that set its
reasoning in motion was now seriously altered, if not reversed.
V. STEWART v. RIcoH: A VERY DIFFERENT CONCEPTUAL VIEW
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Stewart Organization, Inc. v.
Ricoh 193 to resolve the Erie 194 question of whether enforcement of a forum
selection clause in an action in diversity was a question of state or federal law.
The Court held that the enforcement of a forum selection clause was governed
by federal law. 195 The applicable federal law, however, was not that of The
192. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
193. 487 U.S. 22 (1987).
194. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (federal district court sitting in diver-
sity should apply state law to substantive issues and federal law to procedural issues); Stewart, 487
U.S. at 24. The circuits were split on the issue. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits had considered the
question of the enforcement of a forum selection clause to be procedural and applied federal law.
See, e.g., Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theaters, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 279 (9th Cir. 1984);
Crown Beverage Co. v. Cerveceria Moctezuma, S.A., 663 F.2d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 1981) (enforce-
ment of forum selection clause controlled by federal law); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810
F.2d 1066, 1068 (1 1th Cir.) (federal law governed enforcement of forum selection clause) (per
curiam) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 487 U.S. 22 (1987). The Third Circuit treated the ques-
tion of the enforcement of a forum selection clause as a question of substantive state contract law.
See, e.g., General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc. 783 F.2d 352, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1986)
(enforceability of forum selection clauses governed by state law).
195. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28.
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Bremen but rather, the transfer of venue statute. 196
Commentators faulted the holding for its resolution of the Erie question
and its failure to address at least some of the outstanding questions concerning
forum selection clause enforcement.197 In actuality, the Stewart decision did not
dodge the issues surrounding forum selection clauses. Instead, it reconceptual-
ized the forum selection clause from its previous view in The Bremen and at-
tempted to rein in the ability of parties to reorder procedure. Under the Stewart
approach, the forum selection clause does not reorder procedural principles but
is merely a factor to be considered in determining where venue is proper. 198
This view of the forum selection clause is the same as that applied by lower
courts prior to The Bremen that utilized the forum non conveniens formulation
of reasonableness. 199 Thus, the Stewart Court's view of forum selection clauses
was very different from The Bremen's view fifteen years prior. Unfortunately,
the Court did not reverse The Bremen and made only an inadequate attempt to
distinguish it.2 ° °
The decision in Stewart represents the Court's narrowest view of the ability
of parties privately to reorder procedure. Contrary to commentator criticism,
this narrow view serves to resolve many of the questions alleged to have been left
unaddressed in Stewart, such as what is the proper procedural mechanism for
enforcement, and how does a forum selection clause affect choice of law con-
cerns.20 1 Nevertheless, one fundamental issue is not resolved: why two such
different conceptualizations of the forum selection clause?
A. Redefining the Concept
Stewart presented the Court with the opportunity to consider the enforce-
ment of a forum selection clause imported from The Bremen context of an ac-
tion in admiralty involving international trade to the context of a diversity
action involving a domestic contract. 20 2 Stewart Organization, a closely-held
196. See id. at 28 (federal transfer of venue statute governs enforcement of forum selection
clause).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought."
197. See infra note 290 and accompanying text for a partial list of these commentators.
198. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29.
199. See supra notes 82, 86-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
200. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28-29.
201. See infra notes 390-93 and accompanying text for discussion of how these concerns are
resolved.
202. For discussions of Stewart, see generally, eg., Borchers, supra note 6, at 68-71; Richard
D. Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TULANE L. REV. 1087, 1113-17 (1989); Mullenix, Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at 332-39; Solimine, supra note 2, at 61-64; Note, The Enforce-
ability of Forum-Selection Clauses After Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corporation, 6 ALASKA
L. REV. 175 (1989); Robert A. de By, Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Substantive or Proceduralfor
Erie Purposes, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1068 1074-75 (1989); Stephen R. Buckingham, Case Comment,
Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp.: Judicial Discretion in Forum Selection, 41 RUTGERS L. REV.
1379, 1379-81 (1989); Julia L. Erickson, Note, Forum Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine
and Federal Common Law: Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corporation, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1090
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Alabama corporation, and Ricoh Corporation, a New Jersey corporation with
its principal place of business in New York that manufactured copiers for na-
tionwide distribution, entered into an agreement for Stewart to become a dealer
in Alabama of defendant's copiers.20 3 The agreement contained a clause speci-
fying that disputes arising under the contract could be litigated only in a Man-
hattan court. 2°4
A dispute arose, and Stewart filed state and federal claims against Ricoh in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.20 5
Ricoh responded by seeking to have the forum selection clause enforced either
by means of a motion to transfer venue to the Southern District of New York
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or by a motion to dismiss for improper venue
under 28 U.S.C. § 1406.206 These alternative motions placed the conceptual is-
sue of the fundamental nature of the forum selection clause squarely before the
Court. A motion under § 1404(a) is premised upon an action having proper
venue, 20 7 while a motion under § 1406 is appropriate where venue is im-
proper.208 Therefore, the Court faced the issue of whether a forum selection
clause reorders the fundamental procedural principles as to where venue is
proper.2 °9
Alabama law considered forum selection clauses to be contrary to public
policy and therefore unenforceable. 210 Thus the Erie question was formed. If
the court applied state law, the defendant's motions would be denied because the
(1988); Eric Fahlman, Note, Forum-Selection Clauses" Should State or Federal Law Determine Valid-
ity in Diversity Actions?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 439, 442-46 (1989); Matthew W. Lampe, Note, Forum
Selection Clauses Designating Foreign Courts Does Federal or State Law Govern Enforceability in
Diversity Cases? A Question Left Open by Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 22 CORNELL
INT'L L. J. 307, 309-11 (1989); Lederman, supra note 31, at 159-60.
203. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24-25.
204. Id. at 24 n.1. The clause stated:
Dealer and Ricoh agree that any appropriate state or federal district court located in the
Borough of Manhattan, New York City, New York, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
any case or controversy arising under or in connection with this Agreement and shall be a
proper forum in which to adjudicate such case or controversy.
Id.
It is somewhat curious to consider what was intended by the phrase "any appropriate." One
view could be that it was a nod of the head to the fact that the parties could not confer subject matter
jurisdiction upon a court. Such view makes particular sense in light of the derogation effect of the
clause in the context of this action--defendant seeking to have the case dismissed or transferred to
Manhattan. What though if Ricoh had been the plaintiff and was attempting to use the clause to file
suit against Stewart in Manhattan? If no other basis existed to obtain personal jurisdiction over
Stewart, would the clause create it? Would a New York court that did not have personal jurisdiction
absent the clause be an "appropriate" court?
205. Id. at 24.
206. Id.
207. See supra note 196 and accompanying text for a discussion of transfer of venue.
208. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) ("The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying
venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such
case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.")
209. See infra notes 271-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of this point.
210. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 647 (1lth Cir. 1986).
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clause would not be considered valid. If the court applied federal law, the stan-
dards of enforcement from The Bremen would be implicated, and, therefore, the
decision would resolve the issue of whether the holding in The Bremen was to be
limited to actions in admiralty involving international trade or would extend to
purely domestic disputes.211 It also would clarify what limits the language
"freely negotiated" places on the enforceability of such clauses. 21 2 For although
Stewart was not an unsophisticated business person,2 13 other factors that the
The Bremen Court had said were necessary to indicate that a clause had in fact
been freely negotiated were not present.2 14 The clause was in a pre-printed form
contract for which Stewart did not negotiate and apparently had no power to
alter.2 15
The district court held that state law governed the question of the enforce-
ability of a forum selection clause and consequently refused to enforce the
clause.2 16 On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
211. Though the language of the opinion in The Bremen may have indicated a limited applica-
tion of its holding, see supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text, the opinion was applied outside
that context. See Gruson, supra note 6, at 149 ("Federal courts have universally agreed that the
teaching of The Bremen is not limited to admiralty cases nor to cases involving the selection of a
foreign forum but applies to all forum-selection clauses even if they select a domestic forum and even
if they arise in a suit between parties of different states.").
212. See supra note 185 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "freely negotiated"
language.
213. See Stewart, 779 F.2d at 644. The Court described Mr. Stewart, one of the two controlling
figures of the closely held plaintiff corporation, as "a man afflicted with the Midas touch." Id. Mr.
Stewart was attributed to having been involved in several ventures, each with multi-million dollar
profits. Id. He had taken the local copying business that was the subject of this dispute from a
"$750,000 indebtedness to sales of $1.8 million in one year." Id. Though multi-million dollar prof-
its do not necessarily indicate sophistication in business matters, their existence would appear to
make such a conclusion not unjustified.
214. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) (courts should also con-
sider whether clause was part of preprinted contract, whether parties had negotiated as to contract
terms, and whether several companies had bid for contract). See supra note 185 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the "freely negotiated" language.
215. See Stewart, 779 F.2d at 644-45 ("Mr. Bob Banks of Ricoh presented Mr. Stewart with a
printed 'Dealer Sales Agreement'... . Banks stated that the contract was standard and no changes of
substance would be permitted, and he pushed Stewart to sign it so that Banks could catch his plane
back to Atlanta. Stewart never did read the clause until his counsel pointed it out to him prior to
this suit.").
216. Id. at 645. The district court also placed weight upon the fact that Stewart had brought
additional claims that would not have been covered by the forum selection clause because such
claims did not arise under the contract that contained the clause, but arose under federal law. Id.
The Supreme Court viewed this issue somewhat differently, phrasing it in terms of an Erie problem.
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 (1988). That is, if state law were applied to the
diversity claims requiring the clause to not be enforced under Alabama law, severance of the action
would then be necessitated because the application of The Bremen standard to the federal question
claims would have required the transfer of those claims to a Manhattan forum if the clause was
enforced. This issue was not addressed by either the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit for
different reasons. The Eleventh Circuit treated the case as a diversity case, see Stewart, 779 F.2d at
647 (venue in diversity action is "manifestly" governed by federal law), while the Supreme Court
viewed the issue as academic in light of its holding that the federal venue transfer statute governs the
enforceability question. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 20 (plain language of venue statute controls appli-
1993] FORUM SELECTION CLA USE
Eleventh Circuit reversed. 217 The appellate court echoed the reasoning of past
courts in regard to the ouster doctrine-enforcement of a forum selection clause
does not oust jurisdiction but merely is a declination of jurisdiction. 2 18 An Erie
doctrine analysis then led the Eleventh Circuit to hold that enforcement was a
matter of federal procedural law.2 19 The court applied the practical impairment
formulation from The Bremen, which had been termed "an exceptionally heavy
burden," and held the clause to be reasonable. 220 The Eleventh Circuit found
that enforcement was prevented neither by a serious impairment to plaintiff of
having to pursue litigation in Manhattan, nor by the lack of negotiation that is
inherent in a pre-printed contract presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.22 1
Upon rehearing en banc, the Eleventh Circuit was badly divided. 222 A ma-
jority of eight judges held that the Erie question was governed by federal law.22 3
Five judges dissented on this issue.224 The eight judge majority, however, was
split as to what that federal law was. 225 Five judges applied the severe impair-
ment formulation of The Bremen ,226 while three judges, concurring in the hold-
ing as to the Erie question, advocated for a standard of enforcement that
harkened back to the forum non conveniens formulation of reasonableness. 227
That is, these three judges proposed a standard that, though providing for en-
forcement of a forum selection clause, does not allow parties by contract to alter
existing principles of procedure. Under this reasoning, the contract may be en-
forced, but only within the existing procedural framework by means of a motion
cability of clause). See also Mullenix, Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at 335 n.229
(severance question remains unresolved and troubling).
217. Stewart, 779 F.2d at 651.
218. See id. at 647 ("There is no question that Alabama courts have jurisdiction; the only
question is whether they are the appropriate venue."). See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of the ouster doctrine.
219. Stewart, 779 F.2d at 647.
220. Id. at 649.
221. Id. at 649-50.
222. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1067 (1Ith Cir. 1987) (eight to five
decision) (per curiam), aff'd, 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1071 (Godbold, J., dissenting) (joined by Vance, J., Hatchett, J., Clark, J., and
Edmondson, J.).
225. See id. at 1067 (whether individuals can contractually alter forum discussed); id. at 1071
(Tjoflat, J., concurring) (district court erred by not considering choice of forum clause).
226. See id. at 1066-71 (per curiam, joined by Roney, C. J., Hill, J., Fay, J., Johnson, J., and
Tuttle, Senior J., applying The Bremen test).
227. See id. at 1071-76 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring joined by Kravitch, J. and Anderson,
J., applying reasonableness standard).
The commentators have not discussed the divergent approaches to the applicable standard for
enforcement reflected in the majority and concurring opinions. Though one might not ordinarily
expect discussion of a concurring opinion, in this instance it is crucial to an understanding of the
Supreme Court's decision in Stewart. The much criticized opinion of the Court largely adopts Judge
Tjoflat's concurring opinion in the Eleventh Circuit. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 25 n.2 (citing Stewart,
810 F.2d at 1071 (Tjoflat, J., concurring)). Most importantly, Judge Tjoflat's opinion answers many
of the questions commentators have stated were left unanswered by Stewart. See Stewart, 810 F.2d
at 1072 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
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to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1404(a). 2 28 The agreement of the parties is
merely one factor to be considered in deciding the motion.
Judge Tjoflat, writing a specially concurring opinion, discussed several im-
portant conceptual points in regard to the ability of parties privately to reorder
procedure. First, parties may not contractually confer jurisdiction upon a court
in which jurisdiction would otherwise not be present.229 Judge Tjoflat recog-
nized that acceptance of a derogation clause would not necessarily result in ac-
ceptance of a prorogation clause, as the differing contexts present very different
questions as to the extent to which parties may contractually reorder procedural
principles.
Second, Judge Tjoflat recognized that a forum selection clause does not oust
a court of venue. 230 Therefore, a plaintiff who signed a forum selection clause
but filed suit in a forum other than the contractual forum is not subject to having
the suit dismissed for improper venue if the selected venue is otherwise proper
within the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1392.231 Because venue is other-
wise proper, the question of whether to enforce the forum selection clause be-
comes a question of whether the case should be transferred to the contractual
forum pursuant to the federal venue transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404.232 Be-
cause § 1404 codifies the principles of the forum non conveniens doctrine with
the mitigated consequence of transfer instead of dismissal, 233 this approach is
228. Id. at 1072 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
229. Id. at 1075 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) ("[J]ust as parties may not confer jurisdiction on an
Alabama court, 'contract provision which attempts to limit the jurisdiction of the courts of this state
are unenforceable.' ") (quoting Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554, 556 (1980)).
230. Id. at 1073 (Tjoflat) J., specially concurring, joined by Kravitch, J. and Anderson, J.)
(Northern District of Alabama constituted proper venue because Ricoh did business in that district
as well as New York; district court, therefore, properly denied Ricoh's § 1406(a) motion to dismiss).
231. See supra notes 42-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasoning that a
forum selection clause does not oust a court of jurisdiction, which seems to be analagous to Judge
Tjoflat's reasoning about venue ouster.
232. Stewart, 810 F.2d at 1074 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
233. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) revisor's note (statute drafted in accord with doc-
trine of forum non conveniens, allowing transfer to more convenient forum, although venue is
proper).
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, even though venue is proper, a district court can
dismiss an action if the forum in which the suit was filed was not considered to be appropriate based
upon considerations of party and forum convenience. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,
507-12 (1947) (suit dismissed where proper venue inappropriate based on location of witnesses and
events leading to suit). Dismissal, however, can effectively prevent refiling if the statute of limita-
tions has run. See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1955). The transfer provision of
subsection 1404(a) mitigates against this harsh result by allowing a district court to transfer rather
than dismiss the suit. Id. Therefore, transfer under § 1404(a) may be available upon a lesser show-
ing than under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Id. at 32. Because a district court can only
transfer an action to another district court and cannot effectuate a transfer to a state or foreign court,
the doctrine of forum non conveniens retains vitality in those situations. See generally Hon. Irving
R. Kaufman, Observations on Transfers Under Section 1404(a) of the New Judicial Code, 10 F.R.D.
595, 600 (1951) (§ 1404(a) does not replace forum non conveniens when foreign litigants are in-
volved since it only applies to transfers to district courts); Herbert J. Korbel, The Law of Federal
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directly analogous to the forum non conveniens formulation of "reasonableness"
developed by earlier courts.234 Both avenues of analysis provide for the exercise
of judicial discretion in weighing factors of party convenience, availability of
evidence, etc. in determining the appropriate forum for litigation.2 35 This stands
in sharp contrast to The Bremen standard, in which the forum agreement of the
parties obviated the need for judicial discretion in determining enforcement, ex-
cept in a few very limited areas, mostly related to contract formation
considerations. 236
Third, Judge Tjoflat concluded that a forum selection clause has no effect
on other principles of procedure and is simply a venue fixing device.2 37 Judge
Tjoflat discussed at some length that choice of law principles remain intact.238
Venue and Choice of the Most Convenient Forum, 15 RUTGERs L. REV. 607, 611-12 (1961)
(§ 1404(a) applies only when there are at least two district courts in which venue would be proper);
Richard S. Masington, Venue in the Federal Courts - The Problem of the Inconvenient Forum, 15
MIAMI L. REV. 237, 239 (1961) (forum non conveniens still has vitality when more convenient
forum lies in state or foreign court); David E. Steinberg, The Motion to Transfer and the Interests of
Justice, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 443 (1990); Note, Transfer of Civil Actions Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), 36 IND. L.J. 344, 347 (1961) (district court may dismiss suit under forum non conveniens
when there is no other federal district court to transfer to).
There is one other important difference between a § 1404(a) transfer and a forum non con-
veniens dismissal. When an action is transferred, the transfer only changes the place of the trial;
choice of law considerations are not affected. See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text for a
discussion of choice of law considerations in a § 1404(a) transfer. Therefore, when a defendant seeks
a transfer, the court to which an action is transferred (the transferee court) applies the law that
would have been applied in the court from which the action was transferred (the transferor court).
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639-40 (1964); see also John D. Currivan, Note, Choice of Law
in Federal Court After Transfer of Venue, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 149, 163 (1977); Note, Choice of
Law After Transfer of Venue, 75 YALE L. J. 90, 130-37 (1965). This general rule equally holds true
in situations where the plaintiff seeks the transfer. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 521-
32 (1990) (transferee court must apply law of transferor court regardless of who initiates transfer).
But see Ursula Marie Henninger, Note, The Plaintiff's Forum Shopping Gold Card: Choice of Law in
Federal Courts After Transfer of Venue Under Section 1404(a) - Ferens v. John Deere Co., 26 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 809, 825 (1991) (Ferens decision overly generous to plaintiffs and encourages forum
shopping); Michael B. Rodden, Comment, Is 28 US.C § 1404(a) a Federal Forum-Shopping Stat-
ute?, 66 WASH. L. REV. 851, 870 (1991) (law of transferee court should apply to plaintiff-initiated
transfer); Candace J. Smith, Note, Plaintiff-Initiated Transfers Under 28 US.C. § 1404(a) - The
Solution to the Van Dusen v. Barrack Mystery: Ferens v. John Deere Co., 19 N. KY. L. REV. 171,
193, 207 (1991) (Ferens goes against history and intent of federal courts' role in adjudicating diver-
sity cases).
234. See supra notes 82, 86-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the forum non con-
veniens formulation of reasonableness in determining the enforcement of a forum selection clause.
235. See supra notes 19, 86-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the forum non con-
veniens and § 1404(a) factors that courts consider in determining the appropriate forum.
236. See supra notes 181 -91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the presumption of
validity of forum selection clauses unless contract formation is invalid.
237. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1076 (1 th Cir. 1987) (Tjoflat, J., spe-
cially concurring), aff'd, 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
238. See id. at 1072 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring). For discussion of choice of law questions
that are raised by the existence of a forum selection clause, see, e.g., Borchers, supra note 6, at 78-81
(choice of law discussed with regard to many cases, including when forum selection clause is accom-
panied by choice of law clause); Freer, supra note 202, at 1134-39; Gruson, supra note 6, at 185 -92
(choice of law question may depend on where suit filed, whether court views it as matter of proce-
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Although the clause may specify a forum other than that in which the action is
filed, the choice of law rules of the forum state will be applied in both the forum
state and the contractual state if the case is transferred. 239
Together, Judge Tjoflat's conclusions form a very different conceptual view
of the forum selection clause from that of The Bremen. According to Judge
Tjofiat, although parties may contract as to the appropriate venue of an action,
the enforcement of that agreement is subject to judicial discretion that considers
the convenience of the parties and the interests of justice. The parties may not
create jurisdiction where it otherwise would not exist and may not alter other
related principles of procedure.
Unfortunately, Judge Tjoflat did not explain why The Bremen did not have
to be followed. 24° The concurrence suggests that the defendant's choice of seek-
ing enforcement by a transfer motion implicates this reconceptualization of the
forum selection clause.24 1 This attempt at distinguishing Stewart from The
Bremen would lead to Stewart being ignored easily by litigants. If the effect of a
forum selection clause were dictated by the defendant's choice of enforcement
mechanism, no defendant would seek enforcement by a transfer motion because
enforcement would be less likely than under the view of The Bremen .242 Judge
Tjoflat's reasoning, however, would make a transfer motion the only method of
seeking enforcement in a derogation context; because the clause itself does not
make venue in a noncontractual forum improper, the existence of the clause is
not grounds for dismissal for improper venue.24 3 Also, the reasoning under
which the ouster doctrine was previously held not to be an obstacle to forum
selection clause enforcement necessitates that an action not be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. 244
As to the Erie question, the concurrence held that, although enforcement of
the clause was a question of federal law within the auspices of the transfer of
venue statute, state law would govern whether the clause should be given effect
dure or contract law, and whether contractual forum would apply its own law); Mullenix, Consen-
sualAdjudication Procedure, supra note 6, at 346-55 (questions raised when both choice-of-laws and
forum selection clauses in contract).
239. See Stewart, 810 F.2d at 1072-73 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) (transferor court's law
applies to case even if transferred).
240. In fact, Judge Tjoltat referred to The Bremen in stating that "its reasoning should guide
our decision." Stewart, 810 F.2d at 1075 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring). The Bremen reasoning
that Judge Tjoflat applied was that of the formation questions of whether the contract was fairly
negotiated without fraud by experienced business persons. Id.
241. See Stewart, 810 F.2d at 1075 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) ("[T]he Court in The
Bremen was not addressing the effect of a forum selection agreement in a section 1404(a) context
... .1).
242. See infra notes 317-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of issues left unresolved
after Stewart where courts did not apply its reasoning beyond the § 1404(a) context.
243. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) (improper venue defense may be made by motion); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(a) (1988) (case may be dismissed or transferred only for improper venue).
244. See supra notes 42-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of how enforcement of a
forum selection clause does not oust a court's jurisdiction.
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in considering the defendant's transfer motion. 24 5 Judge Tjoflat disagreed with
the majority, however, as to the proper rule in Alabama. It was his view that
Alabama law did not prohibit enforcement. 246
Judge Tjoflat's concurrence reasoned that the existence of a valid forum
selection clause altered the discretion to transfer under § 1404(a) because it "cre-
ates a conclusive presumption" as to the lack of inconvenience in the contractual
forum. 247 This presumption then operates to shift the burden in a transfer mo-
tion to the party opposing the motion-the plaintiff who has filed in the non-
contractual forum.248 Judge Tjoflat argued that plaintiff had not carried the
burden, and, therefore, the action should be transferred to the contractual
forum.
2 4 9
Thus, in its consideration of Stewart, the Supreme Court was faced with the
Erie question of whether to apply state or federal law in determining the en-
forcement of the forum selection clause and with the court of appeals' divided
view as to whether the applicable source of federal law was common law devel-
oped in The Bremen or the federal venue transfer statute. The Court adopted
the reasoning of Judge Tjoflat's concurrence 250 and held that the transfer of
venue statute governed the question of enforcement. 251 By adopting this reason-
ing, the Court surely must have adopted the same conceptual view of forum
selection clauses generally. Unfortunately, the Court did not explain its view
with the clarity of Judge Tjoflat.
245. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1075-76 (Tjoflat, J., specially concur-
ring) (per curiam) (I1th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 487 U.S. 20 (1988).
246. Id. at 1075-76 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
247. Id. at 1074 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
248. Id. at 1075 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
Judge Tjoflat's discussion concerning the shifting of the burden sounds very similar to The
Bremen's discussion concerning the prima facie validity of a forum selection clause and the very
heavy burden borne by the party opposing enforcement of the clause. See supra notes 176-91 and
accompanying text for a discussion of The Bremen approach to enforcing forum selection clauses.
This similarity weakens the attempt at formulating a conceptual view different from that of The
Bremen.
Additionally, a conclusive presumption as to the convenience of the contractual forum is in
error for several reasons. First, convenience in terms of § 1404(a) includes convenience of both the
parties and witnesses. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (transfer evaluated in light of convenience of parties
and witnesses). Though a party may be bound as to its own convenience, that party cannot anticipate
what will be convenient to the witnesses. Second, even if a forum selection clause did create a
conclusive presumption as to convenience of the contractual forum, it does not necessarily follow
that the burden is shifted in a § 1404(a) motion. There are factors considered other than conven-
ience, such as the interest of justice. Third, if a presumption is created, it should be rebuttable.
There can be many intervening factors between the entering and enforcement of a forum selection
clause, such as availability of evidence and witnesses, that could render a forum extremely inconve-
nient although it did not seem so earlier. Fourth, if the choice of forum by a plaintiff in filing an
action does not create a conclusive presumption as to convenience, why should the earlier event of
agreeing to a forum selection clause be a conclusive presumption? Cf. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 9,
§ 2.17, at 93 (transfer under § 1404(a) is available to plaintiff and defendant alike).
249. Stewart, 810 F.2d at 1075 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
250. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 1, 25 n.2, 28 (1988) (federal law governs
venue dispute under § 1404(a)).
251. Id. at 32.
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The lack of conceptual clarity in the Supreme Court's opinion arises be-
cause the Court did not address whether a forum selection clause confers juris-
diction upon a court,252 or whether a forum selection clause alters choice of law
considerations. 253 These two omissions led to much discussion by commenta-
tors that the related issues were unresolved. 254 Though the Court did not di-
rectly discuss the jurisdictional aspects of a forum selection clause,255 it would
seem that by holding that forum selection clause enforcement was a venue ques-
tion governed by the transfer of venue statute, the Court strongly implied that a
forum selection clause simply is a matter of venue and is not jurisdictional in any
sense.
256
The Court discussed that a forum selection clause does not operate to effect
an ouster of venue from a noncontractual forum, but the discussion was placed
inconspicuously in a footnote and rather vaguely explained. 2 57 This conceptual
view that a forum selection clause does not cause otherwise proper venue to be
improper appears to have gone unnoticed, because after Stewart, courts held
that when a defendant seeks enforcement of a forum selection clause by means
other than a § 1404(a) transfer motion, such as a motion to dismiss for improper
venue, the holding of Stewart need not be followed. 258 The point in Stewart has
252. See supra notes 158-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inability of forum
selection clauses to confer jurisdiction on a court.
253. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of how forum selection
clauses have no effect on choice of law considerations.
254. See infra notes 390-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unresolved issues
with respect to forum selection clauses.
255. As in The Bremen, Stewart dealt with enforcement of a derogation clause. Therefore, the
question of whether a forum selection clause confers personal jurisdiction was not before the Stewart
Court, as it was not in The Bremen. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
256. Some commentators have called for a merger of the concepts of personal jurisdiction and
venue into one doctrine. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue
for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 437 (1981) (reasonableness of jurisdiction
and fairness of venue represent same constitutional concept and should be merged); Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, From State Jurisdiction to Interstate Venue, 50 ORE. L. REV. 103, 107 (1971) (state
jurisdiction must yield to interstate venue thereby safeguarding defendants procedural rights); David
L. Seidelson, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Hearing Federal Cases An Examination of the Propriety
of the Limitations Imposed by Venue Restrictions, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 82, 100 (1968) (venue
statutes restrict personal jurisdiction and should be eliminated to allow plaintiff to choose forum).
Nevertheless, venue and personal jurisdiction remain separate and independent requirements each of
which must be satisfied if suit is to be maintained in specific forum.
257. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28 n.8 (1988) ("The parties do not
dispute that the District Court properly denied the motion to dismiss for improper venue under 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a) because respondent apparently does business in the Northern District of Ala-
bama."); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (venue proper in judicial district where corporation is doing
business). One must reason by implication that the forum selection clause does not oust venue from
the fact that a motion to dismiss for improper venue is properly dismissed if the plaintiff has filed in a
forum within the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, even though the venue is other than
specified in the forum selection clause.
But see Freer, supra note 202, at 1118 ("Giving complete effect to the parties' selection would
lead to the conclusion that only the parties' contractual choice was proper [venue].").
258. See infra note 318 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts that failed to follow
Stewart in contexts other than a § 1404(a) transfer.
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been missed that if venue cannot be ousted, venue in a noncontractual forum is
not improper if other venue requirements are met. Therefore, a transfer motion
is the only proper method of enforcing the clause, and Stewart should be con-
trolling in any action to which the transfer of venue statute is applicable. 259
The question then to be addressed is, can Stewart and The Bremen be rec-
onciled, or did Stewart overrule The Bremen? The Stewart Court appears to
have distinguished The Bremen because it was an action in admiralty. 26° Never-
theless, considering that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal
Judiciary Act are applicable to actions in admiralty, this distinction does not
appear meaningful. 261 Therefore, a forum selection clause specifying a district
court other than that in which an action in admiralty has been filed should be
enforced pursuant to § 1404(a). The ability of federal courts to develop federal
common law in admiralty actions does not include the ability to supersede a
federal rule or statute. If the contractual forum did not include a district court,
then § 1404(a) would not be applicable, 262 but the reasoning of Stewart would
imply that enforcement should be considered under the common law doctrine of
forum non conveniens. 263
Distinguishing The Bremen as an international admiralty action is logically
inconsistent with Stewart. The Bremen standard is much broader, requiring en-
forcement in all but a few limited areas. 264 The Stewart standard is narrower,
allowing for judicial discretion to balance transfer of venue considerations in
determining enforcement. The remedy sought is only transfer of the action in
the Stewart approach, while the harsher remedy of dismissal is that which is
sought in The Bremen approach.265 While it would seem that the narrower
Stewart standard should apply to the stricter remedy, the opposite is the case
when one standard is utilized in admiralty, and one standard is utilized in diver-
sity. Attempting to distinguish The Bremen instead of overruling it leads to that
logically inconsistent result. Nevertheless, the Court did not overrule The
Bremen and apparently was content with its attempt to distinguish it. 2 6 6
259. But see Mullenix, Consensual Adjudication Procedure, supra note 6, at 338 (narrowest
reading of Stewart suggests that it only applies in diversity cases when issue involves § 1404(a) trans-
fer motion).
260. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28, 29 (The Bremen instructive in resolving parties' dispute, even
though it involved question of admiralty jurisdiction, but main issue is whether § 1404(a) controls
enforcement of forum selection clause).
261. CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1014, at 61 (1987).
262. See supra note 233 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements of
§ 1404(a).
263. See supra note 233 and accompanying text for a discussion of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens and of § 1404(a) which require analogous considerations of whether judicial discretion
should be exercised in dismissing or transferring an action respectively.
264. See supra notes 176-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of The Bremen standard
and its limitations.
265. See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the divergent remedies
in Stewart and The Bremen.
266. Though the approach to the question of enforcement is very different, four justices who
were in the majority in The Bremen, White, Marshall, Blackmun and Rehnquist, were also in the
1993]
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The essence of the conceptual difference between Stewart and The Bremen
lies in the discretion afforded the trial judge under § 1404(a) to determine
whether enforcement would be fair. Though a clause may be considered valid
and, therefore, enforceable under the contract formation standard of The
Bremen, it may not necessarily be enforced under the Stewart standard due to
considerations of fundamental fairness as expressed in § 1404(a). 267 Under Stew-
art, therefore, a court may consider the relative bargaining power of the parties
in regard to fairness in addition to a consideration of contract formation. 268
Stewart's view of forum selection clause enforcement is the exact view that Berg-
man argued in 1960 was intended by Judge Hand's Krenger dicta.269
Stewart and The Bremen thus represent contrasting views of the extent to
which parties may privately reorder principles of procedure. Stewart allows pri-
vate ordering subject to fairness principles, while The Bremen allows parties to
majority in Stewart. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 1 (1972); Stewart, 487
U.S. at 22. All four saw fit to take a different approach to the issue without sufficient explanation as
to why their previous opinion was not controlling, in need of reversal, or distinguishable. Only
Justice White's position has some logical consistency. He wrote a concurrence in The Bremen that
argued for giving the trial judge more discretion when considering enforcement. See supra note 189
and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice White's concurrence in The Bremen. He also
joined the Stewart majority in an opinion that granted greater judicial discretion to determine en-
forcement than the The Bremen decision. No other Justice participated in both decisions.
See also Buckingham, supra note 202, at 1423-25 (standards of The Bremen and Stewart com-
pared). Perhaps the Court was driven by a concern not to overrule their decision of only 15 years
prior.
267. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30-31 ("It is conceivable in a particular case, for example, that
because of these factors [of fairness] a district court acting under § 1404(a) would refuse to transfer a
case notwithstanding the counterweight of a forum-selection clause.").
268. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29-30. The court stated:
A motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a) thus calls on the district court to weigh in the
balance a number of case specific factors. The presence of a forum-selection clause such as
the parties entered into in this case will be a significant factor that figures centrally in the
district court's calculus. In its resolution of the § 1404(a) motion in this case, for example,
the District Court will be called on to address such issues as the convenience of a Manhat-
tan forum given the parties' expressed preference for that venue and the fairness of transfer
in light of the forum-selection clause and the parties' relative bargaining power. The flexi-
ble and individualized analysis Congress prescribed in § 1404(a) thus encompasses consid-
eration of the parties' private expression of their venue preferences.
Id. at 29-30.
Section 1404(a) directs a district court to take account of factors other than those that bear
solely on the parties' private ordering of their affairs. The district court also must weigh in
the balance the convenience of the witnesses and those public-interest factors of systemic
integrity and fairness that, in addition to private concerns, come under the heading of
"interests of justice."
Id. at 30.
See also Lederman, supra note 31, at 435-40 (§ 1404(a) transfers discussed as mechanism to
enforce forum selection clause).
269. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text for a discussion foreshadowing the change
in judicial view of forum selection clauses. Mr. Bergman refers to the standards of forum non con-
veniens rather than § 1404(a), but this reference is most likely due to the fact that the clauses that
Mr. Bergman was considering most often specified a foreign forum to which § 1404(a) would not be
applicable.
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reorder procedure with only a few limited exceptions. Not only does the Stewart
view provide for greater protection to the parties, it also resolves many of the
conceptual difficulties that have arisen in forum selection clause litigation-that
is, if one accepts that the majority shared Judge Tjoflat's view that a forum
selection clause does not affect procedural principles in terms of conferring juris-
diction, ousting venue, or reordering choice of law issues. 270
B. How Much of a Conceptual Change?
How far Stewart's redefined conceptual view of forum selection clauses ex-
tends would have been answered in a question that, unfortunately, was not
presented factually to the Court.27 ' That is, may parties by contract confer
venue on a forum where it would not otherwise be present? Pursuant to
§ 1404(a), an action may be transferred to "any other district or division where
it might have been brought.1 27 2 An interesting question surfaces which, de-
pending upon its answer, would go far to explain the extent of Stewart's concept
of the forum selection clause and the ability of parties to reorder principles of
procedure: may a contractually specified forum that would not be appropriate
venue for the action pursuant to the general venue statute2 73 be considered by a
court "where [the action] might have been brought" as a result of the forum
selection clause? If the answer is yes, a forum selection clause is not limited by
the applicable venue statute. If the answer is no, the ability of parties to reorder
procedure by means of a forum selection clause is sharply curtailed. Parties
would be able to contract among themselves for the selection of venue only from
among those provided by statute. Though considerably narrowing the possible
scope of a forum selection clause, this limitation would help ensure an element
of fairness by allowing a transfer only to a court that Congress has statutorily
determined to be an appropriate forum for the particular action.
In Hoffman v. Blaski,274 the Court held that the phrase "might have been
brought" did not include a district where venue was not proper within the gen-
eral venue statute, but where defendant had moved to have the action trans-
ferred and would consent to venue. 275 The Court stated that the "power of a
270. See infra notes 390-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the related issues
are resolved.
271. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24, n. I (forum selection clause in question specified contractual
forum as borough of Manhattan). Venue was appropriate in the Southern District of New York,
within which the borough of Manhattan is located, because Ricoh maintained its corporate head-
quarters there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (venue proper where corporation conducts business).
272. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
273. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
274. 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
275. Id. at 342-43. For discussions criticizing this decision, see, e.g., Michael J. Waggoner,
Section 1404(a), "Where It Might Have Been Brought" Brought By Whom?, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV.
67, 75 (1988) (better interpretation of where action might have been brought is in any district where
party seeking transfer might have brought it); Wayne Emery, Comment, District Court May Not
Transfer Civil Action on Defendant's Motion to Another District or Division i(f Defendant Could Have
Objected to Venue or Avoided Service, Had Action Been Brought There Originally, 49 GEO. L. J. 765,
768 (1961) (Hoffman interpretation frustrates fundamental purpose of § 1404(a)); Comment, Mean-
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district court under § 1404(a) to transfer an action is made not to depend upon
the wish or waiver of the defendant .... -276 Hoffman recognized the distinc-
tion between a defendant waiving an objection to improper venue by not raising
it and a defendant creating venue by consent where it otherwise was not proper.
Consequently, the Court held that the ability of a party to do the former was not
authority for the latter.277
Perhaps as often as the false axiom that parties may contractually consent
to jurisdiction is stated, it is also stated that parties may contractually consent to
venue.278 But as with the erroneous view of personal jurisdiction where the
concepts of procedural waiver and procedural consent are improperly equated,
so too is the case with venue. Two cases, Commercial Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Stone Co. 279 and Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp. ,280 are most often cited for the
proposition that venue can be created by consent,281 yet neither actually reached
that holding. Commercial Casualty dealt with waiver, often confused with con-
sent,28 2 and held that a party waives an objection to improper venue by not
raising the objection in a timely fashion.28 3 Neirbo, on the other hand, ad-
dressed submission to existing authority of a court through designation of an
agent, holding that such designation of an agent for service of process within a
state satisfies venue requirements. 2 84 As with Szukhent in the personal jurisdic-
tion context, submission to existing court power must be distinguished from con-
ing of Limitation "Where It Might Have Been Brought," 46 IOWA L. REv. 661, 663 (1961) (Hoff-
man's strict interpretation may preclude transfers that promote interests of justice); Recent Case,
Change of Venue Under Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code: The Meaning of "Might Have Been
Brought," 45 MiNN. L. REV. 680, 689-92 (1961) (Hoffman approach overly restrictive to carry out
main objective of § 1404(a)--convenience of litigation).
276. Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 343.
277. See id. at 343-44 (power to transfer does not depend on waiver but upon whether trans-
feree district court was one in which plaintiff might have brought action).
278. See, e.g., JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., 1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 0.340 [1.-3-2]
(since defendant may waive objection to venue, no reason exists why he cannot contractually agree
to be sued in district wherein venue would be otherwise improper).
279. 278 U.S. 177 (1929).
280. 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
281. See, eg., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 647 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing
Neirbo for proposition that venue can be created by contract); Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 360 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (citing Commercial Casualty and Neirbo for proposition that objection to im-
proper venue can be waived by defendant, thereby allowing court to proceed with case but failing to
recognize that post-filing waiver is distinguishable from pre-filing consent).
282. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differences between
waiver and consent.
283. Commercial Casualty, 278 U.S. at 181.
284. Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 170 ("[S]ervice upon such agent, in conformity with a valid state
statute, constituted consent to be sued in the federal court .... "). Unfortunately, the Court used the
word consent thereby adding to the doctrinal confusion. This limitation of the holding of Neirbo is
apparent from the manner in which the Court distinguished it in Olberding v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 346
U.S. 338, 341-42 (1953), where it held that venue was not created by a non-resident motorist statute
that established personal jurisdiction by implied consent. Because of the designated agent's lack of
presence within the forum, venue was considered to not be present.
The venue statute was amended in 1948 to incorporate Neirbo's holding. FREIDENTHAL, supra
note 9, § 2.15, at 84.
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tracting to create a power where it otherwise would not be present.2 5 Thus,
neither Neirbo nor Commercial Casualty held that a contractual provision alone
may directly confer venue upon a court.286
Construing Stewart and Hoffman together, therefore, leads to the conclu-
sion that a forum selection clause does not render venue improper in other than
the contractual forum.28 7 Therefore, a clause may be enforced only by means of
the transfer of venue statute which injects trial court discretion to ensure funda-
mental fairness.288 If enforcement is sought, it may only be to a forum where
venue is proper within the meaning of the applicable venue statute.28 9 This view
of the forum selection clause is much more narrow than The Bremen view, but it
supports the view of courts that construed reasonableness prior to The Bremen
according to the forum non conveniens formulation.
C. A Chorus of Critics
That the Stewart decision was not well received is an understatement of
monumental proportions. It has been criticized by commentators with a near
uniform voice,29° and most often misapplied or ignored by courts.29 1 The criti-
285. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text for a discussion distinguishing the concepts
of procedural waiver and procedural consent.
286. Hoffman cited two other cases, however, for the proposition that venue may be conferred
upon a district court by consent. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 360 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (citing General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261 (1922); Lee v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry., 260 U.S. 653 (1922)). Both cases address different issues of whether a defendant may
remove an action from a state court to a district court where venue would not have been proper if the
suit had originally been brought there. Holding that a defendant may do so, the Hoffman Court
relied upon the principle that venue is a "personal privilege of the defendant, which he may insist on,
or may waive, at his election, and does waive, where suit is brought in a district other than the one
specified, if he enters an appearance without claiming the privilege." General Inv. Co., 260 U.S. at
272 (citations omitted). These cases, however, do not represent a consent situation. Instead, the
defendant is waiving his or her objection by appearing in the state court action and seeking removal
to the district court.
287. See supra notes 271-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Stewart and Hoff-
man views on venue in noncontractual forums.
288. See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's discretion
under the transfer of venue statute when used to consider enforcement of a forum selection clause.
289. See supra notes 271 -87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the appropriate venue
when enforcing forum selection clauses under Stewart and Hoffman.
290. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 6, at 70-71 (criticizing Stewart because it "failed to clarify
the Court's position on forum selection agreements"); Freer, supra note 202, at 1128-31 (criticizing
Erie doctrine analysis of Stewart and use of § 1404(a), as opposed to § 1406(a), as appropriate proce-
dural mechanism by which to transfer action for purposes of forum selection clause enforcement);
Mullenix, Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at 337-39 (criticizing Stewart for its
approach to Erie question, for "missing a number of nagging problems"); Lederman, supra note 31,
at 467 (primarily discussing court's Erie analysis and arguing that Stewart was decided wrongly and
that standard for enforcement from The Bremen should be applied in every situation). But see
Buckingham, supra note 202, at 1431-33 (praising decision for giving discretion to district courts to
enforce forum selection clauses on case-by-case basis and thereby promoting "interest of justice"
goal of § 1404(a)).
291. The decision in Stewart has been misinterpreted by courts in a variety of ways. Courts
have failed to recognize that under the Stewart view, venue in the forum of filing is not rendered
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cism stems, in large part, from a failure to recognize that Stewart constituted a
major conceptual change in viewing the forum selection clause. Nowhere is that
failure more clearly manifested than in the treatment of Stewart upon
remand.29 2
The district court, although having previously applied Alabama law in
holding the clause unenforceable, upon remand considered the issue under fed-
eral law.293 Judge Acker first addressed the question of whether the forum se-
lection clause shifted the burden of proof in a § 1404(a) transfer motion from the
movant to the party seeking to avoid enforcement of the clause.294 Though
Judge Tjoflat's special concurrence, much of which the Stewart majority had
adopted, had argued for such a shift in the burden,29 5 the Supreme Court in
Stewart did not directly address the question of burden shifting. Judge Acker
reasoned that the burden did not shift from the moving party because of the
forum selection clause. 296 He then considered the private interests of availabil-
improper by a contractual designation of a different forum, and, therefore, that § 1404(a) is the only
proper procedural mechanism for enforcement. Additionally, such courts have held that when en-
forcement is sought by a procedural mechanism other than § 1404(a) Stewart is not applicable. See,
e.g., Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) (Stewart not
applicable when motion to dismiss involved); Crescent Int'l, Inc. v. Avatar Communities, 857 F.2d
943, 944 (3rd Cir. 1988) (Stewart not applicable when motion to transfer is not involved).
Similarly, courts have applied The Bremen instead of Stewart when enforcement is sought by a
means other than § 1404(a) even though the contractual forum is one to which the action could be
transferred, without discussion as to why Stewart is not applicable. See, eg., Docksider, Ltd. v. Sea
Technology, Ltd., 875 F.2d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing The Bremen for rule that forum selection
clause is valid unless enforcement is unreasonable).
Though Stewart did not address who bears the burden in an action seeking forum selection
clause enforcement, one could reasonably infer that such lack of discussion indicates that the usual
burden in a transfer motion remains with the party seeking the transfer. After Stewart, however,
courts have held that a forum selection clause operates as a party's waiver of a claim of inconven-
ience in the contractual forum. This approach goes beyond a shifting of the burden in transfer
motions, by creating an irrebuttable presumption as to the convenience factor of the enforcement by
means of transfer calculus. The presumption harkens back to the prima facie enforcement approach
of The Bremen. See, e.g., Heller Fin. Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1293 (7th
Cir. 1989) (forum selection clause operates as waiver of defendant's right to argue that noncontrac-
tual transferree forum is inconvenient when action is filed in contractual forum).
292. The Stewart Court remanded the action so the district court could determine the appropri-
ate effect of the parties' forum selection clause under federal law on the § 1404(a) motion. Stewart
Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988). Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit remanded the matter to the district court for consideration of defendant
Ricoh's § 1404(a) motion to transfer the action to the Southern District of New York as designated
in the forum selection clause. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 855 F.2d 762, 762-63 (1 1th Cir.
1988) (per curiam).
293. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 696 F. Supp. 583, 584 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
294. Id. at 586.
295. See supra notes 247- 49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Tjoflat's analysis
of the relative burdens in the enforcement of a forum seleciton clause.
296. Stewart, 696 F. Supp. at 580. Judge Acker reached this holding by first distinguishing The
Bremen on the basis of its being an international contract. Id. He then followed the Stewart lan-
guage that the clause should receive "neither dispositive consideration ... nor no consideration" and
treated the clause as a factor upon which the moving party can rely in a § 1404(a) motion. Id. at
587. Though it does not operate to shift the burden on the motion, the forum selection clause factor
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ity of witnesses and documents, finding both to be more readily available in
Alabama.29 7 Judge Acker similarly determined that the public interests of the
closer connection of Alabama to the suit, as well as the fact that Alabama law
would be applied to most, if not all, of the issues presented weighed in favor of
Alabama as the proper forum. 298 Reasoning that the plaintiff's choice of forum
should be afforded deference and that the defendant had not carried its burden
of establishing that a transfer was warranted, the district court exercised its dis-
cretion under § 1404(a) and denied the motion to transfer the case to the con-
tractually specified forum. 299 The district court directly followed the Supreme
Court's holding in Stewart and its very different view of the forum selection
clause as compared to The Bremen.
Upon petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to trans-
fer the action to the contractual forum, the Court of Appeals ignored the major-
ity opinion in Stewart and granted the petition.30" Without even attempting to
explain why it did not have to follow the majority opinion in Stewart, the court
of appeals cited its earlier opinion in Stewart and the concurrence of Justice
Kennedy in Stewart 301 to support its holding that no deference should be af-
forded to plaintiff's choice of forum30 2 and that the venue directed by a forum
selection clause will rarely be outweighed by other § 1404(a) considerations. 30 3
This reasoning was a return to The Bremen and represents an inexplicable at-
tempt by a circuit court to ignore the Supreme Court's reasoning. 3°
is not without consequence for it does weigh toward the transfer to the contractual forum. Id.
Finally, he reasoned that the silence of the Supreme Court on the issue meant that no shift of the
burden had occurred. Id. at 586-87.
297. Id. at 588-90.
298. Id. at 590-91.
299. Id.
300. In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
301. Id. at 573 (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) and Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1075 (1987)). See Stewart, 487
U.S. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (question of whether to transfer case pursuant to § 1404(a)
should be determined by use of enforcement standards of The Bremen). As discussed, the enforce-
ment standards of The Bremen differ significantly from those of a § 1404(a) transfer. That fact
makes Justice Kennedy's concurrence quite perplexing. He apparently viewed the existence of a
forum selection clause to obfuscate the usual factors of, for example, convenience and fairness, to be
considered in a transfer motion. Under this view, § 1404(a) is merely a vehicle to accomplish a task
automatically, and such an application is bereft of any discretion by the trial court.
302. In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d at 573.
303. Id.
304. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 25 ("The Court of Appeals then applied the standards articulated
in the admiralty case of The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) .... We now affirm
under somewhat different reasoning."). The Eleventh Circuit, however, acknowledged The Bremen
considerations, finding that there was no fraud and that the contract had been negotiated by exper-
ienced business persons. Stewart, 310 F.2d at 573-74. This reasoning is exactly the same as that
which the court of appeals had previously utilized, and from which the Supreme Court had chosen
to differ.
Later that same year, Judge Acker was again confronted with the question of enforcement of a
forum selection clause. With either great courtesy or diplomacy, he stated that the Eleventh Circuit
had earlier "misread" the majority opinion in Stewart. Stewart v. Dean-Michaes Corp., 716 F.
Supp. 1400, 1402 (N.D. Ala. 1989). Although he believed that in the case before him, the applica-
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While courts have either ignored or not appreciated the holding of Stewart,
commentators have criticized the decision. The criticism stems from a less than
full appreciation of the shift in the conceptual view of forum selection clauses
manifested in the opinion. Echoing Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, 30 5 com-
mentators have decried the Stewart majority's phrasing of the Erie question, as
whether a federal rule or statute covered the issue, 3° 6 as compelling the conclu-
sion that federal law must control.30 7 Justice Scalia agreed that whether
§ 1404(a) governed the issue was the starting point of the relevant inquiry, 30
but disagreed with the majority about what the inquiry actually was. Justice
Scalia framed the inquiry as what law should be applied to determine the "valid-
ity" of the clause in question. 3° 9 The majority viewed the issue as whether the
clause should be enforced; that is, whether the clause should compel the transfer
of the action. 3 10 Under The Bremen's view of forum selection clauses, in most
instances, validity compels transfer because parties are able to privately order
procedure with little or no interference by the courts. Under the Stewart view,
enforcement does not necessarily follow from a contractually valid clause be-
cause the other § 1404(a) factors are also considered, possibly preventing
enforcement. 311
The majority's framing of the Erie issue as whether § 1404(a) controlled the
transfer question was not an evasion of the true issue. Instead, it was a major
shift in the conceptualization of what a forum selection clause is. The majority
relegated the forum selection clause to a factor within the existing procedural
framework. 312 Justice Scalia disagreed with the reconceptualization because he
did not agree that § 1404(a) factors should be utilized to determine the question
of enforcement to ensure that the "interest of justice" is served. Further, he did
not agree that the question of enforcement should include considerations of "the
tion of Stewart did not warrant the enforcement of the clause in question, he stated that the Eleventh
Circuit's issuance of the writ of mandamus was a "'2 x 4' between the eyes" and that he was com-
pelled to follow the Eleventh Circuit's reading of Stewart. Id. at 1403. Therefore, he applied the
factors of The Bremen, which he referred to as placing an "insurmountable burden of proof" upon a
party seeking to resist the enforcement of a forum selection clause, and transferred the case to the
contractual forum. Id. at 1402-04.
305. See, e.g., Mullenix, Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at 337 (Justice
Scalia's dissent "correctly identified the heart of the problem that the Court's majority missed");
Lederman, supra note 31, at 454 (Justice Scalia's opinion was "well-reasoned").
306. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 25-27.
307. See, eg., Mullenix, Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at 336-38 (arguing
that "[t]he Court incorrectly cast Ricoh as a venue-transfer problem," thereby compelling answer to
Erie question that federal law controlled); Lederman, supra note 31, at 452 (referring to approach of
Stewart majority as "fundamentally misguided" and making "a hard case easier by framing its deci-
sion as one of venue, not of forum selection clauses per se"); de By, supra note 202, at 1069 (arguing
that Stewart "never addressed the pure Erie question").
308. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
309. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 24.
311. See id. at 30-31 (district court should balance "public-interest factors of systemic integrity
... that come under the heading of the interest of justice").
312. See id. at 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia recognized major conceptual change
that majority was bringing about as he referred to it as "the great change in the law asserted here").
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bargaining power of the parties and the presence or absence of overreach-
ing ... .,,313 He preferred to retain The Bremen's conceptualization of forum
selection clauses under which parties may privately order the procedural opera-
tion of disputes outside the constraints of the existing procedural framework.
Because Justice Scalia viewed there to be no inquiry other than contract validity,
it is in fact he who framed the issue so as to compel the answer that state law
should control the question of enforcement of a forum slection clause because
enforcement becomes merely a contract question.
In contrast, the answer that federal law controls is not necessarily com-
pelled by the Erie question under the majority's conceptualization. Judge
Tjoflat, in his special concurrence, took the same conceptual view as the Stewart
majority, yet he reached the opposite conclusion. 314 He opined that state law
should be considered to determine whether a clause is valid and, therefore, is a
factor to be considered in a § 1404(a) analysis of whether to enforce a forum
selection clause. 315 The Stewart majority disagreed, apparently based upon the
desirability of uniform federal consideration of forum selection clauses, 3 16 but
that conclusion was not necessitated by the manner in which the issue was
framed. The framing of the issue was compelled by the conceptual shift.
Commentators have also criticized the Stewart opinion for leaving issues
unanswered. Most commonly, the criticism revolves around the question that
would arise if a party sought to enforce a forum selection clause by a procedural
mechanism other than a § 1404(a) transfer in a suit brought in a forum other
than the contractual forum.3 17 Several courts have not applied Stewart's hold-
ing when the defendant has sought enforcement by a procedural mechanism
313. Id. at 34-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
314. See supra notes 229-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Tjoflat's
concurrence.
315. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
316. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30-32. Cf. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311,
316, 320-33 (1964) (majority, over strong dissent, took similar approach and held that question of
agency validity for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(l) should be governed by federal law).
This issue apparently is diminishing in importance as the number of states that view clauses as
invalid is decreasing. For example, Missouri recently changed its position from invalidity to validity.
High Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 823 S.W.2d 493, 504 (1992). See de By, supra note
202, at 1071 (in Alabama, Georgia, Missouri, and Texas, forum selection clauses are void as contrary
to public policy). Perhaps these few hold-out states will follow the trend toward recognizing forum
selection clauses as valid.
317. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 6, at 70-71 (questions which law applies to non-admiralty
case where enforcement sought by means other than § 1404(a) transfer motion, whether procedural
mechanisms besides § 1404(a) are available to enforce clause, and why forum selection clause is
afforded less weight when transfer is sought under § 1404(a) rather than by other procedural means);
de By, supra note 202, at 1074-76 (Stewart limited to enforcement under § 1404(a); state law should
be used to determine validity of clause when enforcement is sought by motion to dismiss for im-
proper venue); Lederman, supra note 31, at 456-57 (better reading of Stewart would limit it to
§ 1404(a) motions, although unclear whether Stewart applies outside § 1404(a) context); Kornfeld,
supra note 31, at 191 (Stewart addressed the narrow issue of § 1404(a) motions to transfer, giving
little guidance on the influence of forum selection clauses when enforcement is sought by motion to
dismiss); Mullenix, Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at 338 (narrow reading of
Stewart does not resolve Erie question of jurisdictional challenges, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, § 1406
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other than a § 1404(a) transfer.318 This criticism and misapplication misses the
point that Stewart viewed forum selection clauses very differently than had The
Bremen. Under Stewart, forum selection clauses are narrowly interpreted as a
reordering of venue only within the existing procedural framework. A clause
does not render venue improper, 319 deny a court jurisdiction, or confer jurisdic-
tion on a court. Therefore, the only appropriate procedural mechanism for en-
forcement of a clause when plaintiff has filed in a noncontractual forum is a
§ 1404(a) transfer motion. Under Stewart, the clause does not render venue in a
noncontractual forum improper because the clause does not reorder
procedure. 320Finally, Stewart has been criticized for injecting judicial discretion into the
enforcement analysis because the opportunity for the exercise of discretion will
result in increased litigation and unpredictability of result.321 Such criticism
overlooks the fact that while predictability is a worthy goal of an adjudicatory
system, it should not be pursued at the expense of fundamental fairness. A pre-
dictably unfair result is more damaging to the system than a result that,
although not entirely predictable, is predicated on the discretionary considera-
tion of fairness. 322 The standard of enforcement and conceptual view of The
Bremen achieves predictability by providing for enforcement in almost every
situation. It was, however, predicated upon a freely negotiated exchange be-
tween sophisticated business persons. Removed from that context, as in Carni-
val Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, the need becomes apparent for judicial discretion
in the enforcement analysis to protect the interests of justice.
VI. Aw SHUTE!: UNREASONABLE, UNBARGAINED, AND ENFORCEABLE
Because the Supreme Court had expressed two very different conceptual
views of the forum selection clause in The Bremen and in Stewart, the question
remained as to how and why the two differing conceptual views could exist si-
transfers, or removal-remand situations, although it could be read broadly to hold that all forum
selection clause challenges are procedural).
318. See, eg., Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990) (Stewart's reasoning does not
apply to motions to dismiss); Seward v. Devine, 888 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying The
Bremen standards rather than Stewart analysis in enforcing forum selection clause by means of mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Manetti-Farrow v. Gucci Am., 858 F.2d 509,
512 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) (Stewart analysis inapplicable because it involves motion to dismiss rather
than to transfer venue).
319. See supra notes 271-89 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 202, at 1126-27 (§ 1404 allows for discretion and thereby pro-
motes unpredictability and increased litigation); Kornfeld, supra note 31, at 191 (because Stewart
removes certainty of contracts, contracting parties lose predictability and certainty in their contrac-
tual relationship); Lederman, supra note 31, at 438 (Stewart affords district courts enormous discre-
tion in deciding § 1404(a) motions based on forum selection clauses, eliminating predictability of
weight to be afforded these clauses). But see Buckingham, supra note 202, at 1380 (praises Stewart
for giving discretion to district courts to enforce forum selection clauses on case-by-case basis and
promotes "interest of justice" goal of § 1404(a)).
322. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ("[I]n interest of justice, federal district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought. ... ).
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multaneously. In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,323 decided less than three
years after Stewart, the Court had an opportunity to do a bit of conceptual sort-
ing out, or at least a bit of distinguishing and reconciling. Shute presented the
Court with a forum selection clause in an action in admiralty, 324 thereby impli-
cating the standard for enforcement of The Bremen.325 Nevertheless, the clause
was in a domestic contract and specified a domestic forum,326 thereby implicat-
ing the enforcement standard of Stewart because the action could be transferred
from the Western District of Washington to a district court in Florida.327 Shute
presented a scenario that would seem to have forced the Court to distinguish or
reconcile its two conflicting standards for enforcement, yet the Shute Court did
nothing to clarify its previous divergent conceptual views of the forum selection
clause. The Court merely applied the holding of The Bremen. In so doing, the
court "refined" the reasonableness standard so as to remove any serious inquiry
into questions of contract formation from the question of enforcement.
Additionally, the forum selection clause in question was presented in a der-
ogation context, but the Court failed to mention that derogation and proroga-
tion clauses were not to be considered in like fashion. Therefore, as The Bremen
has been extended improperly to mean that parties may confer personal jurisdic-
tion upon a court by a contractual clause and nothing more, 328 so too might
Shute be misconstrued to mean that a passenger ticket, and nothing more, can
confer personal jurisdiction over the ticket holder. With Shute, private reorder-
ing of principles of procedure was brought back with a vengeance, and the dan-
gers involved with that conceptual view of forum selection clauses became
manifestly evident. 329
323. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
324. Id. at 1525.
325. Id. See supra notes 260-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of Stewart's attempt to
distinguish The Bremen as an action in admiralty.
326. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1536. Though the defendant, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., was a
foreign corporation, its principal place of business was in Miami, Florida. Amended Answer, at 2,
Joint Appendix, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, Il1 S. Ct. 1522, 1524 (1991) (No. 89-1647).
327. See supra notes 260-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the reasoning of
Stewart should apply equally to an admiralty action in which transfer could be sought to enforce the
forum selection clause.
328. See supra notes 161-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's analysis in
The Bremen and its implications.
329. For discussion of the decision in Shute, see, e.g., Borchers, supra note 6, at 71-73 (Shute
decision erodes The Bremen standard of reasonableness); Goldman, supra note 98, at 707-14 (Shute
places heavy burden on consumers because it validates forum selection clauses in most consumer
transactions); Mullenix, Carnival Cruise Lines, supra note 6, at 352-70 (Shute criticized for promot-
ing use of adhesive forum selection clauses in consumer contracts); Solimine, supra note 2, at 52
(Shute illustrative of trend of courts to reject challenges to enforcement of forum selection clauses);
Julie H. Bruch, Comment, Forum Selection Clauses in Consumer Contracts: An Unconscionable
Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum, 23 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 329 345 -48 (1992) (Shute decision
left unanswered question as to whether courts should refuse to enforce forum selection clauses in
adhesion contracts and favors business interests over consumer protection); see also Ganter, supra
note 38, at 42-58 (general discussion of Shute case).
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A. More Conceptual Murkiness
The forum selection clause considered in Shute was printed on the back of a
passenger cruise ship ticket.3 30 Russell and Eulala Shute had purchased tickets
from a travel agent in their home state of Washington for a week long cruise
aboard the Tropicale, a passenger ship owned by Carnival Cruise Lines. 33 1 Af-
ter paying the travel agent for the tickets, who in turn forwarded the payment to
Carnival Cruise Lines in Florida, the Shutes received their non-refundable tick-
ets.332 On the back of the tickets were twenty-five paragraphs of boilerplate
terms.333 The eighth paragraph contained a forum selection clause specifying
that all disputes arising in connection with the ticket should be litigated exclu-
sively in a court located in the State of Florida. 334
Two days into the cruise, when the Tropicale was in international waters,
Mrs. Shute slipped, fell, and was injured.33" Thereafter, she filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington seeking to
recover from Carnival Cruise Lines for her injuries. 336 Her complaint invoked
the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court and alleged that "Carnival Cruise
Lines was doing business in the Western District of Washington. ' 337 Two of the
nine affirmative defenses Carnival Cruise Lines raised in its answer became the
focus of the action: a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant
because there was no connection between Carnival Cruise Lines and Washing-
ton;338 and, that the forum selection clause required that the suit must be
brought in a Florida court. 339 Though the ouster doctrine had long since been
330. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1536. It is of interest that the dissenting opinion of Judge Wisdom of
the Fifth Circuit in The Bremen, adopted in large part by the Supreme Court, see The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8 (1972) ("[w]e hold, with the six dissenting members of the Court
of Appeals"), recognized the troublesome nature of giving effect to a forum selection clause con-
tained in a passenger ticket due to the adhesive nature of the contract. See In re Unterweser
Reederei, GMBH Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. M/S Bremen, 428 F.2d 888, 906 n.25 (5th Cit. 1970) (to
deny plaintiff his/her forum based on contractual stipulation may be good rationale to refuse to
enforce forum selection clauses in travel tickets).
331. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1524.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1536-38.
334. Id. at 1536. The forum selection clause stated:
8. It is agreed by and between the passenger and the Carrier that all disputes and matters
whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident to this Contract shall be litigated,
if at all, in and before a Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A., to the exclusion of the
Courts of any other state or country.
Id.
335. Id. at 1524.
336. Id
337. Id.
338. See Amended Answer of Defendant, at 9, Joint Appendix, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, IIl S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 89-1647) ("Carnival is a foreign corporation which is not doing
business in the State of Washington and, therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the person of
defendant, Carnival.").
339. See Amended Answer, 12 ("The Passenger Ticket Contract at paragraph 8 requires that
all lawsuits brought against defendant Carnival must be filed with a court located within the State of
Florida. Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction over the person of defendant Carnival.").
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laid to rest, Carnival Cruise argued that the forum selection clause operated to
deprive the court of personal jurisdiction over it and that the action should be
dismissed or transferred to the Southern District of Florida pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1406. 340
Nevertheless, because § 1406(a) applies only to actions filed in an improper
venue, the defendant's affirmative defense based upon the forum selection clause
must also have been intended to argue that the forum selection clause rendered
venue improper. It is unclear from defendant's Answer and Brief to the
Supreme Court whether the defendant's argument that venue was improper was
based upon the forum selection clause or upon the allegation that defendant was
not doing business in Washington. 341 It is odd, however, that if venue for the
action were improper under the venue statute that defendant did not seek dis-
missal for improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), 342 thereby sparing itself
the forum selection clause problem and possibly the personal jurisdiction fight.
Yet, Stewart held that a forum selection clause in a diversity action did not
render improper venue that otherwise was proper.343 Though Stewart distin-
guished itself from The Bremen on the ground that The Bremen was an action in
admiralty, there is no rational reason for holding that a forum selection clause in
diversity does not render venue improper in a location other than the contrac-
tual forum, but that in admiralty it does. The fallacy of this distinction is partic-
ularly apparent when the noncontractual filing forum and the contractual forum
are both district courts and transfer is available.
In short, the parties, primarily the defendant Carnival Cruise Lines,
presented the forum selection clause issue to the district court in a conceptual
haze. The defendant alleged that the forum selection clause deprived the court
of personal jurisdiction, which was stated not to be doctrinally sound in The
Bremen, and that it also deprived the court of venue, which was stated not to be
doctrinally sound in Stewart.34 It is precisely this lack of conceptual clarity as
to the appropriate basis for a moving party's forum selection clause objections,
and the basis of the ruling of the court in question, that has brought total confu-
340. Id.; Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, Ill S. Ct. 1522
(1991) (No. 89-1647).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), a court may transfer an action from a district court that does
not have proper venue to a district court with proper venue even though the transferring court does
not have proper jurisdiction over the parties. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962).
Nevertheless, § 1406(a) does not provide for transfer on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction.
341. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of defendant's answer and
brief to the Supreme Court. The general venue statute effective at the time that the action was filed
provided for venue over corporations where a corporation "is doing business." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c),
Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 935.
342. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) (dismissal for improper venue).
343. See supra notes 257-59, 271-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Stewart
holding regarding improper venue.
344. The brief to the Supreme Court of Carnival Cruise Lines was primarily devoted to the
personal jurisdiction question. See Mullenix, Carnival Cruise Lines, supra note 6, at 338 n.81 (forum
selection clause given relatively little weight in Supreme Court briefs). Also, the argument in regard
to the enforcement of the forum selection clause did not address what enforcement means. For
instance, is personal jurisdiction lacking, is venue improper; should jurisdiction be declined?
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sion to the consideration of forum selection clauses. 34 5 Unfortunately, the Shute
decision did nothing to resolve this confusion.
The district court did not consider the question of the forum selection
clause, but instead held that Carnival Cruise Lines did not have sufficient mini-
mum contacts with Washington to sustain the exercise of personal jurisdiction
by the district court in Washington over Carnival Cruise Lines.346 The Ninth
Circuit reversed on the personal jurisdiction question, finding that Carnival
Cruise Lines had sufficient contacts to sustain personal jurisdiction. 347 The
court of appeals then turned its attention to the question of the forum selection
clause even though the district court had not considered the issue.348
Faced with the two very different approaches of The Bremen and Stewart,
the Ninth Circuit first had to decide the applicable law. The court distinguished
Stewart and stated that "the starting point for analysis is the Supreme Court's
decision in [The Bremen].' '349 The court distinguished Stewart not because of
the admiralty/diversity distinction, but because of the fact that Stewart applied
only when the motion in question is a transfer under § 1404(a) and here, the
motion in question was a § 1406(a) motion to dismiss or transfer. 350 This dis-
345. Commentators who have addressed the Shute decision have not been much clearer. See,
e.g., Mullenix, Carnival Cruise Lines, supra note 6, at 335 (stating that forum selection clause issue
presented by Shute was "whether its [Carnival Cruise Lines] contractual forum-selection clause
should be honored... "but not discussing whether honoring it affects, for example, venue, personal
jurisdiction); Ganter, supra note 38, at 508 (stating that Carnival Cruise Lines moved for summary
judgment on grounds that forum selection clause prevented suit outside Florida, but not addressing
whether venue, personal jurisdiction, or something else, was present only in Florida, or lacking in
Washington as result of forum selection clause).
346. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 1988 Am. Mar. Cases 591, 593-95 (W.D. Wash.
1987).
347. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 389 (9th Cir. 1990).
As is indicated by the full citation for the case, it actually followed a long procedural trail before
making it to final disposition by the Ninth Circuit. 1988 Am. Mar. Cases 591 (W.D. Wash. 1987),
rev'd, 863 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn, 872 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1989) (mem.), modified, 897
F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991). A recitation of the procedural history of the
treatment of the forum selection clause, for the protracted litigation concerned the personal jurisdic-
tion questions. For a discussion of the long procedural history, see generally Mullenix, Carnival
Cruise Lines, supra note 6, at 332-36.
348. See Shute, 897 F.2d at 387 n.8 ("Although the district court did not reach this issue, both
parties request that, in the interest of judicial economy, this court determine the applicability of the
forum selection provision on appeal, rather than remanding to the district court. Because some of
the factual issues are similar to those raised in the jurisdiction context, and because the record is
sufficiently well-developed, we can decide the forum issue efficiently.").
This request by the Shutes would prove to be a fatal strategic error. The Supreme Court would
later decide that the record did not contain facts to support the finding of the Ninth Circuit that the
Shutes were incapable of pursuing the litigation in Florida. See Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1527-28. Per-
haps on remand they could have made a record that would have supported the finding and allowed
them to meet the heavy burden that The Bremen placed on a litigant seeking to avoid enforcement so
as to deprive the party of its day in court. Perhaps the Shutes, or more accurately their counsel, can
be excused for thinking that after Stewart, The Bremen was not applicable.
349. Shute, 897 F.2d at 388.
350. Id. Other courts of appeals have distinguished Stewart on this basis. See Manetti-Farrow,
Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Our case involves a motion to dismiss,
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tinction makes no sense. It allows a moving party to select the applicable law by
means of the party's choice of motion. Consensual reordering of procedure is
problematic enough; unilateral reordering is perniciously absurd.
Instead, the choice of motion should be dictated by what aspect of the
court's power to hear a case the forum selection clause speaks to. That is, what
is the concept? If it renders venue improper, a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss
or § 1406(a) motion to transfer is appropriate. If the clause does not render
venue improper, a transfer motion pursuant to § 1404(a) is appropriate. Though
Stewart appeared to resolve this question, courts have held Stewart to be inappli-
cable in situations where a § 1404(a) motion was not involved and have ignored
its reasoning. 35 1
Applying The Bremen standards for enforcement, the Ninth Circuit found
the forum selection clause to be unenforceable. The court of appeals looked to
the formation considerations that are the only exception to enforcement under
The Bremen and found the clause to be unreasonable for two reasons. First, the
clause was not part of a freely negotiated contract, but rather, was contained in a
pre-printed passenger ticket.35 2 Second, requiring the Shutes to litigate their
claim in the contractual forum would deprive them of their day in court due to
the grave inconvenience of the forum. 353
The Supreme Court, faced with the questions of whether personal jurisdic-
tion could be asserted over Carnival Cruise Lines and whether the forum selec-
tion clause should be enforced, did not address the personal jurisdiction issue,
finding the forum selection clause issue to be dispositive. 35 4 The Court began its
inquiry by stating that because it was an admiralty case, federal law would gov-
ern enforceability of the forum selection clause. 355 The question generated by
this statement was: what federal law was the question of the moment? Was it
the standard from The Bremen, or was it the § 1404(a) standard in accord with
the reasoning in Stewart that forum selection clauses are matters of venue? The
Ninth Circuit had applied The Bremen on the basis of the procedural mecha-
rather than to transfer venue, and because there is no federal rule directly on point, the Stewart
analysis is inapplicable").
351. See supra note 318 for a discussion of how courts have refused to apply the Stewart hold-
ing to situations where enforcement of a forum selection clause is sought by a procedural mechanism
other than a § 1404(a) motion.
352. Shute, 897 F.2d at 388-89 (Mrs. Shute "physically and financially incapable" of pursuing
suit in Florida).
353. Id. at 388.
354. Shute, Ill S. Ct. at 1525 (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
The refusal to hear the personal jurisdiction question took many commentators by surprise.
See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 6, at 72 (grant of certiorari in Shute led to "confident speculation that
Carnival Cruise would produce yet another 'minimum contacts' opinion"); Mullenix, Carnival
Cruise Lines, supra note 6, at 338 -39 (decision in Shute "caught many ... observers off-guard...
[and] was startling not so much for what it decided as for what it didn't decide"); Winton D. Woods,
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute: An Amicus Inquiry Into the Future of "Purposeful Availment," 36
WAYNE L. REV. 1393, 1401 (1990) (predicting that Shute would produce watershed opinion of
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence).
355. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1525.
1993]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66
nism employed by the party seeking enforcement, but the Supreme Court appar-
ently embraced the admiralty/diversity distinction. It did so, however, with no
explanation other than that the action was in admiralty. 356 Stewart was hardly
mentioned and then cited with a "cf." for the proposition that federal law gov-
erned the forum selection clause question. 35 7
The question whether federal law governed the enforceability of the forum
selection clause was not really open to discussion after Stewart. The true ques-
tion, as previously stated, involved determining what was the federal law. This
question was of particular interest because much of the reasoning from Stewart
was applicable to Shute. Both were filed in a district court other than the con-
tractually selected forum, and both involved a district court as the contractual
forum to which the action could be transferred. Though Shute was an action in
admiralty, could not the same transfer reasoning of Stewart apply?358 The
Court simply did not answer the question. The only explanation for the applica-
bility of the standard of The Bremen is that "[both petitioner and respondent
argue vigorously that the Court's opinion in The Bremen governs the case." '359
356. Id.
357. According to the Blue Book, a "Cf." signal indicates that the "[c]ited authority supports a
proposition different from the main proposition but sufficiently analagous to lend support. Literally,
,cf' means 'compare.' The citation's relevance will usually be clear to the reader only if it is ex-
plained. Parenthetical explanations (citation omitted), however brief, are therefore strongly recom-
mended." A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION § 1.2, at 23 (15th ed. 1991). The Court did not
provide a parenthetical explanation to clarify how its proposition as to the applicable federal law
differed from that of less than three years earlier.
358. The standard to be applied is critical, for arguably, the application of the Stewart standard
would have led to a different result. Considering factors of, for example, convenience and availabil-
ity of witnesses, not to mention the interests of justice, would have allowed an exercise of discretion
to keep the suit in Washington.
359. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1526.
A review of the Shutes' argument does not support the statement that they argued vigorously
that The Bremen governed the forum selection clause issue. Instead, their brief merely responded to
arguments by Carnival Cruise Lines that the reasoning of The Bremen supports enforcement. The
Shutes argued that The Bremen does not support enforcement. Respondent's Brief in Opposition,
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, IIl S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 89-1647).
Carnival Cruise Lines had argued that The Bremen applied because this was an action in admi-
ralty and that "[t]here is no indication that Stewart was intended to modify the holding of The
Bremen." Brief for the Petitioner, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, I I S. Ct. 1522 (199 1) (No.
89-1647).
Arguably, reconciling Stewart and The Bremen was one of the most difficult, if not the most
difficult questions facing the Court. In regard to another very difficult question, whether the Shutes
had notice of the forum selection clause (Justice Stevens writing for the dissent, strongly argued that
the Shutes did not have notice of the clause and even attached a copy of the ticket to his dissenting
opinion to show how it would not come to the attention of the traveler. Id. at 1529, 1534-37 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting)), the Court also based its determination of this issue upon what the parties had
determined and not on its own analysis. See id. at 1525 ("[W]e do not address the question of
whether respondents had sufficient notice of the forum selection clause before entering the contract
for passage. Respondents essentially have conceded that they had notice of the forum-selection pro-
vision.").
See also Borchers, supra note 6, at 72 n.148 (noting that in previous jurisdictional case,
Helicopteros Nationales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), Court also had concluded
that parties had conceded crucial issue).
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Therefore, the Court considered the enforcement of the forum selection clause
by looking at the formation questions presented in The Bremen without consid-
ering the § 1404(a) factors of convenience and the interests of justice as Stewart
would have required.
Deciding that the standard from The Bremen was applicable to the forum
selection clause in Shute did not resolve what aspect of the court's power to hear
the case the forum selection clause applied-jurisdiction, venue, or both.360
Stewart had held that forum selection clauses were a matter of venue.361 In The
Bremen, it is not clear what procedural concept the Court considered the forum
selection clause to have addressed. Because the contractual forum was a court
of a foreign country, honoring the clause required dismissal whether it addressed
jurisdiction, venue, or both. 362 Additionally, the defendant in The Bremen had
argued in the alternative for dismissal based upon lack of jurisdiction and forum
non conveniens. 363 The Bremen decision shed little light on whether the clause
was a matter of jurisdiction or venue. The reference by The Bremen Court to
Szukhent indicates that the Court may have been considering jurisdiction,364
while the discussion as to whether the contractual forum was so seriously incon-
venient as to deprive plaintiff of a day in court indicates venue. 365
Because Shute involved questions of personal jurisdiction and a contractual
forum to which the action could be transferred, it presented the Court with the
perfect opportunity to resolve what the conceptual nature of the forum selection
clause was-venue, jurisdiction, or both. Unfortunately, the Court missed the
opportunity. Its discussion does not clarify what aspect of procedure it was ad-
dressing, but instead speaks in general terms such as where suit "must be
brought" and the "correct forum."' 366 The disposition of Shute is equally unen-
lightening for the Court merely stated that "[t]he judgment of the Court of Ap-
360. See Mullenix, Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure, supra note 6, at 322-27 (discussing
confusion in courts as to whether forum selection clauses are matter of venue or jurisdiction).
361. See supra note 251.
362. See supra note 233.
363. See supra note 121 and accompanying text for the statement of defendant Unterwesser's
motions.
364. See supra notes 146-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the personal jurisdiction
implications of The Bremen's reliance on Szukhent.
365. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of The Bremen analysis
that a forum must be "gravely" inconvenient to deprive plaintiff of due process.
366. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1527 (1991). The Court speaks in
terms of where suit must be brought, but does not explain whether the context is venue, personal
jurisdiction, or both. A typical statement was:
Additionally, a clause establishing ex ante the forum for dispute resolution has the salutary
effect of dispelling any confusion about where suits arising from the contract must be
brought and defended, sparing litigants the time and expense of pretrial motions to deter-
mine the correct forum, and conserving judicial resources that otherwise would be devoted
to deciding those motions. See Stewart Organization, 487 U.S., at 33, 108 S.Ct., at 2249
(concurring opinion).
Shute, Il1 S.Ct at 1527.
It is most interesting that the Court cited to the concurring opinion of Stewart, which took a
very different approach to forum selection clauses and had been cited to by the Eleventh Circuit in
its issuing of a writ of mandamus in Stewart upon remand that essentially overruled the Supreme
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peals is reversed."' 36 7 As the Ninth Circuit had reversed the district court's
dismissal, apparently the Supreme Court's disposition results in the reinstate-
ment of that dismissal. 368 What the Court did not explain was why it did not
transfer, or at least discuss the transfer of the action to Florida.369 Perhaps the
Court was fearful that mention of transfer would invoke the ghost of Stewart
past and therefore would require a different result if the inability of Mrs. Shute
to pursue her action in Florida and the interests of justice were considered in
regard to enforcement.
Resolving the nature of the concept of the forum selection clause is more
than just an exercise in academic labeling. Shute, as did The Bremen, involved a
forum selection clause in a derogation context. 370 The Shute Court only had to
consider whether a clause should be enforced, so as to require refiling elsewhere.
Nevertheless, the holding of The Bremen has been extended by some courts to
stand for the proposition that a forum selection clause confers personal jurisdic-
tion on the contractual forum. 371 Considering the forum selection clause in
Shute in a prorogation context, does a forum designation on the back of a ticket
for a commercial carrier create personal jurisdiction? More specifically, on the
basis of the ticket alone, would Florida have personal jurisdiction over the
Shutes to entertain a suit brought against them by Carnival Cruise Lines? Be-
cause American forum selection clause jurisprudence has not recognized a dif-
ference between the derogative and prorogative nature of forum selection
clauses, the answers would apparently be yes. 372 One might argue that any
other result would render a forum selection clause meaningless, otherwise there
would be no reason to designate a forum contractually in which a party was not
subject to personal jurisdiction.37 3 In fact, lower courts have used this reasoning
to find that a forum selection clause confers personal jurisdiction.374 Instead of
allowing parties to reorder principles of procedure and to stand traditional juris-
Court's decision. See supra notes 300-04 and accompanying text for further discussion about the
Eleventh Circuit's issuance of a writ of mandamus in Stewart.
367. Shute, l1l S. Ct at 1529.
For discussion of the confusion created by the Court's disposition, see generally Borchers, supra
note 6, at 75.
368. See Borchers, supra note 6, at 75 (by not remanding case, court implied that unconditional
dismissal of district court could be reinstated).
369. See Borchers, supra note 6, at 75 (transfer would most certaintly bar refiling this action in
Florida because statute of limitations had run five years after filing of original action).
370. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the derogation context of
forum selection clauses.
371. See supra note 174 for cases in which a forum selection clause has been held to confer
personal jurisdiction.
372. See Mullenix, Carnival Cruise Lines, supra note 6, at 367-68 (criticizing Shute for creating
personal jurisdiction by contract and going against traditional concepts of personal jurisdiction
based upon "affiliating circumstances"); Borchers, supra note 6, at 77-78 (discussing that Shute
"clearly contemplated" creation of personal jurisdiction by contract, but arguing that it is positive
development).
373. See, e.g., Solimine, supra note 2, at 65 ("It does no good to preselect the forum if one party
can still contest personal jurisdiction or other venue requirements.").
374. See supra notes 160, 174 for a discussion of courts and commentators that have viewed
forum selection clauses as conferring personal jurisdiction.
[Vol. 66
1993] FORUM SELECTION CLA USE
dictional notions on their heads, the better result would simply be to consider
such clauses unenforceable due to the absence of jurisdictional prerequisites 37 5
because Shute and The Bremen should not be read to constitute such a dramatic
shift in the nature of personal jurisdiction without even a single word of
discussion.376
B. The Need for Fairness: Unpredictability May Not Be That Bad
Though the Ninth Circuit had relied on the principles of The Bremen to
deny enforcement of the forum selection clause because of the adhesive nature of
the contract and the inability of plaintiff to pursue her action in Florida,377 the
Supreme Court "refined" the reasonableness test from The Bremen, distin-
guished the cases factually, and held the clause to be enforceable. 378 The Court
put forth three reasons for its holding. First, because Carnival Cruise Lines'
ships carry passengers from many locales, a cruise line has a "special interest" in
limiting the fora in which it would be subject to suit.379 Second, such clauses
eliminate confusion as to where suit can be brought, thus conserving litigant and
judicial resources. 38 0 Third, passengers benefit by receiving reduced fares be-
cause the forum selection clause results in savings to the cruise line. 3 8 1 Com-
mentators have uniformly criticized this reasoning for, among other things,
opening the door to the use of forum selection clauses in consumer contracts. 38 2
375. When forum selection clauses are considered to be matters of venue, a suit filed in other
than the contractual forum can be transferred only to a district court where it could have been
brought originally. If personal jurisdiction is not present in the contractual forum, the case cannot
be transferred. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 9, § 2.17 at 92. Similarly, if suit is filed in the con-
tractual forum, an independent basis of personal jurisdiction must be present.
376. See Solimine, supra note 2, at 65 (discussing that "the clauses in The Bremen, Stewart, and
Carnival did not explicitly waive the minimum contacts barrier" but arguing that cases should be
read as if such barrier were waived).
377. See supra notes 347-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's
reliance on The Bremen in deciding Shute.
378. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, I llS. Ct. 1522, 1527 (1991). For discussion of the Shute
application of The Bremen reasonableness test, see, e.g., Borchers, supra note 6, at 71-78 (The
Bremen's reasonableness factors used in Shute to determine that forum selection clause was reason-
able); Mullenix, Carnival Cruise Lines, supra note 6, at 340-58 (Shute Court looked to The Bremen
for its guiding principles); Gantner, supra, note 38, at 524-39 (same); Goldman, supra note 98, at
708-10 (same).
379. Shute, 111 S. Ct at 1527.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. See, eg., Mullenix, Carnival Cruise Lines, supra note 6, at 342 (referring to Shute as
"patently bad decision" and stating that "each rationale the Court offered in support of its holding
cannot withstand legal analysis or intuitive common sense"); Borchers, supra note 6, at 74 (discuss-
ing with a bit more understatement that "[t]here are many troubling aspects" to Shute); Gantner,
supra, note 38, at 539 ("[I]t is difficult to support the Court's determination to allow the cruise line's
interests in convenience and lowered costs to interfere with the Shute's lawful and valid interest in
pursuing their legal claim."); Bruch, supra note 329, at 345 (discussing that Shute "ignored the
fundamental concepts of unconscionability"); Goldman, supra note 98, at 701 (stating that "eco-
nomic analysis cannot support the result or reasoning in Shute").
The commentators have sufficiently pilloried this aspect of Shute. The author will spare the
reader a recitation of what has adequately been previously discussed.
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
Shute demonstrates the danger of removing judicial discretion from the
standard of enforcement. The reasonableness standard for enforcement from
The Bremen, now "refined," allowed for enforcement that was contrary to the
interests of justice because Florida bore almost no connection to the Shute litiga-
tion, and the plaintiff could not pursue her action in Florida for physical and
financial reasons. The Court's reasons for enforcing the clause do not bear scru-
tiny. It is difficult to accept that whatever, if any, reduction in the price of her
ticket Mrs. Shute received as a result of the forum selection clause was a fair
trade for being prevented from pursuing compensation for her injuries. Addi-
tionally, while it was certainly a benefit to Carnival Cruise Lines to have the
clause enforced, a lopsided unilateral benefit does not justify enforcement if such
is blatantly unfair.
Nevertheless, there remains the Stewart concept that forum selection
clauses simply are matters of venue subject to judicial discretion for enforce-
ment. 3 3 Application of the Stewart standard of enforcement would most likely
have resulted in the clause not being enforced. Thus, the result in Shute demon-
strates why the narrow and often criticized view of the forum selection clause
from Stewart is the more reasoned approach.
VII. DEFINING AND NARROWING THE CONCEPT
The Court has struggled to construct a standard for enforcement of forum
selection clauses and has arrived at two very different approaches because each
approach encompasses very different concepts of what a forum selection clause
is, and of the ability of parties privately to reorder procedure. The existing con-
fusion has led to calls for legislative reform. 3s4 A review of these proposals
indicates that although they seek to resolve the existing confusion, they do so
without addressing the ultimate source of the confusion--defining the concep-
tual scope of forum selection clauses. In order to end the confusion, it is first
necessary to define the conceptual scope of the forum selection clause. Only
then can a workable enforcement standard be developed.
A. Stewart: A Narrow but Preferable Approach
The narrow view of Stewart is the preferable approach. Under Stewart, the
forum selection clause is merely one of several factors to be considered in deter-
mining the appropriate venue. 38 5 The forum selection clause is enforceable only
if the contractual forum is one in which venue would otherwise be proper and is
one to which the action should be transferred after a consideration of the factors
of § 1404(a) of party and witness convenience and the interest of justice.38 6
383. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29-30 (1988) (forum selection clauses,
as class of venue, are subject to judicial discretion in enforcement).
384. See supra note 31.
385. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29.
386. Id. In situations where the contractual forum is a foreign court, and therefore, is not a
forum to which the action can be transferred, enforcement should be sought under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, the precursor to the Stewart conceptual view and approach to enforcement.
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Three main reasons support the validity of the Stewart approach.
First, any other formulation allows the forum selection clause to effect a
disruptive reordering of procedural principles that can result in a denial of the
fundamental fairness that these principles were designed to protect. Having
only considered the question of enforcement of a forum selection clause in a
derogation context, where the sole necessary determination is whether the court
should decline jurisdiction, the Supreme Court perhaps has not had full oppor-
tunity to appreciate the reordering of procedural prinicples that the forum selec-
tion clause can effect in its prorogation context. Enforcement in the prorogation
context involves both the conferring of personal jurisdiction and venue on the
contractual forum as well as affecting the choice of the applicable law. There-
fore, it is apparent from the prorogation context that defining the concept as
anything more than a factor in a determination of whether the action should be
transferred to a different venue reorders several basic concepts of civil proce-
dure. To appreciate this unique aspect of the forum selection clause, two false
analogies must be disregarded.
The first false analogy is that a prorogation forum selection clause is analo-
gous either to a waiver of an objection to lack of personal jurisdiction or a waiver
of an objection to improper venue by a party who enters an appearance in an
action and proceeds to defend it on the substantive issues in the case. An accept-
ance of the distinction between procedural waiver and procedural consent is nec-
essary to appreciate that the analogy is improper. 387 The true analogy is
between the forum selection clause and procedural consent. In the situation of
procedural waiver, there is no reordering of procedural principles. The party
making the waiver is submitting herself to a court in which an action has been
filed, and the party is not seeking to reorder procedural concepts that bypass
fundamental considerations of jurisdiction and venue. In the situation of proce-
dural consent, parties are seeking to reorder procedural principles prior to the
filing of an action by contractually determining the jurisdictional power of a
court, as well as supplanting the legislative determination of where litigation
should occur that is reflected in venue. Traditional judicial acceptance of proce-
dural waiver is not authority for the acceptance of the reordering of procedural
principles by procedural consent with a forum selection clause. 38 8
The second false analogy is that devices such as an arbitration clause are
analogous to the forum selection clause. Forum selection agreements constitute
a private reordering of procedural principles within the existing procedural
framework, while an arbitration agreement acts to remove an action from the
As discussed supra in note 233 and accompanying text, analogous factors of party and witness con-
venience and the interest of justice would be involved in the decision to decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion.
Where the contractual forum is a state court to which the action cannot be transferred, the
clause should not be enforced. See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 171 -74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction between
procedural waiver and procedural consent.
388. See supra notes 159-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reordering of proce-
dural rules by procedural consent, including use of the forum selection clause.
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judicial system. An arbitration agreement does not reorder procedural princi-
ples. Instead, it removes an action from the reach of judicial procedural princi-
ples, an effect separate and distinct from that of a forum selection clause.389
Because the analogy is false, judicial acceptance of the arbitration clause should
not be considered authority for judicial acceptance of the forum selection clause.
Additionally, Stewart is preferable because its narrow view of the forum
selection clause eliminates the unresolved issues that have dominated the discus-
sion of the forum selection clause. 39° For example, it resolves choice of law
questions of whether the designation of a contractual forum causes the applica-
tion of the choice of law rules of the contractual forum instead of those of the
forum of filing.3 9 1 Because procedural principles are not reordered, choice of
law rules are applied without alteration.
Questions concerning the proper procedural mechanism to be employed in
seeking enforcement and the attendant questions of whether the choice of rem-
edy determines the standard of enforcement to be applied are also resolved by
Stewart.392 Because under the Stewart approach the forum selection clause is
merely a factor in determining venue and does not make the contractual forum
the only forum with proper venue, the only proper procedural mechanism for
enforcement is a motion to transfer venue. Additionally, conceptualizing the
forum selection clause as a venue factor eliminates the question of whether the
contractual designation of a state court as the exclusive forum requires dismissal
of the action if filed in federal court or requires remand after removal to federal
court.39 3 The justifications for acceptance of a forum selection clause do not
support its use for such a purpose, particularly where the state and federal court-
houses are across the street from each other. When used to designate a state
court as the exclusive forum, the forum selection clause is not used for the pur-
pose of determining the location for potential litigation, rather it becomes a fo-
rum shopping device that harkens back to the ouster doctrine's original
repudiation of the forum selection clause.
Of course, the issues of choice of law, proper mechanism of enforcement,
remand/removal, etc. are not resolved; they actually are eliminated by defining
389. But see William W. Wiggins, Jr., Comment, Application of the Forum Clause to Commer-
cial Contracts, 8 Hous. L. REv. 739, 744 (1971) (rejecting as invalid drawing of distinction between
arbitration agreement and forum selection clause on basis that arbitration agreements remove action
from judicial framework). See also supra note 68 for additional discussion of why the arbitration
clause and forum selection clause are not analogous.
390. See supra notes 30, 317-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of forum selection
issues that remain unresolved.
391. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the choice of law issues.
392. See supra notes 30, 317-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of unresolved forum
selection issues.
393. For discussion of the enforcement of a forum selection clause designating a state or federal
forum when concurrent subject matter jurisdiction is present, see Borchers, supra note 6, at 88-89
(subject to The Bremen's standards parties may contract to subject matter jurisdiction only when
state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction); Mullenix, Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure,
supra note 6, at 334-46 (forum must have jurisdiction in first place to remand, thus "lack ofjurisdic-
tion" argument is illogical).
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the concept narrowly so as to remove them from applicability. But the existence
of these issues when a broader concept is attributed to the forum selection
clause, as in The Bremen and Shute, demonstrates what happens when the pro-
cedural framework is allowed to be privately reordered in part. Related proce-
dural concepts are thrown into turmoil.
Finally, the Stewart approach is the most preferable because it permits the
exercise of judicial discretion in deciding questions of enforcement, thereby pro-
tecting the interests of justice. The need for judicial discretion is demonstrated
by results such as those reached in Shute. By adopting the original forum non
conveniens formulation, resurrected in Stewart, basic considerations of fairness
can be protected while at the same time addressing commercial interests that
seek to reduce litigation expenses by determining where litigation relative to a
contract should take place. Though the Stewart approach is very narrow, its
limited scope does not render forum selection clauses superfluous. In light of
both expansive present day notions of personal jurisdiction and the recent
amendment to the general venue provision specifying that a corporation shall be
deemed to reside for venue purposes in any district in which it is subject to
personal jurisdiction,394 corporations are subject to suit in a potential multitude
of forums. The Stewart view of forum selection clauses would allow a corpora-
tion to limit the breadth of possible locations where it would otherwise have to
defend itself, while a consideration of the interest of justice would remain the
final arbiter in deciding enforcement.
B. The Calls for Legislation: First Define the Concept
The legislative proposals of commentators that address the unresolved is-
sues are worthy efforts to restrict the use of the forum selection clause to situa-
tions that could be considered fair.395 But the proposals merely impose artificial
restrictions that do not add clarity to what the concept is. 39 6 As much of the
confusion surrounding the forum selection clause is attributable to the failure of
the courts to define the underlying concept before embarking on defining a stan-
dard for enforcement, legislative proposals would be most useful if they ad-
dressed the ultimate source of the confusion-what is the conceptual scope of
the forum selection clause? Of course, the task is made easier by defining the
concept in the narrow fashion of Stewart. Preferably, the Court would reverse
The Bremen and Shute and adhere to the conceptual view of the forum selection
clause that formed the basis for its holding in Stewart. Because the Court was
unwilling, or perhaps unable, to reconcile the differing views of Stewart and
Shute, issued within three years of each other, such reversal seems unlikely.
394. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).
395. See supra note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of commentators' legislative
proposals.
396. See Borchers, supra note 6, at 110 (proposal does not define forum selection clause, just
excepts from enforcement forum selection clauses in contracts having aggregate value of less than
$50,000, in pre-dispute employment contracts, in pre-dispute contracts for goods and services if
outside scope of trade or business of one of parties, or where substantially unjust).
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Therefore, corrective legislation may be the only means by which the concept
can be clarified.
Codification of the forum selection concept of Stewart can be accomplished
with two simple additions to Title 28. The first would clarify that a forum selec-
tion clause is only a matter of venue and does not supplant venue that otherwise
would be proper under the applicable venue statute.397 Additionally, the provi-
sion would dictate that a forum selection clause can only specify as venue for
potential litigation that which would be proper under the statute. This amend-
ment would resolve any question as to the proper procedural mechanism for
enforcement and choice of law questions. It would also effectively eliminate the
false view that a contractual provision in and of itself is sufficient to confer per-
sonal jurisdiction.
Though it follows that the only procedural mechanism for enforcement is
§ 1404(a), an amendment to the transfer statute would not only clarify that
point, but would also resolve the effect of a forum selection clause as to the
attendant burden in seeking enforcement through transfer. 398 A clause is best
considered as creating a rebuttable presumption of convenience to the parties
that can be overcome by circumstances intervening between enactment and en-
forcement of the clause. The burden would remain upon the moving party to
establish the other § 1404(a) factors. The questions of contract formation from
the standard of The Bremen should not be abandoned. 399 Thus, the amendment
recognizes that only forum selection clauses contained in an otherwise enforce-
able contract should be given consideration.
CONCLUSION
The attempts of the Court to fashion a standard for enforcement of the
397. The legislative proposal suggested herein would amend 28 U.S.C. § 1391 by adding the
following paragraph:
(f) Parties to a civil action may designate by contract the district or division in which any
action between them as to the contract will be brought, provided that such designation
specifies a venue as provided for in subsections (a)-(f). An action brought in a district
court that is a forum other than that specified in a contractual forum selection clause, but
where venue lies pursuant to any provision of subsections (a)-(f), will not be considered to
have been brought in an improper venue, and enforcement of the contractual designation,
if sought, shall be pursuant to section 1404(a). If the contractual forum is a foreign court
to where a transfer cannot be effectuated, enforcement of the contractual designation, if
sought, shall be pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. If the contractual
designation is a state court, the forum selection clause shall be unenforceable.
398. The legislative proposal suggested herein would amend 28 U.S.C. § 1404 by adding the
following paragraph:
(e) upon motion of a party, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where the parties have designated by an enforceable contract that any
action pursuant to the contract shall be brought and where the considerations of subsection
(a) warranting transfer are present, provided that such contractual designation as to where
any action shall be brought constitutes a rebuttable presumption as to the convenience of
the parties in regard to the contractually designated district or division.
399. The "refinement" of the reasonableness standard in Shute should be abandoned. Forum
selection clauses contained in contracts of adhesion should not be enforced.
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forum selection clause have resulted in conflicting approaches fraught with con-
fusion in application because the Court has failed first to define the concept for
which it was fashioning the enforcement standard. Scrutinizing the develop-
ment of the conflicting standard for enforcement reflected in The Bremen and
Shute as compared to that of Stewart reveals that the conflict is due to a funda-
mental difference in their respective underlying conceptual views of the forum
selection clause. The conceptual difference lies in the extent to which procedural
principles may be privatized by contractual agreement.
Due largely to the derogation context in which the Court has considered
the forum selection clause, the discussion of the concept has focused almost en-
tirely on repudiating the "ouster doctrine" as being inapposite to the question
presented. It was recognized that enforcement of a forum selection clause did
not constitute a private alteration of the fundamental jurisdictional power of a
court thereby requiring dismissal of an action. Instead, enforcement was an ex-
ercise of discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction that was unaltered by pri-
vate agreement. Once that was accomplished, the development of a sound
doctrine also required consideration of the prorogation context of the forum
selection clause, for it is there that the question of the extent to which principles
of procedure should be privately reordered is best framed. In the prorogation
context, the forum selection clause does alter the fundamental jurisdictional
power of a court because it can provide the sole basis for jurisdiction and venue
that, but for the clause, would not be present.
The analysis of the forum selection clause in the prorogation context has
not taken place. The rush to utilize the forum selection clause as an element of
expediency in dispute resolution bypassed the discussion. Additionally, false
analogies have been drawn between the forum selection clause and the waiver of
objections to lack of personal jurisdiction and venue, as well as to the arbitration
clause, and these false analogies have been used to justify the use of the forum
selection clause in the prorogation context. The analogies are false because the
forum selection clause involves a unique private reordering of procedure within
the existing procedural framework. Procedural principles, however, are interde-
pendent. Therefore, this reordering results in unresolved issues in the interde-
pendent procedural areas discussed by commentators. The reordering also
results in the patent unfairness in a decision like Shute.
As the reasoning of Learned Hand was relied upon to begin the shift toward
forum selection clause acceptance, it is perhaps best that Hand's reasoning also
guides the extent of the concept of the forum selection clause as well as the
ability of parties privately to reorder procedural principles. Hand's early con-
ceptual view of the forum selection clause, thereafter manifested in the forum
non conveniens formulation of reasonableness and presently reflected in Stewart,
is the most sound of the two conceptual views of the forum selection clause that
have existed from the inception of its judicial acceptance. That view does not
allow parties privately to reorder the procedural system. Instead, it allows par-
ties to provide an element of predictability to potential litigation by allowing
them contractually to indicate a preference for where venue should lie in the
event there is litigaiton relative to the contract. Nevertheless, that contractual
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preference must be one that is within the existing procedural system, thereby
preserving a basic concern for the interests of justice, interests that are best pro-
tected by judicial discretion.
